Defendant Ericsson filed an unopposed motion for leave to file its motion to strike certain paragraphs of a supplemental expert report for the plaintiff under seal. Although the request was unopposed, the district court evaluated whether it was appropriate to seal the motion and accompanying exhibits. In the motion, Ericsson argued that the motion to strike refers to, quotes from, and attaches exhibits which are designated, contain, and constitute protected material under the Protective Order.
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Articles Posted in District Courts
Patent Misuse and Patent Exhaustion Asserted as Stand Alone Claims Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim
Continental Automotive GmbH and Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. (collectively “Continental”) filed a multi-claim lawsuit against iBiquity Digital Corporation (“iBiquity”), which asserted causes of action for patent exhaustion (Count I), patent misuse (Count II), declaratory judgment of patent rights (Count III), as well as several state law claims. iBiquity moved to dismiss Counts I, II, and III, arguing that patent exhaustion (Count I) and patent misuse (Count II) do not arise under federal patent law because they are not proper independent claims but, rather, are defenses to an anticipated patent infringement suit. iBiquity also contended that Continental’s claim seeking a declaratory judgment of patent rights (Count III) does not arise under federal patent law because it is merely a state law breach of contract claim in disguise, seeking to interpret a license agreement.
The district court began its analysis with the patent exhaustion and patent misuse claims. “iBiquity argues that the claims are merely defenses and not affirmative causes of action and, as such, they do not ‘arise under’ federal patent law. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6-8. Continental responds that this argument is irrelevant ‘[b]ecause subject matter jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action is based on the claims that could be brought by the declaratory judgment defendant, rather than the declaratory judgment plaintiff.’ Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Dismiss 5. Moreover, Continental asserts that patent misuse may be asserted as an affirmative claim. Id.”
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District Court Denies Motion to Stay Pending Ex Parte Reexamination Where Defendant Was Competitor of Plaintiff and Chose Ex Parte Reexamination over Inter Partes Reexamination
Plaintiff Ecolab Inc. (“Ecolab”) filed a patent infringement action alleging that Gurtler infringed Ecolab’s patent for “SANITIZING LAUNDRY SOUR,” United States Patent No. 6,262,013 (the “‘013 Patent”). Gurtler subsequently filed a Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of the ‘013 Patent. Gurtler then filed a motion to stay and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) granted Gurtler’s Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of all claims of the ‘013 Patent.
In support of its motion to stay and lack of prejudice to Gurtler, Gurtler argued that Ecolab tactically delayed serving its complaint for four months, which demonstrates that “time is not of the essence” to Ecolab. Additionally, Gurtler argued that because the case was in the early stages of discovery, there was no prejudice to Ecolab. Ecolab argued it will be unduly prejudiced because it is one of Gurtler’s direct competitors, its ability to litigate its claims will suffer, and because Gurtler delayed in seeking reexamination.
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Three Strikes and You are Out: District Court Grants Summary Judgment on Lack of Standing, No Infringement and Invalidates the Patent
Plaintiff NOV filed a patent infringement action asserting that defendant Omron had infringed NOV’s patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,474,142 or the ‘142 Patent). Specifically, NOV alleged Omron’s oil rig automation control system has an automatic driller function that infringes one or more claims of the ‘142 Patent.
After years of litigation, Omron filed dispositive motions asserting lack of standing, no infringement and invalidity of the ‘142 Patent. The district court first found that NOV had no standing to assert the patent as the owner of the patent had only “agreed to assign” the patent. “In sum, the prevailing Federal Circuit case law makes clear the “agrees to assign” language in the ACA was not a present assignment. The ACA further indicates Varco, L.P. was to issue a separate assignment document, but there is no such piece of paper. Because NOV is unable to show the ACA was a present assignment of assets, the Court finds, on this ground alone, NOV has failed to satisfy its burden of proving ownership and, consequently, standing to sue.”
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District Court Grants Stay Before The PTO Institutes An IPR
In MLC Intellectual Property, LLC v. Micron Technology, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-3657 (N.D. Cal.), MLC filed its lawsuit on August 12, 2014, accusing Micron of infringing U.S. Patent No. 5,764,571 (“the ‘571 patent”). On October 15, 2014, Micron answered the complaint and asserted counterclaims for declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the ‘571 patent. At the initial case management conference on November 21, 2014, the Court set a further case management conference for March 20, 2015, the tutorial hearing for June 10, 2015, and the claim construction hearing for June 17, 2015.
