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After that analysis, the district court determined that it would join the majority of “district courts in the Ninth Circuit in finding that allegations of knowledge alone are not sufficient to state a claim for willful infringement. See XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 17-cv-03848-RS, 2017 WL 4551519, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) (“Although [plaintiff] has alleged knowledge and continued infringement, it needs to do more to show that [defendant] has engaged in ‘egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement’ that could possibly warrant enhanced damages.” (quoting Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935)); Cont’l Circuits, 2017 WL 2651709, at *8 (“The Court continues to conclude that willfulness must be pled, and that allegations of knowledge alone are insufficient.”); Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 17-cv-00072-BLF, 2017 WL 2462423, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2017) (“[E]ven if [plaintiff] had adequately alleged that [defendant] had pre-suit knowledge of the Asserted Patents, dismissal would also be warranted because the FAC does not contain sufficient factual allegations to make it plausible that [defendant] engaged in ‘egregious’ conduct that would warrant enhanced damages under Halo.”).

Following that reasoning, the district court reviewed DSS’ allegations and found that they were insufficient to state a claim for willful infringement. “The Court finds that DSS’s allegations are not sufficient to state a claim for willful infringement of the patents-in-suit. Although, DSS has alleged knowledge and continued infringement, it has failed to allege facts suggesting that Lite-On’s conduct amounts to an “egregious case[] of misconduct beyond typical infringement.” Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935. “Disagreement about the existence of continued infringement does not necessarily indicate willful or deliberate misconduct.” XpertUniverse, 2017 WL 4551519, at *6. Thus, without more, the facts as alleged do not support a plausible inference that Lite-On’s conduct warrants enhanced damages under Halo and § 284.”

As a result, the district court granted Lite-On’s motion to dismiss the claims of willful infringement.

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The plaintiff, Realtime Adaptive Streaming LLC’s (“Realtime”) filed an ex parte application to file its Certification and Notice of Interested Parties under seal (the “Application”) at the beginning of this patent infringement case.  Realtime asserted that it should be permitted to file the Certification under seal in order to keep confidential the identity of the litigation financing company engaged in the case.

Realtime argued that the agreement between Realtime and the litigation funder “explicitly provides that the identity of the parties to the agreement is itself to be treated as confidential information” and “that all terms of the agreement are to be treated as confidential information.”

The district court began its analysis by noting that the courts recognize a “general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n. 7 (1978). They also “have expressly recognized that the federal common law right of access extends to pretrial documents filed in civil cases.” San Jose Mercury News, Inc. V. U.S. Dist. Court–Northern Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, “unless a particular court record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir.2003)). For non-dispositive motions, “a ‘particularized showing’ under the ‘good cause’ standard of Rule 26(c) will suffice.” Id. at 1180 (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1138).

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Greatbatch moved in limine to preclude the defendant, AVX, from presenting the testimony of AVX’s expert, Dr. Panlener, by deposition. The district court concluded that permitting the expert to testify would deprive Greatbatch of the opportunity to challenge Dr. Panlener’s “credibility and would be unfairly prejudicial, under the totality of circumstances, including Dr. Panlener’s role as an employee and then consultant to AVX, his numerous instances testifying (including as a corporate representative), and representations made as to the termination of his relationship with AVX (which appears to have been related to conduct that may be probative of issues that are the subject of the forthcoming trial).”

The district court also noted that AVX may have “procured” the absence of Dr. Panlener by terminating its relationship with him after relying on his deposition testimony and depriving Greatbatch of an opportunity to cross-examine him regarding that termination and then attempting to rely on Dr. Panlener’s necessarily incomplete testimony at trial. The district court concluded that regardless of whether AVX may fairly be viewed as having “procured” Dr. Panlener’s absence, “the Court agrees with Greatbatch that it would be unfair to permit AVX to secure Dr. Panlener’s self-serving testimony about, for instance, the purported pin washer changes, and thereafter fire him so that AVX can play his deposition to the jury and avoid the specter of his live testimony.”

The district court also disagreed with the defendant’s argument that it was entitled to present Dr. Panlener’s deposition testimony at trial under Rule 32(a)(4)(B) (“A party may use for any purpose the deposition of a witness . . .”). The district court found that the Rule 32 did not  override the district court’s “discretion to manage the trial in a manner that is fair to both sides and consistent with all other applicable rules.” See generally Garcia-Martinez v. City & Cty. of Denver, 392 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Other cases hold that the mere fact that a party is more than 100 miles from the courthouse does not require the district court to automatically admit a party’s deposition.”) (emphasis added).

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The Patent Litigation Group at Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP is pleased to announce that its Chair, Stan Gibson, will be speaking at PLI’s Electronic Discovery Institute 2017: What Corporate and Outside Counsel Need to Know.

