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A recent decision from the Central District of California held that a deposition of the author of source code, or similar engineers, cannot be withheld until the producing party, i.e., the party providing the witness, is satisfied that the pinpoint infringement contentions are sufficient. In so holding, the Court indicated that such a determination typically is fact-specific and that given the circumstances in this case the deposition was relevant and not an abuse of the discovery process.

In this instant case, the defendant took the position that until the plaintiff provided sufficient pinpoint citations to the source code, it would not permit the deposition of its principal systems architect over its source code. The defendant expressed its concern that, absent such pinpoint citations, the plaintiff would use the deposition as a “fishing expedition.” The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that it could not supplement its infringement contentions to provide pinpoint citations to the source code until it took the deposition. Both sides supported their positions with expert testimony. Thus, the Court was faced with the proverbial “chicken and egg question.”
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In a patent dispute over a method for detecting fetal Down syndrome, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts invalidated the patent owner’s patent because it was anticipated and obvious. The patent at issue describes screening methods to determine Down syndrome in which physicians estimate the risk of Down syndrome using markers from both the first and second trimesters of a pregnancy. The patent teaches determining the risk for fetal Down syndrome by combining markers from both stages of pregnancy into a single assessment of risk.

According to the district court opinion, after the patent was filed tests that integrate first and second-trimester data into a single calculation of risk were considered to have a higher detection rate than any test that used the data from only one of the trimesters. The testing disclosed by the patent is widely adopted and is licensed to a number of entities with thousands of assessments conducted under theses licenses each year.
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Plaintiffs and defendant manufacture machines that automatically inspect integrated circuits made on semiconductor wafers. Plaintiffs sued defendant for patent infringement and a jury found that the patent was valid and infringed, but did not find that the infringement was willful.

After the jury verdict, the defendant notified its sales force of the verdict and emphasized that the process was not over and that no judgment had been entered. Plaintiffs notified the defendant that it would consider any sales that occurred after the jury verdict evidence of willful infringement. Several months later, the district court denied defendant’s post-trial motions and entered judgment for plaintiffs based on the jury verdict. The district court also entered a permanent injunction. Despite the permanent injunction, the defendant continued to sell the infringing product by meeting with potential customers in the United States who planned to use the machine in other parts of the world. The plaintiffs moved for contempt.
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In a recent case in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the court denied defendants’ motion to transfer the case to the District of New Jersey. The court’s analysis focused primarily on whether the case could have originally been filed in the District of New Jersey. The court began its analysis by noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that “[f]or convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”

Recognizing that the “first determination to be made under § 1404(a) is whether the claim could have been filed in the judicial district to which transfer is sought,” the court stated that the “‘critical time’ when making this threshold inquiry is the time when the lawsuit was filed.” Plaintiff contended that the matter could not have been filed in New Jersey initially because two of the defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. Defendants responded that the action could have been filed in New Jersey because the defendants consented to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey and were indemnified by another defendant, which was based in New Jersey.
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The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., is having its intended effect of reigning in inequitable conduct claims. In a recent decision, Judge Otero of the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment of no unenforceability on defendant’s inequitable conduct claim. Plaintiff U.S. Rubber Recycling, Inc. filed suit alleging, among other things, that Defendant Ecore International, Inc. fraudulently procured and wrongfully enforced its patent relating to rubber acoustical underlayment (insulating material for use with floor tile) in order to monopolize the market for such products. Specifically, the Plaintiff asserted that, “during the prosecution of the [patent], Defendant intentionally failed to disclose to the PTO material prior art that showed the claimed invention had been sold in the United States and described in printed publications more than one year prior to the [patent] application.” In its summary judgment motion, the Defendant alleges “that the issuance of the reissue patent demonstrates that the alleged prior art are not material as a matter of law” and that the “Plaintiff cannot raise an issue of genuine fact that the Defendant failed to disclose any reference with bad intent.”
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Plaintiff brought a patent infringement action alleging direct infringement of a single patent. The defendant, a corporation, sought an extension of time to respond to the complaint through a request from its CEO. Because corporations cannot represented themselves and must instead be represented by a licensed attorney, the district court denied the requested extension and ordered the defendant to answer within 30 days. A few months later, the CEO of the defendant filed an extension request in order to complete a re-examination of the plaintiff’s patent even though there was no re-examination request pending before the Patent and Trademark Office. The defendant still had not filed an answer to the complaint.

