Articles Posted in District Courts

Wonderland Nurserygoods Co., Ltd.(“Wonderland”) filed a patent infringement action against Thorley Industries, LLC, d/b/a 4MOM (“Thorley”) for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,047,609 (the “‘609 Patent”) by the accused mamaRoo device. Pursuant to the Court’s Initial Patent Scheduling Order, Wonderland served its Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions (“Infringement Contentions”) on Thorley on May 10, 2012, ,and Thorley served its Non-Infringement and Invalidity Contentions on Wonderland on May 24, 2012
The Court held a Markman Hearing on September 27, 2012. On January 11, 2013, after receiving the Revised (and corrected) Claim Construction Chart, the transcript of the Markman Hearing, and the Pre-Hearing and Post-Hearing Briefs, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Claim Construction Order.

After the order was issued, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment and exchanged expert reports for a trial set to begin in late January 2014. On December 26, 2013, without seeking leave of the district court, Wonderland served on Thorley Amended Infringement Contentions, and a Supplemental Expert Report directed at whether the gearing and linkage within the accused mamaRoo device constitute part of the alleged second motion mechanism, a necessary limitation of the patent at issue. Thorley filed a Motion to Exclude Wonderland’s Amended Infringement Contentions and Supplemental Expert Report.
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In this patent infringement case brought by Carnegie Mellon University (“CMU”), against Marvell Technology Group, Ltd. and Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. (collectively “Marvell”), CMU alleged that Marvell has infringed two of its patents. After a four-week jury trial, the jury rendered its verdict in favor of CMU on infringement, validity, and willfulness, and awarded damages in the amount of $1,169,140,271.00.

Among many post-trial motions, Marvell file a motion for judgment in its favor on the equitable defense of laches. The district court noted that “[t]he first issue in dispute between the parties is whether Marvell has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that CMU had actual or constructive knowledge of Marvell’s infringement of the patents prior to March 6, 2003, which would raise a presumption in favor of Marvell. (Docket Nos. 804, 823). Marvell points to various events which occurred in 1998, 2001 and 2002 in support of its efforts to invoke the presumption. (Docket No. 804).”
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TransUnion Intelligence LLC (“TransUnion”) filed a patent infringement action against SearchAmerica. After expert reports were served, SearchAmerica moved to exclude all references to the doctrine of equivalents and sought confirmation from TransUnion that they will not attempt to rely on a doctrine of equivalents theory for the remainder of the case.

In support of its motion, SearchAmerica argued that TransUnion should be prohibited from relying on the doctrine of equivalents infringement theory because the Scheduling Order required TransUnion to specify the details of such a theory in its claims charts.
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Unisone Strategic IP, Inc. (“Unisone”) filed a patent infringement action against Tracelink, Inc. (“Tracelink”). Tracelink filed a motion to dismiss the claims for indirect (induced and contributory) infringement because Unisone had alleged no facts demonstrating Tracelink “had the intent to cause infringement . . . or that [Defendant] willfully infringed the patent.” Tracelink further asserted that Unisone “does not even allege that [Defendant] had knowledge of the ‘538 patent.” In addition, Tracelink argued that Unisone’s contributory infringement claim failed because Plaintiff had not alleged the necessary facts detailing how the accused product is made or adapted for use in an infringement of the patent-in-suit.

The district court began its analysis of the inducing claim by quoting the relevant statutory language and the standard set out by the Federal Circuit. “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). To state a claim for induced infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the alleged infringer (1) knew of the patent, (2) knowingly induced the infringing acts, and (3) possessed a specific intent to encourage another’s infringement of the patent. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 2013 WL 444642, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2013).
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Taser International, Inc. (“Taser’) proceeded to trial on its patent infringement action against Karbon Arms, LLC (“Karbon Arms”). After expert reports and with the trial approaching, Taser filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony Val DiEuliis, one of Karbon Arms’ experts, regarding electrophysiology.

