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Echostar Satellite L.L.C. (“Echostar”) moved to compel the production of settlement agreements from the plaintiff. Several issues arose on the motion, including whether the Magistrate Judge had jurisdiction to grant the motion even though the discovery cutoff date had passed, whether a party has an obligation to supplement its prior production with documents that were not created until after the discovery cutoff, and whether the settlement agreements were responsive to the prior document requests.

Turning to the first issue, the court found that it had jurisdiction because of an extension due to a mediation date. “Ordinarily, any motion concerning discovery must be filed sufficiently in advances of the discovery cutoff to allow any production to be completed prior to the cutoff date. Here, however, the parties had obtained an extension of the mediation date from the District Judge in order to allow the instant motion to be decided before the mediation. The Court concludes that, given the foregoing, it has jurisdiction to entertain the instant motion.”
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In this patent infringement action, a dispute arose over whether the defendant B/E Aerospace could rely on declarations from one or more of the inventors of the asserted patent in support of its claim construction position. As explained by the district court, “[i]n the Joint Claim Construction Statement (“Joint Statement,” ECF No. 45) filed on May 9, 2014, Plaintiff MAG Aerospace Industries, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant B/E Aerospace, Inc. (“Defendant”) dispute whether, in its claim construction briefing, Defendant may rely on declaration evidence from one or more of the individuals named as inventors on U.S. Patent Nos. 6,353,942; 6,536,054; and 6,536,055 (the “Asserted Patents”).
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For over a decade, to show that a claim term is invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶2, the Federal Circuit has required that such terms be “not amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous.” The Supreme Court in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. has rejected that standard on the grounds that it tolerates too much imprecision. Under the new standard, a claim term is indefinite if it, instead, fails to define “the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”

The patent at issue, assigned to Biosig Instruments, Inc. (“Biosig”), involves a heart-rate monitor used with exercise equipment. Prior heart-rate monitors, the patent asserts, were often inaccurate in measuring the electrical signals accompanying each heartbeat (electrocardiograph or ECG signals) because of the presence of other electrical signals (electromyogram or EMG signals) generated by the user’s skeletal muscles. The invention claims to improve on prior art by detecting and processing ECG signals in a way that filters out the EMG interference.

Claim 1 of the patent, which contains the limitations critical to the case, recites a “heart rate monitor for use by a user in association with exercise apparatus and/or exercise procedures.” The claim comprises, among other elements, a cylindrical bar with a “live” electrode and a “common” electrode “mounted . . . in spaced relationship with each other.” Biosig filed the underlying patent infringement suit, alleging that Nautilus, Inc. (“Nautilus”) infringed on its patented claims by selling exercise machines containing Biosig’s patented technology.

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In the long-awaited decision in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., the Supreme Court once again reversed the Federal Circuit. This time, the Court’s reversal involved the issue of indirect infringement. Specifically, the Court held that an accused infringer cannot be liable for inducing infringement under §271(b) where no one has directly infringed under §271(a) or any other statutory provision.

By way of background, Akamai Technologies, Inc., (“Akamai”) is the exclusive licensee of a patent that claims a method of delivering electronic data using a content delivery network (“CDN”). Limelight Networks, Inc., (“Limelight”) also operates a CDN and carries out several of the claimed steps in the patent. But, its customers, rather than Limelight itself, perform a claimed step of the patent known as “tagging.”

Under Federal Circuit case law, most recently refined in Miniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., liability for direct infringement of a method patent requires performance of all steps to be attributable to a single party. The District Court concluded that Limelight could not have directly infringed the patent at issue because performance of the “tagging” step could not be attributed to Limelight. In an en banc decision, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that a defendant who performed some steps of a method patent and encouraged others to perform the rest could be liable for inducement of infringement even if no single entity was liable for direct infringement.

