Articles Posted in District Courts

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Plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware against defendants asserting declaratory judgment, antitrust, Lanham Act and state tort claims based on two patents co-owned by the defendants. The defendants moved to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, primarily because a related case involving the same patents was in the Central District. The District Court granted the motion to transfer.

In opposing the motion to transfer, the plaintiff argued that the case could not be transferred to the Central District of California because the Central District did not have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff. In rejecting this contention, the district court noted that Section 1404(a) requires that “the party moving for transfer bear the burden of proving that the action properly could have been brought in the transferee court in the first instance.”
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In a recent case in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the district court stayed a patent infringement case pending reexamination of the patent in the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). Defendant filed a motion to stay the case in light of an inter partes reexamination of the patent-in-suit that was granted by the PTO, arguing that the reexamination will simplify the issues before the parties and the court because “75% of all reexaminations granted from 1981 through June 30, 2009 have resulted in either the cancellation of all claims or at least some claims.” Plaintiff opposed the motion as a “delay tactic,” contending that “recent trends in inter partes reexaminations indicate that only 24% of reexaminations result in the cancellation of all patent claims at issue and that inter partes reexamination proceedings can last six to eight years.”

First, referring to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) and noting that a district court may impose a stay of discovery on a showing of good cause, the district court stated that “[s]pecifically, a court has broad discretion to stay a case pending reexamination.” Second, the district court found that granting a stay would not cause undue prejudice to the plaintiff or allow the defendant to gain a clear tactical advantage.
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Plaintiff filed a patent infringement suit against 17 defendants alleging direct, indirect and joint infringement. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motions to dismiss the joint infringement and indirect infringement claims, but denied the motions to dismiss the direct infringement claims.

The patent-in-suit discloses a data processing station subscriber unit that delivers interactive or television-quality entertainment and informational content to subscribers. Each of the independent claims include a limitation requiring a plurality of sources of video text and television program channels available from a wireless television program communication network.
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A Texas Court recently granted a plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s non-infringement theory based on the defendant’s failure to previously disclose it. At trial, the defendant attempted to elicit testimony from the plaintiff’s expert witness that the accused website did not infringe, in light of the way it operated. Because the defendant had not previously disclosed this theory of non-infringement at any time before trial, the plaintiff moved to strike this testimony. In granting the plaintiff’s motion, the Texas court rejected the defendant’s argument that it was not required to disclose its non-infringement theory because the plaintiff bears the burden of proving infringement.

In its opinion, the Court reiterated the long held liberal discovery policies in the Eastern District of Texas: “[t]he Eastern District of Texas is well known for it liberal discovery policies and its high expectations that the parties and their counsel be forthcoming in their discovery obligations. Under the Court’s Discovery Order, requests for production are not required; parties are expected to produce all relevant documents without formal requests for production. These policies promote efficient dispute resolution and avoid trial by ambush.”
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Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in California seeking to invalidate defendant’s patents and for a declaration that it did not infringe the patents. The defendant responded by filing a patent infringement lawsuit in Florida in the same court where it had previously filed and litigated a patent infringement matter on three of the four patents at issue in California against an unrelated party. In ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, the district court sided with the defendant and dismissed the declaratory judgment action in California even though it was filed before the patent infringement action.

The defendant was a resident of Florida, who owned a patent portfolio pertaining to Ground Data Link (“GDL”) technology that collects flight performance data from aircraft and transmits that information wirelessly to ground-based systems. Defendant had licensed its technology to various companies and also had engaged in prior litigation over its patents in Florida, including proceeding through claim construction and obtaining a jury verdict of infringement of its valid patents.
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The plaintiff filed a patent infringement action against the defendant in the Northern District of Illinois after licensing negotiations fell apart. Defendant, a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Michigan moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to transfer. The district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, but it permitted plaintiff to amend the complaint.

