Articles Posted in D. Delaware

Amazon.com (“Amazon”) filed a motion to dismiss Tuxis Technologies, LLC’s (“Tuxis”) complaint for failure to state a claim. Tuxis alleged infringement of the 6,055,513 (“the ‘513 patent”) against Amazon. As explained by the district court, the ‘513 patent relates to a method of upselling. The term “upsell” is defined in the patent to be “an offer or provision of a good or service which is selected for offer to the customer and differs from the good or service for which the primary contact was made.” The patentee defined “real time” as “during the course of the communication initiated with the primary transaction or primary interaction.”

Amazon moved to dismiss, asserting that the ‘513 patent’s claims are invalid because they do not claim patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. After analyzing the recent case law on section 101 of the Patent Act, including Alice Corp., the district court found that “[i]n applying the framework set out above, it is clear that the claim 1 of the ‘513 patent is drawn to unpatentable subject matter. It claims the fundamental concept of upselling–a marketing technique as old as the field itself. While the additional limitations of the claim do narrow its scope, they are insufficient to save it from invalidity.”
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After a jury trial in which Power Integrations, Inc. (“Power”) obtained a verdict of infringement and validity in its favor against Fairchild Semiconductor (“Fairchild”), Power moved for a permanent injunction. In analyzing the motion, the district court first repeated the common test from eBay: “In order to obtain a permanent injunction, Power, as the moving party, must demonstrate each of the following four factors:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

eBay Inc v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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After the PTAB instituted a CBM review of the patents-in-suit, Google sought a stay of the litigation pending resolution of CBM review by the PTAB. The district court explained that “[c]ourts consider four factors when deciding whether to stay litigation pending CBM review: (1) whether a stay will simplify the issues, (2) whether discovery is complete and a trial date is set, (3) whether there will be undue prejudice to the non-moving party, and (4) whether a stay will reduce the burden on the Court and the parties. See AIA § 18(b)(1).”

With respect to the first factor, the district court found that some “simplification of the issues could result from cancellation of the asserted claims or, failing that, from the estoppel effects on Google arising from presenting its arguments to the PTAB in the CBM process. See AIA § 18(a)(1)(D).” But the district court also found that the “estoppel only goes so far, especially as the PTAB rejected several of the grounds for CBM review articulated by Google. Thus, unless the PTAB invalidates all of the asserted claims on a basis on which it has initiated CBM review, it is likely that the Court will have to address at least some of Google’s invalidity defenses. Therefore, while the simplification factor favors a stay, it does not do so by much.”
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In these patent infringement actions, the defendants moved to transfer to three different district courts. As explained by the district court, “[t]here are currently six pending actions in the District of Delaware involving LifePort, LifeScreen, or both. All of the infringement cases involve technology pertaining to the field of minimally invasive vascular repair and many of the actions share overlapping patents-in-suit, which will require claim construction. LifePort has asserted the most patents against the defendant W.L Gore & Associates, Inc. (“Gore”), which must be litigated in this district because Gore is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Newark, Delaware. Five of the patents asserted against Gore overlap with the defendant Endologix, Inc. (“Endologix”). LifePort has also asserted another patent against Gore that overlaps with the defendants Medtronic, Inc. and Medtronic Vascular, Inc. (collectively, “Medtronic”). Similarly, LifeScreen has asserted a patent against C.R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (collectively, “Bard”), and Cook Incorporated and Cook Medical Incorporated (collectively, “Cook”), but Bard has not sought transfer.”
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Plaintiffs Versata Software, Inc. and Versata Development Group, Inc. (collectively, “Versata”) filed a patent infringement action in July 2012 against defendant Callidus Software, Inc. (“Callidus”) The patents were all characterized as “covered business method patents.”

