Articles Posted in District Courts

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Plaintiff NOV filed a patent infringement action asserting that defendant Omron had infringed NOV’s patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,474,142 or the ‘142 Patent). Specifically, NOV alleged Omron’s oil rig automation control system has an automatic driller function that infringes one or more claims of the ‘142 Patent.

After years of litigation, Omron filed dispositive motions asserting lack of standing, no infringement and invalidity of the ‘142 Patent. The district court first found that NOV had no standing to assert the patent as the owner of the patent had only “agreed to assign” the patent. “In sum, the prevailing Federal Circuit case law makes clear the “agrees to assign” language in the ACA was not a present assignment. The ACA further indicates Varco, L.P. was to issue a separate assignment document, but there is no such piece of paper. Because NOV is unable to show the ACA was a present assignment of assets, the Court finds, on this ground alone, NOV has failed to satisfy its burden of proving ownership and, consequently, standing to sue.”
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In MLC Intellectual Property, LLC v. Micron Technology, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-3657 (N.D. Cal.), MLC filed its lawsuit on August 12, 2014, accusing Micron of infringing U.S. Patent No. 5,764,571 (“the ‘571 patent”). On October 15, 2014, Micron answered the complaint and asserted counterclaims for declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the ‘571 patent. At the initial case management conference on November 21, 2014, the Court set a further case management conference for March 20, 2015, the tutorial hearing for June 10, 2015, and the claim construction hearing for June 17, 2015.

On December 24, 2014, Micron filed a petition for inter partes review (“IPR”) at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), challenging the patentability of at least each asserted claim of the ‘571 patent. The PTO accorded the IPR petition a filing date of December 24, 2014, and thus the PTO must issue a decision on whether to institute the IPR no later than June 24, 2015. On December 29, 2014, Micron filed its motion to stay pending the IPR. In its motion, Micron sought a stay through a final written decision of the IPR including any appeals to the Federal Circuit. MCL partially opposed only the portion of the stay beyond the final written decision of the PTO rather than after all appeals have been exhausted. MCL also argued that the case should not be stayed at this time until after the claim construction was completed.
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In this patent infringement action, the plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the defendants’ claim construction experts. The plaintiff’s motion was based on the argument that the defendants’ disclosures did not comply with local rules in that they did not identify the actual opinions of the experts.

The district court agreed with plaintiff’s position. “After consideration of the briefing and of Defendants’ expert disclosures, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants’ disclosures do not comply with Local Rule 4.2.d.2. insofar as Defendants simply identify the general subjects on which their experts may testify, but do not identify the actual opinions Defendants expect the experts to offer.”
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Four weeks prior to trial, defendant Cerner Corporation (“Cerner”) filed a motion to join a summary judgment motion filed by a defendant in a related case involving the same patents. In the summary judgment motion in the related case involving Allscripts, Allscripts argued that the plaintiff’s (RLIS) patents claim ineligible subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act.

The motion in the related case was filed in May 2014 and gained strength after the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int.’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Yet, Cerner did nothing. As explained by the district court, “[i]n fact, the Court held a lengthy motions hearing on October 1, 2014. Many of the numerous motions argued that day were joined by both Cerner and Allscripts. Rather than asking to join Allscripts’ section 101 motion, Cerner made a tactical decision to sit on the sideline while Allscripts argued the Alice issue to the Court.”
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Princeton Digital Image Corp. (“Princeton Digital”) filed a patent infringement action against Hewlett-Packard and Hewlett Packard filed a summary judgment motion. With the summary judgment motion pending, Princeton Digital filed a letter with the district court requesting that the district court order a mediation between the parties pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.9.

The district court also received a letter from Hewlett-Packard opposing Princeton Digital’s mediation request, arguing that their outstanding motion for summary judgment should be determined first.
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Defendant Adobe Systems (“Adobe”) filed a Daubert motion seeking to limit the testimony of plaintiff EveryScapes’ expert, Dr. Maja Bystrom (“Dr. Bystrom”), for three reasons.

