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TiVo filed a patent infringement action against Verizon and Verizon counterclaimed alleging that TiVo infringed six of its patents. TiVo raised inequitable conduct counterclaims against certain of the Verizon patents. Verizon filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted under the principles set forth in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009), but permitted TiVo to amend its pleading. TiVo amended its pleadings and Verizon renewed its motion to dismiss.

The district court began its analysis by noting that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Company, 2011 WL 2028255 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 2011) was decided after the parties had completed their briefing on the motion. Although Therasense changed the standard for proving inequitable conduct, the district court stated that Thereasense did not address the pleading standard because it was decided based on the review of a bench trial. Accordingly, Exergen remains the leading authority on the pleading standard for inequitable conduct. “Exergen held that for ‘pleading inequitable conduct in patent cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO.'”
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Plaintiff filed a patent infringement action based on patents for wireless communications networks and a system and method for monitoring and controlling remote devices. Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for direct infringement and for inducing and contributory infringement based on the argument that plaintiff failed to identify a specific system or product in its complaint. Defendants also asserted that plaintiff failed to adequately plead indirect infringement because the complaint did not identify the underlying infringing product, the direct infringer, or the alleged infringing claims. One of the defendants also asserted that the indirect infringement contentions should be dismissed because the identification of customers as the direct infringers is insufficient and the plaintiff failed to plead any facts to show that defendants knew of the patent and intended to encourage infringement.

The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the motion. After discussing the pleading standards under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Twombly (Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555-56, 570 (2007))and Iqbal (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 1953 (2009)), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 84, Form 18, the court concluded that plaintiff’s allegations of direct and indirect infringement were sufficient.
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Plaintiff filed a patent infringement action against the defendant alleging that certain of defendant’s T-shirt transfer products infringed plaintiff’s patent. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim which accused the plaintiff of inequitable conduct in amending its patent during a reissuance of the patent. Defendant claimed that plaintiff deliberately pursued a broadened reissue patent based on her learning of material faults in the patent after having had an opportunity to analyze defendant’s products and technology. Defendant’s primary contention was that the amendments made during the reissuance proceeding added new material to the patent.

As the district court wrote, “[a] reissue patent that enlarges the scope of the claims contained in an original patent shall not be granted unless it is applied for within two years of the grant of the original patent.” The reissue application for the patent-in-suit was filed more than two years after the issuance of the patent. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the inequitable conduct defense on the grounds that the facts alleged did not support a plausible inference that the plaintiff (1) made an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact or failed to disclose material information to the PTO during the reissue examination and (2) intended to deceive the PTO.
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In a recent ruling from the United States District Court for the Sothern District of California, a Magistrate Judge allowed discovery to take place on an inequitable conduct defense after the discovery cut-off. The defendant propounded document requests a little more than 30 days before the discovery cut-off and plaintiff produced documents in response to those requests the day before the discovery cut-off. On the last day for discovery, defendant took the deposition of the inventor of the patent-in-suit.

Based on information learned during the deposition and documents produced by plaintiff at the close of discovery, defendant contended that the plaintiff made material misrepresentations to the Patent Office to overcome a section 112 rejection. Based on that contention, defendant sought leave to amend its answer, assert an affirmative defense of inequitable conduct and to pursue additional discovery directed toward that defense.
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Plaintiff Hurricane Shooters, LLC sought summary judgment of no invalidity on Defendant’s defenses of prior inventorship under Section 102(g) and lack of utility under Section 101. The patents-in-suit involve drinking cups for serving mixed drinks in bars and restaurants having a plural chamber that optimizes the mixing of fluids as they are simultaneously poured while minimizing interference with the nose of the drinker.

Defendant’s invalidity defense was based on a plural chamber “bomb cup” invented by a competitor. Rejecting Plaintiff’s evidence of an earlier date of invention in August 2004 consisting only of the uncorroborated inventor’s testimony, Plaintiff’s inventors’ evidence showed that they invented their plural chamber cup in November of 2004. Defendant, however, presented evidence that its plural chamber cup was invented in October 2004. The Hurricane Shooters court was faced with the issue of whether Defendant’s evidence of an earlier invention was sufficient to survive summary judgment.
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After the district court determined that the plaintiff’s patent was infringed and was not invalid based on anticipation or obviousness, the district court held a bench trial on the issue of damages. The district court first analyzed the issue of lost profits. Finding that the plaintiff could not meet several of the Panduit factors because, among other things there were acceptable, non-infringing substitutes in the marketplace during the relevant time period, the district court denied plaintiff’s request for lost profits. “As plaintiff has not shown a reasonable probability that it would have made the majority of [defendant’s] sales given the existence of non-infringing switchblade divot repair tools on the market, the Court finds plaintiff has not met its burden in this regard.”

