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PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC (“PersonalWeb”) filed a patent infringement action against Google for infringement of its “Truenames” patents. Google filed a motion for sanctions based on a contention that PersonalWeb systematically deleted relevant emails when it reasonably anticipated litigation. PersonalWeb opposed the motion arguing that it had an email retention policy and timely implemented a litigation hold shortly after the filing of the lawsuit against Google.

In working on its analysis of the motion, the court stated that PersonalWeb’s duty to preserve evidence arose when litigation became reasonably foreseeable. Google asserted that PersonalWeb anticipated litigation no later than June 2011, before it even acquired the patents-in-suit because there were discussions regarding future litigation against major technology companies during weekly lunch meetings. The court agreed that “PersonalWeb probably acquired the patents with an eye toward litigation. However, it is difficult to say that litigation was reasonably foreseeable before PersonalWeb even acquired the thing which would give it standing to sue.”
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Orbit Irrigation Products (“Orbit”) filed a patent infringement action against Sunhills International (“Sunhills”). After the completion of certain discovery, Sunhills filed a motion to compel. Sunhills contended that Orbit had failed to provide a computation of damages as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and failed to produce its documents related to its damages. As a result, Sunhills asked the district Court to bar Orbit from introducing any evidence related to damages beyond that already produced.

In its disclosure and in discovery, Orbit claimed that it suffered $19 million in damages. The court explained that “[o]n its face Rule 26 requires Orbit to provide Sunhills both with a computation of each category of damages it claims and with the non-privileged documents on which it bases those calculations. Orbit asserted a fixed number for damages suffered from price compression ($19 million) as compared to the lack of any concrete number offered for reputational damages. Sunhills has a right to know from the outset how Orbit reached that number. Such disclosure does not prevent a party from changing theories as the case proceeds.”
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After trial and the denial of post-trial motions, AT&T Operations, Inc. (“AT&T”) filed motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). AT&T argued that the e-mail notice of electronic filings (NEF’s) that defense counsel received did not provide them with “notice” that Defendants’ substantive post-trial motions had been resolved. To make this argument, AT&T noted that the e-mail notifications defense counsel received only contained language regarding the district court’s grant of their motions for leave to file sealed documents, but failed to mention the denial of their substantive post-trial motions, which was provided in the same orders. Nonetheless, the district court noted that AT&T did, however, receive e-mail notifications that the Court had entered an order on Plaintiff’s bill of costs and had denied Defendants’ motion for new trial and JMOL on invalidity which were not sealed pleadings.

AT&T also argued that the docket entries for the orders at issue were modified two days later to reflect the denial of the substantive post-trial motions, but no new electronic notices were sent by the district court’s electronic case filing (ECF) system to reflect these amended docket entries. Accordingly, AT&T contended that based on the NEFs they received, counsel believed the motions for JMOL and new trial on damages and non-infringement had not been disposed of and remained pending before the Court. As a result, AT&T claimed that it “did not receive sufficient notice of the substance of the orders entered justifies reopening the time to file an appeal.”
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Clouding IP (“Clouding”) filed a patent infringement action against Rackspace, which alleged direct, indirect, and willful infringement of the patents-in-suit. The district court granted defendant Rackspace’s motion to dismiss with respect to indirect infringement, but also granted Clouding leave to amend its complaint. In that ruling, the district court found that Clouding had adequately plead the knowledge requirement for induced infringement, but the district court dismissed Clouding’s claims because the First Amended Complaint “failed to plead facts from which the Court [could] infer intent.”

Clouding filed a second amended complaint, which again alleged claims for inducing infringement. Rackspace moved to dismiss the indirect infringement claims. Rackspace’s motion presented a narrow issue as to whether Clouding failed to sufficiently plead the element of intent for its inducement claims.
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Digital-Vending Services International, LLC (“Digital-Vending”) filed a patent infringement action against The University of Phoenix, Inc. and Apollo Group, Inc. (“Defendants”). During the course of the litigation, the Magistrate Judge granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions for Digital-Vending’s spoliation.

After the matter settled, Digital-Vending and the Defendants filed a consent motion to vacate the Magistrate Judge’s opinion and order granting Defendants’ motion for sanctions for spoliation. As part of the consent motion, the parties informed the court that the Defendants had withdrawn their motion for sanction and that Digital-Vending and the Defendants had settled the case. The parties also informed the court that as part of the settlement Defendants had agree to join the consent motion and that Digital-Vending had dismissed its appeal to the Federal Circuit with prejudice.

The court then proceeded to reject the consent motion, finding that it was inappropriate and the court would not hide Digital-Vending discovery abuse. “The Court will not agree to hide the discovery abuse of the plaintiff in this case by withdrawing the October 3, 2013” order.

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Geotag, Inc (“Geotag”) filed a patent infringement action against Frontier Communications Corp. (“Frontier”). Frontier filed a motion for summary judgment of non-infringement, arguing that no triable issue of material fact exists as to whether their accused products practice the limitations of U.S. Patent No. 5,930,474 (“the ‘474 Patent”) requiring topical organization of a database and topical searches.

