Articles Posted in District Courts

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Plaintiff Forest Laboratories, Inc. (“Forest”) moved to centralize their litigation in the District of Delaware. The litigation consisted of two action pending in the District of Delaware and the Northern District of Illinois. The defendants in the Delaware action did not oppose centralization, but one of the defendants suggested selection of the Northern District of Illinois as the transferee district. The defendants in the Northern District of Illinois opposed centralization and, alternatively, suggested selection of the Northern District of Illinois as the transferee forum.

Forest brought the actions in this litigation after various generic drug manufacturer defendants submitted Abbreviated New Drug Application seeking the approval of the Food and Drug Administration to make and sell generic versions of the patented Forest drug Bystolic before the drug’s patent expires. Bystolic reportedly contains a beta-adrenergic blocking agent, or “beta blocker,” called nebivolol hydrochloride and is indicated for the treatment of hypertension, to lower blood pressure. Alkem and Indchemie oppose centralization by arguing, inter alia, that (1) centralization is unnecessary Alkem and Indchemie oppose centralization by arguing, inter alia, that (1) centralization is unnecessary because only two actions are pending in two districts, and (2) the facts among the different actions will vary, given the difference proposed generic formulations at issue. We respectfully disagree with these arguments. Even though only two actions are pending, the Panel has recognized that “actions involving the validity of complex pharmaceutical patents and the entry of generic versions of the patent holder’s drugs are particularly well-suited for transfer under Section 1407.” In re Alfuzosin Hydrochloride Patent Litig., 560 F.Supp. 2d 1372, 1372 (J.P.M.L. 2008). Indeed, the Panel has frequently centralized litigation compromised of only two Hatch-Waxman Act cases.
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Apple moved for summary judgment with respect to Claim 5 of Motorola’s U.S. Patent No. 6,175,559 (the ‘559 patent). Claim 5 of the ‘559 patent provides for a A method of generating preamble sequences in a CDMA system, the method comprising” steps of forming an outer code, forming an inner code and multiplying the outer code by the inner code to generate a preamble sequence.

A couple of weeks earlier, the district court interpreted the claim language to mean that the third step of multiplying the chips of the inner code by the chips of the outer code only occurs after the inner code and outer code are completed. Apple argued on summary judgment that its devices do not completely form the alleged inner and outer codes before those codes are combined to generate the preamble sequence.
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In this patent infringement action, plaintiff Hoyt Fleming (“Fleming”) moved to strike certain paragraphs of the report of Escort’s expert on its defense of non-infringement. One of Escort’s defenses to the charge of infringement was that Escort’s devices lock out false signals by using a process different from that described in Fleming’s patents. Escort asserted that false signals are locked out of Fleming’s invention when the device reaches a predetermined distance from the predetermined position of a false signal, but with Escort’s devices, the distance from a lockout varies.

Accordingly, as the district court explained, “Escort’s expert, Dr. Grindon, concluded, among other things, that ‘the asserted claims of the ‘038 patent are not infringed’ by Escort’s devices. Id. at pp. 1-8. In his claim-by-claim analysis set forth in that Supplemental Report — at paragraphs 21 through 42 — he concludes that Escort’s products do not infringe claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 23, 25, 26, and 27 of the ‘038 patent because those claims describe a device that locks out an alert if the device is a predetermined distance from a predetermined false signal, while with the Escort products, ‘the distance from a lockout varies.’ Id.”
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In this dispute over the inventorship of a patent that is integral to BlackBerry products, the district court held a bench trial on the applicability of laches. The issue at the bench trial turned on whether RIM suffered economic prejudice as a result of plaintiff’s delay in bringing the lawsuit.

The complaint to correct the inventorship of the patent-in-suit was filed on August 1, 2011. After a summary judgment motion disposed of the state law claims, the district court found that RIM had established a presumption of laches on the correction-of-inventorship claim but the plaintiff had rebutted the presumption by showing a lack of evidentiary or economic prejudice that resulted from the unreasonable delay in bringing the lawsuit. The district court then ordered a bench trial to resolve the disputed issues of fact as laches is an equitable defense that is heard by the court and not a jury. After the bench trial, the district court made various findings of fact.
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In this dispute over inventorship of a patent, Affymetrix (“Affymetrix”) and Gregory Kirk (“Mr. Kirk”) sought to correct U.S. Patent Nos. 7,510,481 and 7,612,020 to add Mr. Kirk as one of the inventors on the patents. The patents are directed to a method and an apparatus for conducting genetic testing using microarrays and are assigned to the defendant, Illumina, Inc. (“Illumina”). The plaintiffs contended that Mr. Kirk is a joint inventor because of certain information he disclosed in an email to one of the named inventors several months before the first patent application was filed.

The plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to preclude Illumina’s expert from testifying at trial on the ground that his opinions were neither relevant nor helpful. In its motion, the plaintiffs divided Illumina’s expert report into three parts: (1) an opinion that Mr. Kirk did not contribute a “complete and operative invention”; (2) an opinion on Mr. Kirk’s contribution to “decoding”; and (3) an opinion on the “organization and structure” of Mr. Kirk’s emails.
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In one of several patent battles that Apple is waging across the country against Google’s Android operating system, Motorola moved to exclude the testimony of one of the inventors of the patent-in-suit. As part of determining this motion, the district court, Judge Posner, requested that Apple answer several questions in camera, including why the inventor retained certain counsel and under what circumstances the inventor retained the additional counsel provided by Apple.
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Zep Solar Inc. (“Zep”) filed a patent infringement action against several defendants. Two of the defendants, Lightway Green new Energy Company, LTD (“Lightway”) and Brightway Global LLC (“Brightway”) answered and counterclaimed with an allegation of inequitable conduct. Zep moved to strike or dismiss the counterclaim and affirmative defense.

As the district court stated, “[i]n the fourth affirmative defense, Brightway and Lightway allege that ‘[t]he Complaint and the purported claim for relief therein is barred because the ‘537 Patent, and each claim thereof, is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.’ (Docket No. 49, Answer and Counterclaims for Relief at 7:26-27.) In their second counterclaim for relief, Lightway and Brightway alleged hat the ‘537 Patent is ‘invalid and/or unenforceable for failing to meet the conditions of patentability including but not limited to hose specified in 36 U.S. C. Sections 1 et seq., including 35 U.S.C. sections 102, 103, 112, 199, 256 and 37 C.F.R. section 1.56.'”
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In a patent case pending before Judge Selna in the Central District of California, Defendant Nestlé USA, Inc. (“Nestlé”) moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff Network Signatures, Inc.’s (“NSI”) infringement claims under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The Court denied Nestlé’s motion finding that NSI’s complaint alleged enough facts to plausibly state a claim for direct, indirect and willful infringement.

The Court recited the well established legal standard for attacking a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal:

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under Twombly, the Court must follow a two-pronged approach. First, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but “[t]hread-bare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Most succinctly stated, a pleading must set forth allegations that have “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1940. Courts “‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Id. at 1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “In keeping with these principles[,] a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

Second, assuming the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1950. This determination is context-specific, requiring the Court to draw on its experience and common sense; there is no plausibility “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.

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And so began a recent order from Judge Posner in the ongoing dispute between Apple and Motorola over various patents directed to features of smart phones. Apple and Motorola have each asserted patent claims against the other and, as the case approaches trial, Judge Posner has issued an order regarding the phases and sequence of the trial.
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On remand to the district court after the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., the district court reviewed the procedural posture of the case and the landmark Therasense decision. The district court noted that “Therasense worked a seismic shift in the law of inequitable conduct,” and particularly that “materiality would henceforth use a but-for definition, meaning that submission of the withheld item would have led to a rejection.” The district court also analyzed the decision including the closeness of the vote on the new standard, stating that “[d]espite the closeness of the decision and the importance of the question to our patent system and national economy, no petition for certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court.”

Before applying the facts to the new standard articulated by the Federal Circuit, the district court noted the Federal Circuit’s instructions on remand (1) that the “district court should determine whether there is clear an convincing evidence demonstrating that Sanghera or Pope knew of the EPO brief, knew of their materiality, and made the conscious decision not to disclose them in order to deceive the PTO” and (2) the “district court should determine whether the PTO would have granted the patent but for Abbott’s failure to disclose the EPO briefs. …”
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