Articles Posted in District Courts

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In Smart Options, LLC v. Jump Rope, Inc., Case No. 12-C-2498 (N.D. Ill. March 25, 2013), plaintiff Smart Options brought suit for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,313,539 against Jump Rope. The ‘539 Patent relates to a method for purchasing an “option” to buy a good or service (e.g., concert ticket) at a “reservation price” within a designated time period. If the option to buy is not exercised then it expires and there is no refund of the “option fee.” Smart Options utilizes the patent in the operation of its website www.optionit.com. Jump Rope operated a smart phone application that allows users to bypass entrance lines at events by purchasing a “Jump” which allows immediate access to the event without any additional purchase required.

After the suit was filed, Jump Rope served Smart Options with a Rule 11 motion and cover letter stating that Jump Rope would seek its attorneys’ fees and costs if Smart Options proceeded with the suit and the Court entered a finding of non-infringement. Jump Rope explained why it considered the suit to be meritless:

Plaintiff alleges violation of a patent that covers providing options on the right to purchase goods or services at a future time. Defendant’s software application, however, does not provide options or charge option fees. Rather, it allows someone to buy the service provided – a right to “jump the line” at an event or facility. Plaintiff and its counsel could have and easily should have discovered this, as the iPhone/Android application they accuse is free to download.

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TravelClick, Inc. (“TravelClick”) filed a declaratory judgment action against defendants Variant Holdings, LLC and Variant, Inc. (“Variant”), seeking a declaration that its iHotelier online hotel reservation system did not infringe Variant’s patent number 7,626,044 (the ‘044 patent). Variant filed a motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Texas based on the “first-filed” rule or 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) on the grounds that the Eastern District of Texas is a more convenient forum and transfer will serve the interests of justice.

In analyzing the motion, the district court found that the convenience factor did not weigh heavily in either direction. “Plaintiff does not identify any connection to Wisconsin that would make litigating in this state more convenient for it. Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in New York, with offices in Schaumburg, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia, Orlando, Florida; Houston, Texas and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Only 16 of plaintiff’s 2000 customers that use the iHotelier system are located in Wisconsin. One of the defendants, Variant, Inc. is headquartered in this district, though it has no employees or present activities in this district and supports a transfer to Texas. (Its sole employee recently moved from Missouri to Texas.) The other defendant, Variant Holdings, LLC is headquartered in Nevis and has no employees. No matter where the case proceeds, the venue will be more convenient for some parties than others.”
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In Arrival Star S.A.., et al. -v- Meitek Inc., et al., Defendant Meitek Inc. (“Meitek”) moved for Rule 11 sanctions against the Plaintiff Arrival Star S.A. (“Arrival Star”) based on Meitek’s contentions that “ArrivalStar’s counsel (1) failed to prepare any claim construction before filing suit, (2) made a “tactical decision” to sue Meitek instead of its Chinese parent company due to the difficulties of retaining service and recovering judgment against the latter, and (3) improperly relied on the views of a patent practitioner to opine on the issue of infringement.” Meitek sought at least three times its attorneys’ fees of $110,000 and preferably 5 to 10 times this amount, or $550,000 to $1,100,000 in sanctions.

The Court recited the standard under Rule 11 that sanctions may be imposed “when a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose. The standard governing both the ‘improper purpose’ and ‘frivolous’ inquiries is objective.” (internal citations omitted). The Court further stated that Local Rule 11-9 further provides that the presentation to the Court of frivolous motions subjects the offender at the discretion of the Court to sanctions.
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Plaintiff Parkervision, Inc. filed a patent infringement action against Qualcomm. Qualcomm answered the complaint and alleged an affirmative defense of inequitable conduct and a counterclaim that included a claim for inequitable conduct. Parkervision moved to strike the affirmative defense and the counterclaims pertaining to inequitable conduct, among other defenses and claims.

As explained by the district court, “Qualcomm counterclaims that ParkerVision’s ‘551 patent is unenforceable due to ParkerVision’s inequitable conduct and that the other five ParkerVision patents — ‘518, ‘371, ‘734, ‘342, and ‘845 — are also unenforceable because they stem from the ‘551 patent. (Doc. No. 91, ¶¶ 69-116.) All six of the inequitable conduct counterclaims thus rest on the factual allegations regarding the ‘551 patent. Specifically, Qualcomm sets forth three theories of inequitable conduct, alleging that Michael Q. Lee, the ‘551 patent’s prosecuting attorney, and David F. Sorrells, an inventor: (1) “buried” the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) with references; (2) belatedly disclosed a material reference to the PTO; and (3) materially misrepresented four references to the PTO. Qualcomm urges the Court to consider the alleged inequitable conduct cumulatively, as a “course of deliberate egregious misconduct.” (Id. ¶ 35.)”
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In a patent case pending before Judge Koh in the Northern District of California, Defendant Pinnaclife Inc. (“Pinnaclife”) moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff CreAgri, Inc. (“CreAgri”) infringement claims under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The Court denied in part and granted in part CreaGri’s motion finding that Pinnaclife’s amended complaint alleged facts sufficient to plausibly state a claim for direct infringement, but failed to meet the pleading requirements for indirect infringement.

