Published on:

by

Abaxis, Inc. (“Abaxis”) filed a patent infringement action against Cepheid asserting that Cepheid infringed four of Abaxis’ patents. In its answer, Cepheid asserted a defense of inequitable conduct and Abaxis moved to dismiss the defense. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted the motion.

In support of the inequitable conduct defense, Cepheid alleged that the patent prosecutor knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) material prior art during the prosecution of the patents. Cepheid also explained that the undisclosed prior art anticipated and/or rendered the patents obvious and, therefore, the patents would not have issued had the prior art been before the PTO. Cepheid also alleged that the patent prosecutor made statements to the PTO during the patent prosecution to distinguish prior art cited by the by the PTO that were knowingly false in light of the information withheld from the PTO and “but for” these statements and the withholding of the material prior art the patents would not have issued.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Mean-plus-function limitations in patent claims require special construction and can result in narrow patent claims that may not be beneficial to patent owners. As a result, many potential infringers will try to take advantage by claiming that certain terms in patent claims are in reality means-plus-function claims. The determination of whether certain terms in a patent are means-plus-function claims can have an important impact on the validity of the patent.

The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in a case involving patents pertaining to elevator systems highlights the importance of whether a claim limitation is considered a means-plus-function term. In Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Americas Corp., Case No. 2010-1525 (Fed. Cir. June 15, 2011), this distinction played a key role.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Plaintiff Personal Audio, LLC (“Personal Audio”) filed a patent infringement action against Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) over two patents, which teach an audio program player that will play a sequence of audio program files and accept commands from the user to skip forward or backward in the sequence. After a jury trial, the jury found that the patents were infringed and awarded damages of $8 million in the form of a lump sum royalty.

After the jury verdict, Personal Audio moved for an award of ongoing royalties pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 283. The district court denied the motion. The district court found that “the jury’s lump sum damages award represents a fully paid up license for all past and future sales of Apple products that incorporate the patented technology. The court finds that the $8 million lump sum awarded by the jury adequately compensates Personal Audio for both past and future infringement, and therefore no ongoing royalty award is necessary.”
Continue reading

Published on:

by

After the Federal Circuit’s decision in Thereasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 2011 WL 2028255 (Fed. Cir. 2011), it appeared likely that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to proceed on an inequitable conduct claim. A recent decision from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey may change that trend.

Schering Corp. (“Schering”) filed a complaint alleging that Mylan Pharmaceuticals’ (“Mylan”) Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) infringed two of Schering’s patents that disclosed different ways to reduce cholesterol levels. Schering filed motions for partial summary judgment, one of which sought to eliminate Mylan’s defense of inequitable conduct in light of Thereasense. After granting Schering’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of infringement, the district court examined the motion addressing the inequitable conduct defense.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Plaintiff, Jan Voda, M.D. (“Dr. Voda”), filed a patent infringement action against Medtronic Inc. (“Medtronic”) based on a patent that taught how to use a guide catheter to perform angioplasty of the left coronary artery. After Dr. Voda filed an amended complaint adding an additional patent, Medtronic moved to dismiss the new count based on the new patent pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and attached documents that were not referred to in the complaint and that were not central to Dr. Voda’s claims. The district court issued an order notifying the parties that it would treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and would consider the documents.

Medtronic’s motion argued that one of the counts of the amended complaint should be dismissed because the newly added patent was unenforceable in light of the Terminal Disclaimers. The Terminal Disclaimers stated that the ‘195 patent “shall be enforceable only for and during such period that it” is commonly owned with the ‘213 patent and another patent (the ‘625 patent),
Continue reading

Published on:

by

In a patent dispute over a method for detecting fetal Down syndrome, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts invalidated the patent owner’s patent because it was anticipated and obvious. The patent at issue describes screening methods to determine Down syndrome in which physicians estimate the risk of Down syndrome using markers from both the first and second trimesters of a pregnancy. The patent teaches determining the risk for fetal Down syndrome by combining markers from both stages of pregnancy into a single assessment of risk.

According to the district court opinion, after the patent was filed tests that integrate first and second-trimester data into a single calculation of risk were considered to have a higher detection rate than any test that used the data from only one of the trimesters. The testing disclosed by the patent is widely adopted and is licensed to a number of entities with thousands of assessments conducted under theses licenses each year.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Plaintiffs and defendant manufacture machines that automatically inspect integrated circuits made on semiconductor wafers. Plaintiffs sued defendant for patent infringement and a jury found that the patent was valid and infringed, but did not find that the infringement was willful.

After the jury verdict, the defendant notified its sales force of the verdict and emphasized that the process was not over and that no judgment had been entered. Plaintiffs notified the defendant that it would consider any sales that occurred after the jury verdict evidence of willful infringement. Several months later, the district court denied defendant’s post-trial motions and entered judgment for plaintiffs based on the jury verdict. The district court also entered a permanent injunction. Despite the permanent injunction, the defendant continued to sell the infringing product by meeting with potential customers in the United States who planned to use the machine in other parts of the world. The plaintiffs moved for contempt.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

In a recent case in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the court denied defendants’ motion to transfer the case to the District of New Jersey. The court’s analysis focused primarily on whether the case could have originally been filed in the District of New Jersey. The court began its analysis by noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that “[f]or convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”

Recognizing that the “first determination to be made under § 1404(a) is whether the claim could have been filed in the judicial district to which transfer is sought,” the court stated that the “‘critical time’ when making this threshold inquiry is the time when the lawsuit was filed.” Plaintiff contended that the matter could not have been filed in New Jersey initially because two of the defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. Defendants responded that the action could have been filed in New Jersey because the defendants consented to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey and were indemnified by another defendant, which was based in New Jersey.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

Plaintiff brought a patent infringement action alleging direct infringement of a single patent. The defendant, a corporation, sought an extension of time to respond to the complaint through a request from its CEO. Because corporations cannot represented themselves and must instead be represented by a licensed attorney, the district court denied the requested extension and ordered the defendant to answer within 30 days. A few months later, the CEO of the defendant filed an extension request in order to complete a re-examination of the plaintiff’s patent even though there was no re-examination request pending before the Patent and Trademark Office. The defendant still had not filed an answer to the complaint.

In response, the plaintiff requested that the district court enter a default judgment against the defendant and to set a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff and whether a permanent injunction should issue. More than a week later, the defendant, through an attorney, filed an answer to the complaint. Plaintiff moved to strike the answer because the defendant had failed to seek leave of court to files its late answer. The district court denied plaintiff’s motion and permitted the defendant to answer the complaint.
Continue reading

Published on:

by

In a patent infringement action, the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the on sale bar and dismissed plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Defendants then requested that the district court find the case exceptional due plaintiff’s litigation misconduct. Based on that misconduct, the district court found that the case was exceptional. Defendants then moved for an award of $800,000 in attorneys’ fees.

The district court noted under 35 U.S.C. § 285, it may in exceptional cases award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. To do so, the court must first determine that there is clear and convincing evidence that the case is exceptional and then the court must exercise its discretion in determining whether an award of fees is justified. The district court also noted that “[l]itigation misconduct and unprofessional behavior may suffice, by themselves, to make a case exceptional under § 285” but “[i]n cases deemed exceptional only on the basis of litigation misconduct, however, the amount of the award must bear some relation to the extension of the misconduct.”
Continue reading