The ‘474 Patent, titled “Internet Organizer for Accessing Geographically and Topically Diverse Information,” was issued on July 27, 1999 and it claims a method, system, and apparatus for searching information both topically and geographically, wherein information relevant to one geographical area is “dynamically replicated” into a database relevant to another geographical area. As explained by the district court, “[t]he accused instrumentalities in this case are web sites or mobile applications involving geographical data. With few exceptions, these fall into four broad categories: (a) online “yellow pages”-type sites that are designed to help consumers locate businesses near a geographical area; (b) store-locator functionalities on the web sites of brick-and-mortar retailers; (c) mobile store locator “apps”; and (d) job locator sites that help potential applicants find nearby employment.”
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Infinite Data filed twenty-one patent infringement actions against a number of companies, including Amazon.com. Mellanox Technologies sued Infinite Data for a declaratory judgment that its technology does not infringe Infinite Data’s patent and that the patent is invalid. Mellanox also alleged that it had received indemnification requests from “many” of the twenty-one defendants because many of them are users and/or customers of Mellanox’s technology.

All twenty-one defendants filed motions to stay, arguing that each of them use Mellanox’s technology, and that the Court should exercise its discretion to stay their cases while the Mellanox case proceeds. To begin its analysis, the district court noted the standard for a stay: “(1) whether granting the stay will simplify the issues for trial; (2) whether discovery is complete and a trial date is set; and (3) whether granting a stay would cause the non-moving party to suffer undue prejudice from any delay, or a clear tactical disadvantage. See, e.g., Vehicle IP LLC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2010 WL 4823393, *1 (D.Del. 2010).”
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To resolve Apple and Nokia’s request for sanctions against Samsung from Samsung’s violation of a protective order, the court ordered written discovery and depositions to determine the extent of the violation. After discovery and several hearing, the court began its analysis by noting that “[a] junior associate missing one redaction among many in an expert report is not exactly a historical event in the annals of big-ticket patent litigation. Even if regrettable, these things can happen, and almost certainly do happen each and every day. But when such an inadvertent mistake is permitted to go unchecked, unaddressed, and propagated hundreds and hundreds of times by conscious – and indeed strategic – choices by that associate’s firm and client alike, more significant and blameworthy flaws are revealed.”

The court then addressed three separate questions. “First, has its protective order been violated? Second, if the protective order has been violated, does the court have the authority to issue sanctions for those violations? Finally, if the court has the authority to issue sanctions, what factors should it consider in determining whether sanctions are warranted?”
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Wonderland Nurserygoods Co., Ltd.(“Wonderland”) filed a patent infringement action against Thorley Industries, LLC, d/b/a 4MOM (“Thorley”) for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,047,609 (the “‘609 Patent”) by the accused mamaRoo device. Pursuant to the Court’s Initial Patent Scheduling Order, Wonderland served its Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions (“Infringement Contentions”) on Thorley on May 10, 2012, ,and Thorley served its Non-Infringement and Invalidity Contentions on Wonderland on May 24, 2012
The Court held a Markman Hearing on September 27, 2012. On January 11, 2013, after receiving the Revised (and corrected) Claim Construction Chart, the transcript of the Markman Hearing, and the Pre-Hearing and Post-Hearing Briefs, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Claim Construction Order.

After the order was issued, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment and exchanged expert reports for a trial set to begin in late January 2014. On December 26, 2013, without seeking leave of the district court, Wonderland served on Thorley Amended Infringement Contentions, and a Supplemental Expert Report directed at whether the gearing and linkage within the accused mamaRoo device constitute part of the alleged second motion mechanism, a necessary limitation of the patent at issue. Thorley filed a Motion to Exclude Wonderland’s Amended Infringement Contentions and Supplemental Expert Report.
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In a nine to zero decision authored by Justice Breyer, the United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Federal Circuit and held that when a licensee seeks a declaratory judgment against a patentee that the licensee’s products do not infringe the licensed patent(s), the patentee bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of infringement.

Petitioner Medtronic, Inc., (“Medtronic”) designs, makes, and sells medical devices. Respondent Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, (“Mirowski”) owns patents relating to implantable heart stimulators. In 1991, Medtronic and Mirowski entered into a patent-license agreement that allows Medtronic to practice several Mirowski patents in exchange for royalty payments. In 2007, pursuant to terms of the agreement, Mirowski notified Medtronic that it believed several newly released Medtronic products infringed the licensed patents and, therefore, Medtronic owed additional royalties. Medtronic disagreed and challenged Mirowski’s infringement claim in a declaratory judgment action. The District Court (for the District of Delaware) concluded that Mirowski, as the party asserting infringement, bore the burden of proving infringement and that Mirowski had not met that burden. Mirowski appealed to the Federal Circuit.
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