Articles Posted in D. Delaware

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Rosebud filed a patent infringement action Adobe and Adobe moved for summary judgment arguing that Rosebud had no remedy for its patent against Adobe. Adobe based its summary judgment motion on the argument that the patent-in-suit did not issue until after Adobe’s accused product was discontinued.

As set out by the district court, the parties did not dispute that the accused feature of Adobe’s product (Collaborate Live) was discontinued and could not have been used after January 2013. As the ‘280 patent issued on November 5, 2013, Rosebud could not recover post-issuance damages. Instead, Rosebud sought to recover provisional remedies under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d), based on the publication of the ‘280 patent application on December 29, 2011, which requires the defendant to have actual knowledge of the published patent application.
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Intellectual Ventures (“IV”) filed a motion to bifurcate and stay discovery of Symantec’s patent misuse defense. The district court agreed with Intellectual Ventures. “While the Court views IV’s motion as essentially two motions one to bifurcate for a separate trial, see F.R.C.P. 42(b), and one to stay discovery, to which the general stay factors may be pertinent, see, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 921 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313-14 (D. Del. 2013) it finds that the circumstances do not warrant departure from the Federal Circuit’s general guidance that antitrust and related issues be bifurcated in patent cases, and further finds that judicial economy warrants staying discovery related to these issues. See In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1986).”
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In this patent infringement action, the defendant moved to exclude portions of the plaintiff’s (Dr. Bambos’) expert testimony. Defendant argued that Dr. Bambos lacks familiarity with the infringing products, relied too heavily on someone else to provide him with relevant segments of source code to review, and used the district court’s claim construction to determine how the products work.

In analyzing the motion, the district court noted that “Dr. Bambos never used the allegedly infringing products, but his expert opinion was based on ‘thousands of pages of technical manuals, source code, and depositions transcripts.’ (D.I. 221 at p.1) (See D.I. 221-4 at 3-6; D.I. 221-3 at 2-5). Rule 702 requires that expert testimony be based on “sufficient facts or data.” Dr. Bambos need not use the product if, as here, he has familiarized himself with it in other ways. Reviewing source code and other materials can be sufficient.”
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Amazon.com (“Amazon”) filed a motion to dismiss Tuxis Technologies, LLC’s (“Tuxis”) complaint for failure to state a claim. Tuxis alleged infringement of the 6,055,513 (“the ‘513 patent”) against Amazon. As explained by the district court, the ‘513 patent relates to a method of upselling. The term “upsell” is defined in the patent to be “an offer or provision of a good or service which is selected for offer to the customer and differs from the good or service for which the primary contact was made.” The patentee defined “real time” as “during the course of the communication initiated with the primary transaction or primary interaction.”

Amazon moved to dismiss, asserting that the ‘513 patent’s claims are invalid because they do not claim patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. After analyzing the recent case law on section 101 of the Patent Act, including Alice Corp., the district court found that “[i]n applying the framework set out above, it is clear that the claim 1 of the ‘513 patent is drawn to unpatentable subject matter. It claims the fundamental concept of upselling–a marketing technique as old as the field itself. While the additional limitations of the claim do narrow its scope, they are insufficient to save it from invalidity.”
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After a jury trial in which Power Integrations, Inc. (“Power”) obtained a verdict of infringement and validity in its favor against Fairchild Semiconductor (“Fairchild”), Power moved for a permanent injunction. In analyzing the motion, the district court first repeated the common test from eBay: “In order to obtain a permanent injunction, Power, as the moving party, must demonstrate each of the following four factors:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

eBay Inc v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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After the PTAB instituted a CBM review of the patents-in-suit, Google sought a stay of the litigation pending resolution of CBM review by the PTAB. The district court explained that “[c]ourts consider four factors when deciding whether to stay litigation pending CBM review: (1) whether a stay will simplify the issues, (2) whether discovery is complete and a trial date is set, (3) whether there will be undue prejudice to the non-moving party, and (4) whether a stay will reduce the burden on the Court and the parties. See AIA § 18(b)(1).”