Callidus filed a challenged to the validity of the patents-in-suit in August 2013, pursuant to the “covered business method” (“CBM”) patent review process provided for under the America Invents Act. As explained by the district court, “[t]he CBM petitions were filed by Callidus some 13 months after suit was filed and after Callidus had instituted a motion practice which included motions to dismiss and/or transfer. On March 4, 2014, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) granted review of the patents-in-suit, finding it more likely than not that the challenged claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter and, therefore, unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”
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Novartis sought to use the deposition testimony of defendant’s expert at trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(4)(B). As explained by the district court, “the Rule provides that a party may use the deposition of a witness for any purpose” if “the witness is more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or trial or is outside the United States, unless it appears that the witness’s absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.” FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(B). “[A] conclusion that a party has procured the absence of a witness requires a finding that the party ‘actively took steps to keep the deponents from setting foot in the courtroom,’ and ‘procuring absence and doing nothing to facilitate presence are quite different things.'” Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 2012 WL 1161125, at *2 (D.N.H. Apr. 6, 2012) (quoting Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1988)).

The district court then noted that Dr. Kibbe was an expert witness on obviousness for the defense in a case that went to trial in August 2013. The defendant here, Par, had its case stayed on the morning of trial because Par and Novartis had purportedly reached a settlement agreement. The trial against another defendant then proceeded without Par’s presence, and Dr. Kibbe testified as scheduled.
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Plaintiff Andrulis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (“Andrulis”) filed a patent infringement action against Celgene Corporation (“Celgene”) alleging direct, induced, and contributory infringement. Celgene filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim.

After Andrulis voluntarily dismissed the contributory infringement claim, the district court analyzed the claims for direct and induced infringement. For direct infringement, Andrulis alleged two factually distinct theories. “The first is that Celgene itself directly infringes the claims because it administers the patented method, which Andrulis refers to as the undivided direct infringement claim. The second is that Celgene is a joint infringer because physicians administer the patented method under Celgene’s direction and control, which Andrulis refers to as the joint direct infringement claim.”
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Plaintiff SecureBuy, LLC (“SecureBuy”) filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings pending resolution of a Covered Business Methods (“CBM”) review at the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (“PTAB”). When the motion was stayed, the PTAB had not yet granted review of the CBM petition.

Before ruling on the stay request, the district court had previously heard argument on defendant’s motion for preliminary injunction or in the alternative for expedited discovery and an expedited trial. The district court denied the preliminary injunction but granted Defendant’s request to expedite the case and scheduled trial for August of 2014. When it opposed the preliminary injunction and expedited trial, SecureBuy made similar arguments as it raised in its motion to say pending the CBM review, which the district court considered when ruling on the previous motion.
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Clouding IP (“Clouding”) filed a patent infringement action against Rackspace, which alleged direct, indirect, and willful infringement of the patents-in-suit. The district court granted defendant Rackspace’s motion to dismiss with respect to indirect infringement, but also granted Clouding leave to amend its complaint. In that ruling, the district court found that Clouding had adequately plead the knowledge requirement for induced infringement, but the district court dismissed Clouding’s claims because the First Amended Complaint “failed to plead facts from which the Court [could] infer intent.”

Clouding filed a second amended complaint, which again alleged claims for inducing infringement. Rackspace moved to dismiss the indirect infringement claims. Rackspace’s motion presented a narrow issue as to whether Clouding failed to sufficiently plead the element of intent for its inducement claims.
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Infinite Data filed twenty-one patent infringement actions against a number of companies, including Amazon.com. Mellanox Technologies sued Infinite Data for a declaratory judgment that its technology does not infringe Infinite Data’s patent and that the patent is invalid. Mellanox also alleged that it had received indemnification requests from “many” of the twenty-one defendants because many of them are users and/or customers of Mellanox’s technology.

All twenty-one defendants filed motions to stay, arguing that each of them use Mellanox’s technology, and that the Court should exercise its discretion to stay their cases while the Mellanox case proceeds. To begin its analysis, the district court noted the standard for a stay: “(1) whether granting the stay will simplify the issues for trial; (2) whether discovery is complete and a trial date is set; and (3) whether granting a stay would cause the non-moving party to suffer undue prejudice from any delay, or a clear tactical disadvantage. See, e.g., Vehicle IP LLC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2010 WL 4823393, *1 (D.Del. 2010).”
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