First, the Court held that the pleading standards for direct infringement are governed by Form 18, even though the patent claims at issue were method claims:

[A] claim for direct infringement of a method patent is still a claim for direct infringement, and is therefore governed by the Form 18 pleading standard. Nothing in Form 18 suggests that its applicability is limited to device patents, nor did the Federal Circuit, in confirming that pleading requirements for direct infringement claims are governed by Form 18, suggest that this holding should be limited to device patents.

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In this patent infringement action, plaintiff Allvoice Developments US LLC (“Allvoice”) moved to amend its infringement contentions against Microsoft. Allvoice sought the amendment to incorporate changes that related to two claim constructions by the district court that differed from those asserted by Allvoice and to provide technical corrections or clarifications that would avoid confusion. Allvoice asserted there was good cause for the amendments and there be no prejudice to Microsoft. Microsoft opposed the amendment on the grounds of undue delay and unfair prejudice.

The district court began its analysis of the motion by citing to the local patent rules. “Local Patent Rule 124 allows for amendments of infringement contentions ‘only by order of the Court upon a timely showing of good cause.’ W.D. Wash. Local Patent Rule 124. Non-exhaustive examples of circumstances that may, absent undue prejudice to the non-moving party, support a finding of good cause include: (a) a claim construction by the Court different from that proposed by the party seeking amendment; (b) recent discovery of material prior art despite earlier diligent search; and (c) recent discovery of nonpublic information about the Accused Device which was not discovered, despite diligent efforts, before the service of the Infringement Contentions.”
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Klausner Technologies, Inc. (“Klausner Technologies”) filed a patent infringement action against Interactive Intelligence Group, Inc. (“Interactive Intelligence” or “IIG”). After the action was filed, Klausner Technologies assigned all of its interest in the patent-in-suit to IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. (“IPVX”), including the rights to enforce the patent and to recover for past infringement of the patent. IPVX was incorporated only three days before the assignment. As a result of the assignment, Klausner Technologies moved to substitute IPVX for Klausner Technologies as the plaintiff and counter-defendant in the patent infringement action.

Interactive Intelligence agreed that IPVX should be joined as a plaintiff but opposed the dismissal of Klausner Technologies from the action. Interactive Intelligence asserted that because virtually all of the discovery would come from Klausner Technologies and its officers and employees, dismissing Klausner Technologies would cause added expense and delay as discovery would be needed from a third party. Klausner Technologies responded by arguing that it had agreed to provide all information regarding the patent to IPVX. Klausner Technologies also argued that it had to be dismissed because it no longer had standing to participate in the litigation as a result of the assignment of the patent.
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In the patent infringement action brought by Carnegie Mellon University (“Carnegie Mellon” or “CMU”) against Marvell Technology Group, LTD. (“Marvell’), the jury returned a verdict in favor of Carnegie Mellon in the amount of $1.17 billion, finding that Marvell had infringed two patents owned by Carnegie Mellon. The jury also found that Marvell’s infringement of the patents was willful, paving the way for the potential for enhanced damages as well as an award of attorneys’ fees. Marvell has vowed to challenge the damage award before the district court and, if necessary, the Federal Circuit.

A few days before the jury returned its verdict, Carnegie Mellon filed a motion to preclude Marvell from relying on an advice of counsel defense to defend against the charge of willful infringement. Carnegie Mellon filed a motion to strike the testimony of one of Marvell’s witnesses and also to preclude Marvell from relying on an advice of counsel defense.
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Plaintiff Suffolk Technologies, LLC (“Suffolk”) brought a patent infringement action against AOL and Google. Suffolk’s complaint alleged that “AOL and Google have infringed U.S. Patent No. 6,082,835 (135 patent) entitled “Internet Server and Method of Controlling an Internet Server.” The ‘835 patent claims a method of controlling an internet server whereby the server receives a hypertext transfer protocol file request from a web browser with an identification signal and then compares the identification signal with one or more predetermined identification signals, and based on the results of the comparison, a file may be transmitted from the server back to the requesting web browser.”

AOL and Google filed a motion to dismiss the action based on lack of standing. As explained by the district court, “[t]his patent infringement suit presents the increasingly common, but always vexing jurisdictional question whether plaintiff, the assignee of the patent in issue, possesses ”all substantial rights’ to the patent, such that it has standing to sue putative infringers.”
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In December 2010, plaintiff Multimedia Patent Trust (“MPT”) filed a complaint for patent infringement against several defendants, including Apple, LG and Canon. The complaint accused the defendants of infringing several patents pertaining to video compression technology. The district court subsequently granted Canon’s motion for summary judgment based on exhaustion. Prior to trial, the remaining defendants filed a motion to exclude MPT’s infringement expert’s analysis under the doctrine of equivalents.

After reviewing the standard for a Daubert motion to exclude expert testimony, the district court turned to the specific standard for infringement of means-plus-function claims. “A patent infringement analysis proceeds in two steps. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 517 U.S. 370. In the first step, the court construes the asserted claims as a matter of law. See id. In the second step, the factfinder compares the claimed invention to the accused device. Id.; see also Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A determination of infringement is a question of fact . . . .”). “To prove literal infringement, the patentee must show that the accused device contains every limitation in the asserted claims. If even one limitation is missing or not met as claimed, there is no literal infringement.” Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).”
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