With respect to the first factor, the district court found that some “simplification of the issues could result from cancellation of the asserted claims or, failing that, from the estoppel effects on Google arising from presenting its arguments to the PTAB in the CBM process. See AIA § 18(a)(1)(D).” But the district court also found that the “estoppel only goes so far, especially as the PTAB rejected several of the grounds for CBM review articulated by Google. Thus, unless the PTAB invalidates all of the asserted claims on a basis on which it has initiated CBM review, it is likely that the Court will have to address at least some of Google’s invalidity defenses. Therefore, while the simplification factor favors a stay, it does not do so by much.”
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In these patent infringement actions, the defendants moved to transfer to three different district courts. As explained by the district court, “[t]here are currently six pending actions in the District of Delaware involving LifePort, LifeScreen, or both. All of the infringement cases involve technology pertaining to the field of minimally invasive vascular repair and many of the actions share overlapping patents-in-suit, which will require claim construction. LifePort has asserted the most patents against the defendant W.L Gore & Associates, Inc. (“Gore”), which must be litigated in this district because Gore is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Newark, Delaware. Five of the patents asserted against Gore overlap with the defendant Endologix, Inc. (“Endologix”). LifePort has also asserted another patent against Gore that overlaps with the defendants Medtronic, Inc. and Medtronic Vascular, Inc. (collectively, “Medtronic”). Similarly, LifeScreen has asserted a patent against C.R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (collectively, “Bard”), and Cook Incorporated and Cook Medical Incorporated (collectively, “Cook”), but Bard has not sought transfer.”
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Plaintiffs Versata Software, Inc. and Versata Development Group, Inc. (collectively, “Versata”) filed a patent infringement action in July 2012 against defendant Callidus Software, Inc. (“Callidus”) The patents were all characterized as “covered business method patents.”

Callidus filed a challenged to the validity of the patents-in-suit in August 2013, pursuant to the “covered business method” (“CBM”) patent review process provided for under the America Invents Act. As explained by the district court, “[t]he CBM petitions were filed by Callidus some 13 months after suit was filed and after Callidus had instituted a motion practice which included motions to dismiss and/or transfer. On March 4, 2014, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) granted review of the patents-in-suit, finding it more likely than not that the challenged claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter and, therefore, unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”
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Novartis sought to use the deposition testimony of defendant’s expert at trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(4)(B). As explained by the district court, “the Rule provides that a party may use the deposition of a witness for any purpose” if “the witness is more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or trial or is outside the United States, unless it appears that the witness’s absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.” FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(B). “[A] conclusion that a party has procured the absence of a witness requires a finding that the party ‘actively took steps to keep the deponents from setting foot in the courtroom,’ and ‘procuring absence and doing nothing to facilitate presence are quite different things.'” Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 2012 WL 1161125, at *2 (D.N.H. Apr. 6, 2012) (quoting Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1988)).

The district court then noted that Dr. Kibbe was an expert witness on obviousness for the defense in a case that went to trial in August 2013. The defendant here, Par, had its case stayed on the morning of trial because Par and Novartis had purportedly reached a settlement agreement. The trial against another defendant then proceeded without Par’s presence, and Dr. Kibbe testified as scheduled.
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Plaintiff Andrulis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (“Andrulis”) filed a patent infringement action against Celgene Corporation (“Celgene”) alleging direct, induced, and contributory infringement. Celgene filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim.

After Andrulis voluntarily dismissed the contributory infringement claim, the district court analyzed the claims for direct and induced infringement. For direct infringement, Andrulis alleged two factually distinct theories. “The first is that Celgene itself directly infringes the claims because it administers the patented method, which Andrulis refers to as the undivided direct infringement claim. The second is that Celgene is a joint infringer because physicians administer the patented method under Celgene’s direction and control, which Andrulis refers to as the joint direct infringement claim.”
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