The district court next analyzed whether the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable royalty. Plaintiff contended that it was entitled to a 20% royalty on the gross profits of defendant’s infringing tools because the patented tools sold by the plaintiff had a high gross profit of 70%, there were few competitors, the tools were an impulse buy because they had a low price, the tools were an effective and low-cost promotional product, they had a unique design and function and the tools were accepted and known in the marketplace. The defendant argued for royalty rate of 5% of net profits.
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As the battle between Oracle and Google approaches nearer to trial, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California has denied Google’s objection to the selection of the pool of jurors who will hear the trial. The district court previously notified Oracle and Google that the district court intended to pre-clear a large number of potential jurors for a multi-month criminal trial and that it intended to use this same pool of potential jurors for the trial between Oracle and Google in the event the criminal trial was postponed. Oracle did not object to the procedure. Google did.

In its objection, Google argued that many potential jurors who would normally be available to serve on a three week trial would have significant personal or professional commitments that would prevent them from serving in a much longer criminal trial. As a result, Google reasoned that the pool cleared for the much longer criminal trial would be less diverse and less representative than a group specifically cleared for a shorter three week trial. In Google’s words, “[t]o maximize the size and diversity of the venire, enhance the [quality] of the jury-selection process, and increase the likelihood that the jury eventually selected will provide the parties with a fair cross section of the community, Google respectfully requests that the Court not use the pre-clearance process.”
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Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit for patent infringement, unfair competition and breach of fiduciary duty against several defendants, including AIM Sports. Plaintiffs design, develop and distribute firearm related tools, accessories and sporting optics. Defendants and plaintiffs had a business relationship that permitted Defendants to access trade secret information that belonged to the plaintiffs, including trade secrets regarding manufacturing, product development and plaintiffs’ patented products. After the plaintiffs sued defendants for patent infringement and settled the lawsuit, plaintiffs discovered that defendants had formed a new company that continued to infringe the patent and violated the settlement agreement.

After both parties filed motions to compel the production of documents, the Magistrate Judge granted both motions in part and denied both motions in part. Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to two of the requests was denied because the defendants represented in declarations signed under penalty of perjury that they had no responsive documents. Plaintiffs then conducted fact witness depositions and alleged, after conducting these depositions, that defendants had withheld responsive documents and that declarations filed with the district court were false. At this point, the Magistrate Judge granted plaintiffs’ motion, ordered the production of the responsive documents and ordered defendants to file new declarations. When the defendants failed to produce the financial and design documents sought and filed no new declarations, the plaintiffs moved for monetary sanctions and evidentiary sanctions.
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In this patent infringement suit, the parties were unable to agree upon a written Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”) protocol. Before the protocol was executed, the district court ordered the parties to comply with all scheduling orders and production deadliness regardless of whether they had agreed upon a final written agreement regarding the search and production of ESI. The parties subsequently disagreed over the scope of the document production and whether the document production was deficient.

After the district court intervened in the process of finalizing the written ESI protocol, the parties finally executed a written ESI protocol. A dispute then arose between the parties over the production of ESI according to the protocol and the plaintiff moved to compel.
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Abaxis, Inc. (“Abaxis”) filed a patent infringement action against Cepheid asserting that Cepheid infringed four of Abaxis’ patents. In its answer, Cepheid asserted a defense of inequitable conduct and Abaxis moved to dismiss the defense. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted the motion.

In support of the inequitable conduct defense, Cepheid alleged that the patent prosecutor knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) material prior art during the prosecution of the patents. Cepheid also explained that the undisclosed prior art anticipated and/or rendered the patents obvious and, therefore, the patents would not have issued had the prior art been before the PTO. Cepheid also alleged that the patent prosecutor made statements to the PTO during the patent prosecution to distinguish prior art cited by the by the PTO that were knowingly false in light of the information withheld from the PTO and “but for” these statements and the withholding of the material prior art the patents would not have issued.
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