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The defendants in this patent infringement action filed several motions for leave to amend their answers to include various affirmative defenses, including: (1) the affirmative defense of patent misuse; (2) the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct; (3) a counterclaim for declaratory judgment of non-infringement; and (4) a counterclaim for declaratory judgment of invalidity. Plaintiff REC Software (“REC”) opposed the motions for leave to amend and asserted that the proposed amendments would be futile and the proposed counterclaims and affirmative defenses were duplicative.

REC argued that there was no basis for a defense or counterclaim of patent misuse because an affirmative defense or counterclaim of patent misuse may not be based on infringement or damages positions asserted in litigation. As the district court explained: patent misuse usually applies where a patentee seeks to impermissibly extend the monopoly grant of a patent. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int‟l Trade Comm‟n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1184-85 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit has held that certain activities constitute per se patent misuse, such as when a patentee attempts to extend the term of the patent by contractually requiring payment of post-expiration royalties. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997). But other activities have been excluded from the doctrine of patent misuse. For example, Congress has declared that a patent owner may seek “to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement” without being guilty of patent misuse or illegal extension of the patent right. 35 U.S.C. §271(d)(3).
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Rec Software USA, Inc. (“Rec”) filed a patent infringement action against HTC America, Inc. (“HTC”). HTC requested leave to file a motion for summary judgment based on 35 U.S.C. §101. The request for leave to file the summary judgment motion occurred prior to claim construction proceedings.

HTC argued that the summary judgment motion could potentially dispose of the entire case in support of its request for leave to file an early motion for summary judgment. Rec opposed HTC’s request by arguing that claim construction was necessary to understand the nature of the asserted claims.
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Plaintiff GT Nexus, Inc. (“GT Nexus”) filed a declaratory judgment action against Inttra, Inc. (“Inttra”) seeking a declaration that four of Inttra’s patents (“patents-in-suit”) were invalid and have not been infringed. Inttra filed counterclaims against GT Nexus for infringement of the patents-in-suit.

The district court had previously stayed the action pending the ex parte re-examination of the patents-in-suit. After the patents emerged from the ex parte re-examination, Inttra moved to lift the stay. GT Nexus opposed arguing that the stay should not be lifted because it had filed petitions for Covered Business Method (“CBM”) review with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). The district court then denied Inttra’s motion, finding that each of the four factors for determining whether to stay a case pending CBM review weighed in favor of a stay. In its order, the district court “stated that if CBM review is granted, the case will remain stayed pending completion of the CBM review proceedings. Id. The Court also stated that if CBM review is denied, Inttra may file a motion requesting to lift the stay and reopen the action. Id.”
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Plaintiff Labyrinth Optical Technologies LLC (“Labyrinth”) filed a patent infringement action against Defendant Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. (“Lucent”), alleging that Lucent infringes U.S. Patent No. 8,103,173 (the “‘173 Patent”). On the eve of trial, Lucent filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of standing, arguing that Labyrinth could not show that it holds the rights to the ‘173 Patent.

The district court review the following facts to analyze the motion: “In November 2011, Teradvance Communications, LLC (“Teradvance”) granted to Acacia Research Group LLC (“Acacia”) an exclusive licence to certain patents and patent applications listed in an attached exhibit (“Exclusive License”). The list included foreign and domestic patents and pending patent applications, including U.S. Patent Application No. 12/554,241, which later issued as the ‘173 Patent. In April 2012, Acacia entered into an Assignment and Assumption Agreement (“Assignment”) with Labyrinth, one of Acacia’s affiliates. By its express terms, the Assignment is governed by Texas law. The Assignment notes that the Exclusive License covered “the Patents listed in the Exhibit attached hereto (the ‘Patents’),” but the Assignment does not specify whether the Exclusive License covered anything else. The Assignment states that it conveyed rights to the “Patents.” But unlike the Exclusive License, which actually has an exhibit identifying the patents subject to the agreement, the Assignment does not.”
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Defendant Ericsson filed an unopposed motion for leave to file its motion to strike certain paragraphs of a supplemental expert report for the plaintiff under seal. Although the request was unopposed, the district court evaluated whether it was appropriate to seal the motion and accompanying exhibits. In the motion, Ericsson argued that the motion to strike refers to, quotes from, and attaches exhibits which are designated, contain, and constitute protected material under the Protective Order.
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After the parties submitted expert reports in this patent infringement action, Ford objected to Eagle Harbor’s damage expert’s expected testimony and demonstratives. Ford objected to Eagle Harbor’s evidence because it involved multiple dates of possible infringement and the damage expert only calculated his royalty rate based on one possible date of first infringement.