The plaintiff, operating out of Illinois, owned four patents pertaining to laser-etching technology, which is used to etch patterns and effects onto a wide range of materials, including fabrics and leather. Defendant sold leather for use in automotive interiors for distribution throughout the United States, including in the district. The parties had worked together since 2004, with the goal of selling leather etched with plaintiff’s technology to automotive companies. In 2009, the plaintiff sent defendant some samples on a new etching which the plaintiff alleged defendant converted for its own use and sold to an automotive company. Ultimately, the parties began to negotiate a license to resolve these issues, among others. As part of these negotiations, the parties exchanged e-mails and negotiated by telephone as well. When the negotiations ceased, the plaintiff filed suit for patent infringement, breach of a non-disclosure agreement, and trade secret misappropriation, among other claims. The defendant moved to dismiss or transfer venue.
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In a recent case from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the district court granted a defendant’s motion to compel an interrogatory response where the infringement contentions were inadequate to put the defendant on notice of the alleged infringement. The infringement contentions relied on a number of screenshot that referred to a specific configuration file. The defendant argued that the screenshots alone failed to explain how the products as depicted allegedly met the limitations of the asserted claims and that the citations to the documents accompanying the infringement contentions also did not supply the missing information.

The defendant served an interrogatory seeking the missing information. The plaintiff refused to respond to any portion of the interrogatory, asserting that its amended infringement contentions contained screenshots that showed the products at each stage of the infringing processes and that the claim charts also contained a detailed narrative and citations to show the infringing processes. The defendant disagreed, arguing that neither the screenshots nor the narrative disclosed the particular configurations of the accused products and were meaningless without an understanding of the custom configuration of the accused products that were used to produce the screenshots.
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Defendant contended that several claims of a patent were indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶2. The defendant argued that the term “engine for” should be construed under §112, ¶6 because engine is only discussed in functional terms. The defendant also argued that the term “engine for” did not connote sufficient structure because it does not have a well understood meaning in the art. The district court disagreed with both points and denied the motion for summary judgment.

The patent in the case involved the creation of a web-based database application that used a data dictionary. The patent teaches that the data dictionary eliminates the need for a programmer or web-developer, which reduces the cost and time associated with creating a web-based data application. Certain claims of the patent recited “an engine for” performing various tasks, such as “determining and storing” or “building and/or updating and/or running an application.” The defendant contended that the “engine for” limitations were indefinite and should be construed as means-plus-function claims. It also contended that the “engine for” terms did not recite particular algorithms that performed the functions and were therefore indefinite.
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Recently, a Court in the Central District of California, applying the Patent Rules from the Northern District of California, held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the requisite good cause to amend its infringement contentions to add additional accused products. In particular, Plaintiff Kruse Technology Partnership (“Kruse”) sought to add new engines to its infringement contentions based on its recent testing of the engines. In denying Kruse’s motion for leave to amend its infringement contentions, the Court took issue with Kruse for failing to explain why it had not tested the accused engines before it filed its infringement contentions. In doing so, the Court held that “[m]erely stating the tests are expensive is insufficient,” particularly where Kruse was able to later acquire and test the engines at issue. The Court also noted that Kruse never did disclose the cost of the testing. The Court further rejected Kruse’s argument that any disruptions caused by its amended contentions were contemplated by the Patent Rules. The Court found that, while the Patent Rules allow for disruptions caused by timely amending infringement contentions, the disruptions resulting from Kruse’s proposed amendments were not contemplated because Kruse was not diligent in discovering the engines it now seeks to add, and thus its amendments were not justified. The Court found that Kruse’s failure to move to compel discovery on these engines was further evidence of Kruse’s lack of diligence.
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In this case, the defendant asserted a defense of inequitable conduct on the grounds that the inventors of the patent-in-suit were aware of prior art when they prosecuted the patent but failed to disclose that prior art.. On a motion to dismiss the inequitable conduct defense, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the defendant had plead insufficient factual allegations to support an inequitable conduct defense.

The plaintiff asserted that the defendant had failed to sufficiently plead inequitable conduct because it had not plead that material prior art was withheld, sufficient knowledge of the prior art, and that such prior art was withheld with an intent to deceive the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). The district court started its analysis by noting that inequitable conduct is akin to a claim for fraud and therefore must meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must sate with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).
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