In a patent case pending before Judge Selna in the Central District of California, Defendant Nestlé USA, Inc. (“Nestlé”) moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff Network Signatures, Inc.’s (“NSI”) infringement claims under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The Court denied Nestlé’s motion finding that NSI’s complaint alleged enough facts to plausibly state a claim for direct, indirect and willful infringement.
The Court recited the well established legal standard for attacking a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal:
In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under Twombly, the Court must follow a two-pronged approach. First, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but “[t]hread-bare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Most succinctly stated, a pleading must set forth allegations that have “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1940. Courts “‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Id. at 1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “In keeping with these principles[,] a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
Second, assuming the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1950. This determination is context-specific, requiring the Court to draw on its experience and common sense; there is no plausibility “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.