On December 24, 2014, Micron filed a petition for inter partes review (“IPR”) at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), challenging the patentability of at least each asserted claim of the ‘571 patent. The PTO accorded the IPR petition a filing date of December 24, 2014, and thus the PTO must issue a decision on whether to institute the IPR no later than June 24, 2015. On December 29, 2014, Micron filed its motion to stay pending the IPR. In its motion, Micron sought a stay through a final written decision of the IPR including any appeals to the Federal Circuit. MCL partially opposed only the portion of the stay beyond the final written decision of the PTO rather than after all appeals have been exhausted. MCL also argued that the case should not be stayed at this time until after the claim construction was completed.
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District Court Denies Motion to Exclude Defendants’ Experts from Claim Construction But Orders the Defendants to Supplement Their Disclosures or Face Exclusion
In this patent infringement action, the plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the defendants’ claim construction experts. The plaintiff’s motion was based on the argument that the defendants’ disclosures did not comply with local rules in that they did not identify the actual opinions of the experts.
The district court agreed with plaintiff’s position. “After consideration of the briefing and of Defendants’ expert disclosures, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants’ disclosures do not comply with Local Rule 4.2.d.2. insofar as Defendants simply identify the general subjects on which their experts may testify, but do not identify the actual opinions Defendants expect the experts to offer.”
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Request to Join Summary Judgment Motion Based on Alice Four Weeks Before Trial Denied as Untimely
Four weeks prior to trial, defendant Cerner Corporation (“Cerner”) filed a motion to join a summary judgment motion filed by a defendant in a related case involving the same patents. In the summary judgment motion in the related case involving Allscripts, Allscripts argued that the plaintiff’s (RLIS) patents claim ineligible subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act.
The motion in the related case was filed in May 2014 and gained strength after the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int.’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Yet, Cerner did nothing. As explained by the district court, “[i]n fact, the Court held a lengthy motions hearing on October 1, 2014. Many of the numerous motions argued that day were joined by both Cerner and Allscripts. Rather than asking to join Allscripts’ section 101 motion, Cerner made a tactical decision to sit on the sideline while Allscripts argued the Alice issue to the Court.”
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With Motion for Summary Judgment Pending Against It, Plaintiff Requests District Court to Order Parties to Mediation and District Court Grants Summary Judgment Motion Instead
Princeton Digital Image Corp. (“Princeton Digital”) filed a patent infringement action against Hewlett-Packard and Hewlett Packard filed a summary judgment motion. With the summary judgment motion pending, Princeton Digital filed a letter with the district court requesting that the district court order a mediation between the parties pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.9.
The district court also received a letter from Hewlett-Packard opposing Princeton Digital’s mediation request, arguing that their outstanding motion for summary judgment should be determined first.
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Daubert Motion Denied Where Defendant Had “Salubrious Fodder” for Cross-Examination If Plaintiff’s Expert Used Wrong Source Code
Defendant Adobe Systems (“Adobe”) filed a Daubert motion seeking to limit the testimony of plaintiff EveryScapes’ expert, Dr. Maja Bystrom (“Dr. Bystrom”), for three reasons.
First, Adobe sought to exclude the testimony that the Mok3 Perspective Clone Brush practiced claims of EveryScape’s patent, partly because Dr. Bystrom allegedly relied on the wrong source code in reaching her opinions about Mok3. As explained by the district court, “[t]he admission of expert testimony, as the parties are well aware, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Newell Puerto Rico, Ltd. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1994). “[C]ourts must be cautious – except when defects are obvious on the face of a proffer – not to exclude debatable scientific evidence without affording the proponent… adequate opportunity to defend its admissibility.” Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 1997).”
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Motion to Reconsider Claim Construction Order on Indefiniteness after Nautilus Denied Where District Court Found Term Definite
Defendant Stealth Cam, LLC (“Stealth Cam”) requested that the district court reconsider its Claim Construction Order holding that the term “extending parallel” was not indefinite.
The district court first noted that under the local rules a party must show “compelling circumstances” to obtain permission to file a motion to reconsider, D. Minn. L.R. 7.1(j), and that a motion to reconsider should not be employed to relitigate old issues, but rather to “afford an opportunity for relief in extraordinary circumstances.” Dale & Selby Superette & Deli v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 838 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (D. Minn. 1993).
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