First, Adobe sought to exclude the testimony that the Mok3 Perspective Clone Brush practiced claims of EveryScape’s patent, partly because Dr. Bystrom allegedly relied on the wrong source code in reaching her opinions about Mok3. As explained by the district court, “[t]he admission of expert testimony, as the parties are well aware, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Newell Puerto Rico, Ltd. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1994). “[C]ourts must be cautious – except when defects are obvious on the face of a proffer – not to exclude debatable scientific evidence without affording the proponent… adequate opportunity to defend its admissibility.” Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 1997).”
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Defendant Stealth Cam, LLC (“Stealth Cam”) requested that the district court reconsider its Claim Construction Order holding that the term “extending parallel” was not indefinite.

The district court first noted that under the local rules a party must show “compelling circumstances” to obtain permission to file a motion to reconsider, D. Minn. L.R. 7.1(j), and that a motion to reconsider should not be employed to relitigate old issues, but rather to “afford an opportunity for relief in extraordinary circumstances.” Dale & Selby Superette & Deli v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 838 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (D. Minn. 1993).
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In the matter pending in the Western District of Texas, Katrinecz, et al. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, Motorola moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In its complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Motorola infringed U.S. Patent No. 7,284,872 entitled “Low power, low cost illuminated keyboards and keypads.” The ‘872 patent lists Plaintiffs Katrinecz and Byrd as the inventors. In April 1997, the plaintiffs conceived of a keyboard invention and during the summer of 1997 they developed prototypes. In October 1997, they engaged attorneys and filed their first patent application for the invention on August 26, 1998.

During this time, on August 11, 1998, Katrinecz and his spouse executed a Marital Settlement Agreement dissolving their nine-year marriage. The Florida State court rendered a Final Judgment Dissolving Marriage on September 17, 1998. Motorola contended that the invention of the ‘872 patent was developed during the marriage and thus should be considered personal property subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution of the marriage. Motorola further asserted that “when a marital settlement agreement fails to address personal property, that property is co-owned by both spouses by operation of law upon entry of final judgment dissolving the marriage.” Consequently, because the Agreement did not expressly address the disposition of the rights to the invention, Motorola argued that the rights became co-owned by the inventor and his ex-spouse upon entry of the final judgment on September 17, 1998. Because the ex-spouse co-owned the patent when it issued and because she was not a party to the action, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the case.
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In the matter pending in the Northern District of California, Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., Apple moved to stay the litigation pending inter partes review of the patent-in-suit. On October 9, 2013, plaintiff Aylus Networks filed suit against Apple for infringement of U.S. Patent No. RE44,414. On September 29, 2014, Apple filed two petitions for inter partes review of the ‘414 patent. On September 30, 2014, Apple filed the instant stay motion.

The Court began by reciting the applicable law, particularly in cases such as this one where the motion to stay was sought before the PTAB instituted any proceedings against the patent-in-suit:

Courts have inherent power to manage their dockets and stay proceedings, including the authority to order a stay pending conclusion of a PTO reexamination.” Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). However, a “court is under no obligation to delay its own proceedings” where parallel litigation is pending before the PTAB. See Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Cardiocom, LLC, C-14-1575 EMC, 2014 WL 3107447 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 3, 2014). This is especially true when the Patent Office has yet to decide whether to institute IPR proceedings. See, e.g., VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that the case for a stay is “stronger after post-grant review has been instituted”); Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc., 13-CV-665, 2014 WL 3736514 at *1-2 (E.D. Tx. Jul. 29, 2014) (Bryson, J.) (noting that the “majority of courts . . . have denied stay requests when the PTAB has not yet acted on the petition for review”).

In determining whether to stay this litigation, the Court considers three factors: “(1) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party.” Robert Bosch, 2014 WL 3107447 at *3 (citation omitted).

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In this patent infringement action, the district court issued a sua sponte order requiring plaintiff to show why its inducing infringement claims should not be dismissed as a matter of law. After addressing the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Limelight, the district court noted that no single party performed all of the steps of the method in the patent-in-suit.

As noted by the district court, “[e]ach of the method claims presented by the ‘835 and ‘740 patents specifies that some method steps are to be performed by the ‘assisted user,’ while other steps are to be performed ‘at the relay.’ Conceding that no single party actually performs every step of the claimed methods, plaintiffs seek to establish that defendants’ customers (the ‘assisted users’) direct and control defendants in performing those steps to be performed ‘at the relay’ such that the performance of all of the steps of the method can be attributed to the assisted users.”
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