Stan’s panel will focus on the “Preservation of Electronically Stored Information (ESI).”

The program is designed for corporate counsel, outside counsel, and other attorneys or risk management professionals who advise corporations on electronic discovery and document retention issues. This program is designed to provide participants with critical information on the latest developments in the law governing e-discovery.

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After this patent infringement action was filed, the defendant, BigCommerce, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). BigCommerce did not file a motion to transfer or to challenge at that time.  After the district court ordered the plaintiff to file an amended complaint and the plaintiff filed the amended complaint, BigCommerce filed a motion for improper venue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). The BigCommerce motion was filed shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, No. 16-341, 137 S.Ct. 1514 (May 22, 2017).

BigCommerce argued that although it is incorporated in Texas, it is not incorporated in the Eastern District of Texas and lacks any place of business in the Eastern District of Texas. Therefore, BigCommerce argued it should be dismissed from the case because of improper venue.

The district court concluded that BigCommerce had waived the defense because the defense was not raised in the original Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) by . . . omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(A). Under Rule 12(g)(2), “a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.” Certain defenses are exempt from Rule 12(g)(2)’s consolidation requirement, but venue is not one of the exempt defenses. See Rule 12(h)(2)–(3). See Elbit Sys. Land & C41 Ltd. v. Hughes Network Sys., LLC, No. 2:15-cv-37-RWS-RSP, 2017 WL 2651618, at *19 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2017) (citing Albany Ins. Co. v. Almacenadora Somex, S.A., 5 F.3d 907, 909 (5th Cir. 1993)). “Thus, by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and omitting its venue defense, [BigCommerce] waived the defense.” Id. at *20 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2) and 12(h)(1)(A)).

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In this patent infringement action, T-Mobile sought email discovery from seventeen named inventors of the asserted patents and the licensing executives involved in the parties’ FRAND negotiations. T-Mobile asserted that the discovery could reveal the inventors’ contemporaneous understanding of the invention and whether T-Mobile is an unwilling FRAND licensee. T-Mobile also proposed limiting the email discovery by specific search terms.

Huawei raised two arguments in support of its objections to producing the requested documents. First, Huawei contended that T-Mobile had not shown that the e-mail discovery would be necessary or proportional to the needs of the case. Second, T-Huawei argued that T-Mobile delayed in seeking the discovery warranted denying the requested relief.

In analyzing the arguments, the district court was not persuaded by either of Huawei’s arguments. “As other courts have explained in complex case such as this, Huawei’s proposed limitations on e-discovery or the number of email custodians is not typically warranted. See Knauf Insulation, LLC v. Johns

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During this patent infringement action, Apple filed a motion for discovery sanctions based on a failure to produce documents after a remand. The parties apparently had agreed to limited discovery post-remand, but a dispute arose over whether discovery before remand should be supplemented or corrected.

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In this patent infringement action, Plaintiff Wright’s Well Control Services, LLC (WWCS) filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss defendant Christopher Mancini pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) with prejudice, but with a “reservation of all rights and actions against co-defendant Oceaneering International, Inc., and any other parties and solidary obligors.”

Defendant Mancini opposed the reservation of rights against unnamed third parties. Mancini also moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims, and WWCS filed a moved for an extension of time to respond to Mancini’s motion for summary judgment.

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After the defendants Ingenico S.A.’s, Ingenico Corp.’s, and Ingenico Inc.’s (the “Ingenico Defendants”) prevailed at trial, the defendants filed a Motion to Declare this an Exceptional Case and For Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.

The district court began its analysis by noting that “[d]istrict courts may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014). Section 285 imposes ‘one and only one constraint’ on a district court’s discretion to award attorney fees in patent litigation: the case must be ‘exceptional.’ Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1755-56. The Ingenico Defendants must show exceptionality by a preponderance of the evidence. Iris Connex, LLC v. Dell, Inc., 2017 WL 365634, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2017).”
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The plaintiff Alexsam, Inc. (“Alexsam”) filed an ex parte application to compel compliance with a subpoena to produce documents against a third party to the action, MasterCard. Alexsam had first served a Rule 45 subpoena on MasterCard several months earlier but had not received the documents it requested. Alexsam contended that it was being “stonewalled by delays in responding [by MasterCard] and then a last-minute demand that is unreasonable” after the close of fact discovery. As a result, Alexsam sought ex parte relief, arguing that it has acted diligently, but that MasterCard, while at first appearing cooperative, then refused to comply.

The district court began its analysis of the ex parte application by noting that ex parte applications are solely for extraordinary relief and should be used with discretion. See Local Rule 37-3 (to be heard on an ex parte basis, the moving party must show “irreparable injury or prejudice not attributable to the lack of diligence of the moving party”).

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