In response, the plaintiff requested that the district court enter a default judgment against the defendant and to set a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff and whether a permanent injunction should issue. More than a week later, the defendant, through an attorney, filed an answer to the complaint. Plaintiff moved to strike the answer because the defendant had failed to seek leave of court to files its late answer. The district court denied plaintiff’s motion and permitted the defendant to answer the complaint.
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In a patent infringement action, the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the on sale bar and dismissed plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Defendants then requested that the district court find the case exceptional due plaintiff’s litigation misconduct. Based on that misconduct, the district court found that the case was exceptional. Defendants then moved for an award of $800,000 in attorneys’ fees.

The district court noted under 35 U.S.C. § 285, it may in exceptional cases award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. To do so, the court must first determine that there is clear and convincing evidence that the case is exceptional and then the court must exercise its discretion in determining whether an award of fees is justified. The district court also noted that “[l]itigation misconduct and unprofessional behavior may suffice, by themselves, to make a case exceptional under § 285” but “[i]n cases deemed exceptional only on the basis of litigation misconduct, however, the amount of the award must bear some relation to the extension of the misconduct.”
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Xerox Corporation (“Xerox”) filed a patent infringement action against Google and Yahoo! in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. After construing certain terms of the patent-in-suit as part of a claim construction proceeding, the district court resolved a discovery dispute between the parties over the production of communications between Xerox and a third-party licensing company, IPValue. Google and Yahoo! sought production of documents that Xerox exchanged with IPValue and which Xerox had listed on its privilege log based on a common interest privilege.

Google and Yahoo! contended that the documents could not be protected by the common interest privilege because the relationship between Xerox and IPValue is purely commercial. Xerox disagreed contending that both it and IPValue retain attorneys to perform legal analyses on issues relating to patent rights and because Xerox and IP Value have a joint objective of successfully asserting the Xerox intellectual property rights, which requires close cooperation between the companies. IPValue is a patent licensing company that works with other companies to help monetize their patent portfolios. Prior to the litigation, Xerox and IPValue had entered into agreements designating IPValue as Xerox’s worldwide agent for intellectual property licensing.
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It is fast becoming clear that it is very difficult to transfer a patent infringement case out of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware when the defendant is incorporated in Delaware. In this case, Netgear sued Ruckus Wireless for patent infringement in the District of Delaware. Ruckus is a Delaware corporation with its principal of business in California. Netgear is also a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California.

Ruckus moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California based on the arguments that both it and Netgear have their headquarters and primary places of business in the Northern District, nearly all key events, parties, documents and third party witnesses are in the Northern District, there are already two patent infringement lawsuits involving related technologies pending between the parties in the Northern District and there is significant court congestion in Delaware.
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In a patent case brought by Plaintiff Rembrandt Vision Technologies, L.P. (“Rembrandt”) against Defendant Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. (“J&J”) in the Eastern District of Texas, J&J moved to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Central to the Judge Ward’s grant of J&J’s motion was the fact that he and Magistrate Judge Everingham soon would be retiring effective October 1, 2011, which — along with the balance of private and public interest factors — resulted in the transferee venue being “clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by [Rembrandt].”

Initially, the district court noted that Rembrandt is a New Jersey limited liability partnership with offices in Pennsylvania and no facilities in Texas. The district court also noted that the inventors of the patent-in-suit have no connection to Texas, but own a house in the Middle District of Florida. The district court pointed out that the only connection that Rembrandt had to the Eastern District of Texas was the pending lawsuit and other lawsuits it had filed there. On the other hand, the district court countered that J&J had been involved in litigation in the Middle District of Florida involving the same accused products, J&J was a Florida corporation with its headquarters in Jacksonville, Florida, and that it employed over 1200 people to manufacture the accused product in its Florida facility.

After concluding that the threshold determination that Rembrandt’s claim could have been brought in the Middle District of Florida, the district court turned to Rembrandt’s argument that judicial economy weighed against transfer. Rembrandt argued that judicial economy weighted against transfer because of the district court’s experience with the patent-in-suit and also because J&J waited 17 months to file its transfer motion. Judge Ward stated that “[b]ecause both the undersigned and Magistrate Judge Everingham are retiring from the bench on October 1, 2011, these issues do not weigh as heavily, with respect to judicial economy, as they may have otherwise.” Judge Ward further explained that “[w]ith respect to the Court’s familiarity and experience with the patents-in-suit, due to the approaching retirement of both the undersigned and Magistrate Judge Everingham, there will no longer be a judge in the Marshall Division with familiarity of this case.”

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