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In these patent infringement actions, the defendants moved to transfer to three different district courts. As explained by the district court, “[t]here are currently six pending actions in the District of Delaware involving LifePort, LifeScreen, or both. All of the infringement cases involve technology pertaining to the field of minimally invasive vascular repair and many of the actions share overlapping patents-in-suit, which will require claim construction. LifePort has asserted the most patents against the defendant W.L Gore & Associates, Inc. (“Gore”), which must be litigated in this district because Gore is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Newark, Delaware. Five of the patents asserted against Gore overlap with the defendant Endologix, Inc. (“Endologix”). LifePort has also asserted another patent against Gore that overlaps with the defendants Medtronic, Inc. and Medtronic Vascular, Inc. (collectively, “Medtronic”). Similarly, LifeScreen has asserted a patent against C.R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (collectively, “Bard”), and Cook Incorporated and Cook Medical Incorporated (collectively, “Cook”), but Bard has not sought transfer.”
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After the district court issued a Markman ruling, the parties informed the court that they had reached an agreement in principle to settle the action. The plaintiff, FlatWorld, then moved to vacate the claim construction order. The district court noted that it had only adopted FlatWorld’s proposed construction for one out of nine terms. “Now plaintiff FlatWorld Interactives LLC wants me to vacate the claim construction order, in which I adopted only one of its proposed constructions out of nine terms to be construed, because it is concerned about the potential collateral estoppel effects of my order in two actions pending before the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.”

The district court then explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides that a court may relieve a party from an order if “applying it prospectively is no longer equitable” or for “any [ ] reason that justifies relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). “Although the Court may vacate an order upon settlement there is no requirement to do so; otherwise any litigant dissatisfied with a trial court’s findings would be able to have them wiped from the books.” White v. Shen, No. 09-cv-989-BZ, 2011 WL 2790475, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “district court can decide whether to vacate its judgment in light of ‘the consequences and attendant hardships of dismissal or refusal to dismiss’ and ‘the competing values of finality of judgment and right to relitigation of unreviewed disputes.'” Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Plaintiff Trading Technologies International, Inc. (“TT”) moved to strike the invalidity expert report of the defendant, CQG. TT made two arguments its motion: “(1) that Dr. Mellor failed to conduct a proper written description analysis because, according to TT, he incorrectly focuses on features that are not recited in the claims and concludes that there is no written description to support the unclaimed features; and (2) that Dr. Mellor failed to consider the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art in his written description analysis.”

CQG responded that TT mischaracterized Dr. Mellor’s opinions and that Dr. Mellor correctly applied the written description test to determine whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand whether the inventors were in possession of TT’s asserted Static Limitation. CQG further asserted that TT misrepresented Dr. Mellor’s explanation of a person of ordinary skill in the art and offered no explanation why the district court should adopt TT’s definition.
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Plaintiffs Versata Software, Inc. and Versata Development Group, Inc. (collectively, “Versata”) filed a patent infringement action in July 2012 against defendant Callidus Software, Inc. (“Callidus”) The patents were all characterized as “covered business method patents.”

Callidus filed a challenged to the validity of the patents-in-suit in August 2013, pursuant to the “covered business method” (“CBM”) patent review process provided for under the America Invents Act. As explained by the district court, “[t]he CBM petitions were filed by Callidus some 13 months after suit was filed and after Callidus had instituted a motion practice which included motions to dismiss and/or transfer. On March 4, 2014, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) granted review of the patents-in-suit, finding it more likely than not that the challenged claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter and, therefore, unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”
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In this patent infringement action between Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. (“Golden Bridge or GBT”) against Apple, Golden Bridge’s counsel moved to withdraw as counsel of record because Golden Bridge had failed to pay the legal bills. As explained by the court, “[s]ince this case appeared on the undersigned’s docket, Plaintiff Golden Bridge Technology Inc. has been represented by attorneys from the McKool Smith firm. With GBT’s consent, McKool now seeks to withdraw as GBT counsel based on the client’s failure to pay its bills.”

Although the court was sympathetic to the plight of the attorneys, it did not believe that granting the request to withdraw was appropriate. “This court is quite sympathetic to the idea that attorneys ordinarily should not be made to work for free. But here two key factors weigh against granting McKool’s withdrawal request. First, no other attorneys have appeared for GBT. Even in the time since McKool filed its motion, no new attorneys have appeared. Second, trial is upon us. Jury selection is May 30, and opening statements are set for the following Monday. All pretrial motions have been briefed, and the parties are set to appear for a final pretrial conference this Friday.”
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HTC Corporation and HTC America, Inc. (“HTC”) moved for a finding that this patent infringement action is “exceptional” under the Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision which authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases.” 35 U.S.C. § 285.

The district court had previously found that the patents in suit were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct before the patent office. Intellect Wireless, Inc., v. HTC Corp., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d, 732 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The prior rulings establish prima facie support for a finding of an exceptional case. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). As a result, the district court had granted HTC’s request for additional limited document discovery was granted.
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