Articles Posted in Federal Circuit

Published on:

by

Pfizer filed a patent infringement action against Teva Pharmaceuticals (“Teva”) over a patent that claims the use of certain chemical compounds claimed as a method to treat erectile dysfunction. During the case, Teva filed a motion to amend its answer and counterclaims to alleged a defense and counterclaim for inequitable conduct. The district court granted the motion, but noted that it was a close case.

Several months later, Teva moved to amend its answer and counterclaim to change its allegations supporting the inequitable conduct claim. The district court denied the requested amendment on the ground of prejudice and futility because the amendment was late and would prejudice Pfizer and the individuals named in the proposed amendment and because the amendment failed to make any plausible showing of but-for materiality.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Plaintiff, Innova Patent Licensing, LLC (“Innova”) filed a patent infringement action against Alcatel-Lucent Holdings (“Alcatel”) for a patent claiming methods for using a mail processing program to scan electronic messages to obtain additional information. Alcatel challenged the patent on the ground that it did not claim eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and moved to dismiss.

The court stated that “[u]nder the patent laws, certain broad categories of subject matter are eligible for patent protection,” and cited the language from Section 101 (” Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or a new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title”) and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“in choosing such expansive terms modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope”).
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Plaintiff AlmondNet, Inc. filed a patent infringement action against Microsoft Corporation based on four patents pertaining to Internet advertising. Microsoft filed several affirmative defenses and counterclaims against AlmondNet, including a defense and counterclaim that AlmondNet engaged in inequitable conduct before the PTO by failing to disclose three articles related to Internet advertising and three existing Internet advertising systems. AlmondNet moved to dismiss the inequitable conduct counterclaim and the district court granted the motion with leave to amend to plead inequitable conduct with particularity.

Microsoft subsequently amended its answer and counterclaim and AlmondNet moved to strike the inequitable conduct defense and to dismiss Microsoft’s counterclaim for inequitable conduct. The district court determined that Microsoft’s amended pleading was sufficient and denied the motion.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

TiVo filed a patent infringement action against Verizon and Verizon counterclaimed alleging that TiVo infringed six of its patents. TiVo raised inequitable conduct counterclaims against certain of the Verizon patents. Verizon filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted under the principles set forth in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009), but permitted TiVo to amend its pleading. TiVo amended its pleadings and Verizon renewed its motion to dismiss.

The district court began its analysis by noting that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Company, 2011 WL 2028255 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 2011) was decided after the parties had completed their briefing on the motion. Although Therasense changed the standard for proving inequitable conduct, the district court stated that Thereasense did not address the pleading standard because it was decided based on the review of a bench trial. Accordingly, Exergen remains the leading authority on the pleading standard for inequitable conduct. “Exergen held that for ‘pleading inequitable conduct in patent cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO.'”
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Plaintiff filed a patent infringement action against the defendant alleging that certain of defendant’s T-shirt transfer products infringed plaintiff’s patent. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim which accused the plaintiff of inequitable conduct in amending its patent during a reissuance of the patent. Defendant claimed that plaintiff deliberately pursued a broadened reissue patent based on her learning of material faults in the patent after having had an opportunity to analyze defendant’s products and technology. Defendant’s primary contention was that the amendments made during the reissuance proceeding added new material to the patent.

As the district court wrote, “[a] reissue patent that enlarges the scope of the claims contained in an original patent shall not be granted unless it is applied for within two years of the grant of the original patent.” The reissue application for the patent-in-suit was filed more than two years after the issuance of the patent. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the inequitable conduct defense on the grounds that the facts alleged did not support a plausible inference that the plaintiff (1) made an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact or failed to disclose material information to the PTO during the reissue examination and (2) intended to deceive the PTO.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Mean-plus-function limitations in patent claims require special construction and can result in narrow patent claims that may not be beneficial to patent owners. As a result, many potential infringers will try to take advantage by claiming that certain terms in patent claims are in reality means-plus-function claims. The determination of whether certain terms in a patent are means-plus-function claims can have an important impact on the validity of the patent.

The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in a case involving patents pertaining to elevator systems highlights the importance of whether a claim limitation is considered a means-plus-function term. In Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Americas Corp., Case No. 2010-1525 (Fed. Cir. June 15, 2011), this distinction played a key role.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

After the Federal Circuit’s decision in Thereasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 2011 WL 2028255 (Fed. Cir. 2011), it appeared likely that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to proceed on an inequitable conduct claim. A recent decision from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey may change that trend.

Schering Corp. (“Schering”) filed a complaint alleging that Mylan Pharmaceuticals’ (“Mylan”) Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) infringed two of Schering’s patents that disclosed different ways to reduce cholesterol levels. Schering filed motions for partial summary judgment, one of which sought to eliminate Mylan’s defense of inequitable conduct in light of Thereasense. After granting Schering’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of infringement, the district court examined the motion addressing the inequitable conduct defense.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., is having its intended effect of reigning in inequitable conduct claims. In a recent decision, Judge Otero of the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment of no unenforceability on defendant’s inequitable conduct claim. Plaintiff U.S. Rubber Recycling, Inc. filed suit alleging, among other things, that Defendant Ecore International, Inc. fraudulently procured and wrongfully enforced its patent relating to rubber acoustical underlayment (insulating material for use with floor tile) in order to monopolize the market for such products. Specifically, the Plaintiff asserted that, “during the prosecution of the [patent], Defendant intentionally failed to disclose to the PTO material prior art that showed the claimed invention had been sold in the United States and described in printed publications more than one year prior to the [patent] application.” In its summary judgment motion, the Defendant alleges “that the issuance of the reissue patent demonstrates that the alleged prior art are not material as a matter of law” and that the “Plaintiff cannot raise an issue of genuine fact that the Defendant failed to disclose any reference with bad intent.”
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Failing to act and follow up on cease and desist letters against potential infringers of a patent may preclude enforcement of the patent. This is particularly true when the patent owner does not begin litigation or execute a license for the patent and, during the intervening time, the potential infringer takes action to build its business in reliance on the patent owners failure to act. These issues were addressed by the Federal Circuit in a recent decision, Aspex Eyewear Inc v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 605 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

For further details, see a discussion of Aspex.

______________________________

Continue reading
Published on:

by

In a recent case from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the district court held that the defendant was not liable for patent infringement based on the doctrine of divided infringement. The district court based its ruling on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Communications Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

In Centillion, the Federal Circuit analyzed a patent that disclosed a system for collecting, processing, and delivering information from a service provider, such as a telephone company, to a customer. The Federal Circuit focused its decision on the word “use” — agreeing that “direct infringement by ‘use’ of a system claim ‘requires a party … to use each and every … element of a claimed [system.]” Id. at 1285. The Federal Circuit also stated that “to use’ a system for the purposes of infringement, a party must put the invention into service, i.e., control the system as a whole and obtain benefit from it.”
Continue reading