As the district court explained, “[i]n his report, Mr. Wagner provides that, for the alleged infringement by Ford’s SYNC system, ‘the hypothetical negotiation date is on or around 2007 Q2.’ . . . Mr. Wagner’s trial exhibits, however, disclose three other possible dates for the date of first infringement. . . . These additional dates are based on the issuance of two of the continuation patents–the ‘739 Patent and the ‘119 Patent–and the possibility that Eagle Harbor’s damages may be limited for failure to mark. The new dates are March 23, 2010, August 17, 2010, and August 23, 2011. Mr. Wagner did not provide a hypothetical negotiation for any of these new dates.”
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Continental Automotive GmbH and Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. (collectively “Continental”) filed a multi-claim lawsuit against iBiquity Digital Corporation (“iBiquity”), which asserted causes of action for patent exhaustion (Count I), patent misuse (Count II), declaratory judgment of patent rights (Count III), as well as several state law claims. iBiquity moved to dismiss Counts I, II, and III, arguing that patent exhaustion (Count I) and patent misuse (Count II) do not arise under federal patent law because they are not proper independent claims but, rather, are defenses to an anticipated patent infringement suit. iBiquity also contended that Continental’s claim seeking a declaratory judgment of patent rights (Count III) does not arise under federal patent law because it is merely a state law breach of contract claim in disguise, seeking to interpret a license agreement.

The district court began its analysis with the patent exhaustion and patent misuse claims. “iBiquity argues that the claims are merely defenses and not affirmative causes of action and, as such, they do not ‘arise under’ federal patent law. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6-8. Continental responds that this argument is irrelevant ‘[b]ecause subject matter jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action is based on the claims that could be brought by the declaratory judgment defendant, rather than the declaratory judgment plaintiff.’ Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Dismiss 5. Moreover, Continental asserts that patent misuse may be asserted as an affirmative claim. Id.”
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Plaintiff Ecolab Inc. (“Ecolab”) filed a patent infringement action alleging that Gurtler infringed Ecolab’s patent for “SANITIZING LAUNDRY SOUR,” United States Patent No. 6,262,013 (the “‘013 Patent”). Gurtler subsequently filed a Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of the ‘013 Patent. Gurtler then filed a motion to stay and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) granted Gurtler’s Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of all claims of the ‘013 Patent.

In support of its motion to stay and lack of prejudice to Gurtler, Gurtler argued that Ecolab tactically delayed serving its complaint for four months, which demonstrates that “time is not of the essence” to Ecolab. Additionally, Gurtler argued that because the case was in the early stages of discovery, there was no prejudice to Ecolab. Ecolab argued it will be unduly prejudiced because it is one of Gurtler’s direct competitors, its ability to litigate its claims will suffer, and because Gurtler delayed in seeking reexamination.
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Plaintiff Ecolab Inc. (“Ecolab”) filed a patent infringement action alleging that Gurtler infringed Ecolab’s patent for “SANITIZING LAUNDRY SOUR,” United States Patent No. 6,262,013 (the “‘013 Patent”). Gurtler subsequently filed a Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of the ‘013 Patent. Gurtler then filed a motion to stay and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) granted Gurtler’s Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of all claims of the ‘013 Patent.

In support of its motion to stay and lack of prejudice to Gurtler, Gurtler argued that Ecolab tactically delayed serving its complaint for four months, which demonstrates that “time is not of the essence” to Ecolab. Additionally, Gurtler argued that because the case was in the early stages of discovery, there was no prejudice to Ecolab. Ecolab argued it will be unduly prejudiced because it is one of Gurtler’s direct competitors, its ability to litigate its claims will suffer, and because Gurtler delayed in seeking reexamination.
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After the defendants moved to stay a patent infringement action pending an IPR, the district court analyzed the impact of a potential withdrawal of petitioners from the IPR. The district court began its analysis with the understanding that this was a contingency that might not occur. “The contingency of a PTAB decision after IPR petitioner withdrawal would arise only if all IPR petitioners were to withdraw. I have no idea whether this is at all likely. Nor do I have a basis to speculate upon the reasons why a PTAB petitioner may choose to withdraw after the case has progressed to the point at which a written decision would be appropriate.”
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