As explained by Taser, Dr. DiEuliis offered opinions on certain limitations of the patent-in-suit (United States Patent 7,800,885), including: “compliance signals of the group differ in intensity of pain compliance,” “compliance signals of the group differ in intensity of skeletal muscle contraction,” and “effective duration.”
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Otto Bock HealthCare LP (“Otto Bock”) filed a patent infringement against Defendants Össur hf and Össur Americas, Inc. (together, “Össur”). Otto Bock alleged that a number of Össur’s infringed four claims of United States Patent No. 6,726,726 (the ” ‘726 Patent”). Otto Bock moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Össur from infringing the ‘726 Patent, and the Court denied Otto Bock’s, holding that Otto Bock was unlikely to prove that the accused combination of products satisfied the ‘726 Patent’s “means for sealing” and “means for maintaining a vacuum” limitations.

After the preliminary injunction was denied, Össur petitioned the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “Patent Office”) to institute an inter partes review of 19 claims of the ‘726 Patent. Össur’s petition asserted that certain claims of the ‘726 Patent are invalid because they would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Össur’s petition did not seek review of two of the four independent claims at issue in the case. Össur’s moved to stay the district court case pending the inter partes review. At time of the motion to stay, the Patent Office had not yet decided whether to institute an inter partes review.
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Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. (“Kimberly-Clark) filed a patent infringement action against First Quality Baby Products, LLC (“First Quality”) over a variety of patents relating to disposable absorbent products, such as diapers and incontinence products, including U.S. Patent No. 5,147,343 (the “Kellenberger Patent”), which relates to an absorbent composite or core for use in disposable absorbent products. As explained by the district court, “[t]he absorbent core consists of a matrix of fibers with superabsorbant polymer (“SAP”) dispersed between the pores of the matrix. An SAP is a chemical compound capable of absorbing ten or more times its own weight in fluid-a useful property for products designed to absorb and retain fluids.”

As one of its defenses, First Quality argued that the Kellenberger Patent was invalid for obviousness. Defendants had previously moved for summary judgment on the of obviousness and had argued in support of that motion that the only feature distinguishing the Kellenberger Patent from the prior art was its use of a new SAP in the absorbent core to replace an older, less effective SAP. “In short, Defendants argued that Plaintiff simply took a new SAP (invented by a third party) and included it in a preexisting diaper design, and that it was obvious to do so. By memorandum issued July 8, 2013, the court denied Defendants’ motion after finding genuine disputes of material fact as to whether it would have been obvious to substitute the new SAP.”
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The Defendant QxQ Inc. (“QxQ”), which is a California company, moved to transfer a patent infringement case from the Eastern District of Wisconsin to the Northern District of California. QxQ asserted that the connections between the Eastern District of Wisconsin and the case were so limited that litigating the action in Wisconsin would be less convenient than litigating in the Northern District of California. Plaintiff Circuit Check Inc. (“Circuit Check”), which is a Minnesota company, opposed the motion, in part, because QxQ delayed filing the motion to transfer.

QxQ moved to transfer based on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which, as explained by the district court, authorizes changes of venue “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” As noted by the district court, “[w]ith respect to the convenience evaluation, courts generally consider the availability of and access to witnesses, and each party’s access to and distance from resources in each forum. Other related factors include the location of material events and the relative ease of access to sources of proof.” Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Intern., Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In assessing the interest of justice, “courts look to factors including docket congestion and likely speed to trial in the transferor and potential transferee forums, each court’s relative familiarity with the relevant law, the respective desirability of resolving controversies in each locale, and the relationship of each community to the controversy.” Id. (citations omitted).
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Automatic Data Processing, Inc. (“ADP”) filed a declaratory judgment action against Wellogix, Inc., and Wellogix Technology Licensing LLC (“Wellogix”) for a determination that ADP does not infringe a Wellogix method patent on comparing data from purchase orders, field data, and invoices. After the action was filed, ADP moved for summary judgment on the ground that not all of the allegedly infringing steps were performed in the United States.

The district court began its analysis by stating that “[a] machine patent may be infringed if the protected technology is used, sold, or offered for sale ‘within the United States.’ Unlike a machine patent, a foreign method cannot be patented if its sold or offered for sale in the United States. All steps of the method must be done domestically.’
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