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In this patent infringement action, Adobe filed a Daubert motion seeking to exclude the plaintiff’s damage expert largely based on VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 4548722 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2014). As explained by the district court, “Adobe does not seriously challenge Mr. Yurkerwich’s qualifications as an economist. Nor does it question the fundamental approach he has taken in arriving at an estimation of the value of the royalties lost to EveryScape as a result of the alleged infringement. The “hypothetical willing buyer-willing seller” model is a standard economic tool that has been used by economists and appraisers for decades in determining the estimated value of lost economic opportunities.”

Instead, Adobe challenged that “Mr. Yurkerwich has overvalued the revenue and royalty base apportionable to Vanishing Point by considering Vanishing Point as a whole rather than segregating the incremental value added to Photoshop by the accused Clone Brush (which EveryScape claims as its proprietary invention). Adobe relies specifically on VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 4548722, at *15-18 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 16, 2014), which holds that a damages expert must attempt to apportion value specifically to the infringing features of the contested product.”
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Dell moved to compel the production of certain internal counsel communications at the plaintiff, MLR. MLR had refused to produce the documents, claiming work product protection.

As explained by the district court, “[i]n the circumstances presented here, which are the result of MLR’s choices, the established policies underlying the work product doctrine require that the phrase ‘in anticipation of litigation’ in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A) be limited, with respect to non-opinion material, to material generated solely with respect to MLR’s relationship with a particular potential licensee/defendant beginning at the time that potential licensee/defendant is identified. Other or more general relationship to litigation will render the material presumptively business-related and not protected.”
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In this patent infringement action between Ultratec, Inc. (“Ultratec”) and Sorenson Communications, Inc. (“Sorenson”), Sorenson sought to admit evidence of an inter partes review proceeding of the patent-in-suit. Sorenson wanted to admit the evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s use of the presumption of validity of the patent.

As explained by the district court, “[a]t the final pretrial conference on October 3, however, defendants expressed their view that, in light of the court’s ruling that it would instruct the jury on the presumption of validity and allow plaintiffs’ counsel to refer to the presumption during argument, evidence as to the pending inter partes review proceedings is relevant and admissible to rebut the presumption of validity.”
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Following the district court’s previous order granting a motion to compel against Fujitsu, and Fujitsu’s unsuccessful appeal to the Federal Circuit, the district court ordered sanctions in the form of a civil penalty. As the district court explained, the civil penalty was designed to provide an incentive to motivate the Fujitsu Entities to comply with the district court’s orders.

The district court was less than impressed with Fujitsu’s response. “After stalling for months following Judge Cole’s 7/25/2014 order with meritless objections, overruled by this court on 8/19/2014, and an even more meritless mandamus attempt denied by the Federal Circuit yesterday, Fujitsu’s counsel cavalierly concludes ‘Fujitsu’s Response’ with ‘Fujitsu expects to have the translations ready for production by Friday, October 10, 2014.’
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In this patent infringement action, the district court granted a motion to compel filed by Tellabs against Fujitsu. Fujitsu then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Federal Circuit to overturn the decision of the district court.

The Federal Circuit promptly denied the writ of mandamus as Fujitsu had to establish a “clear and indisputable” right to relief and that it “lack[ed] adequate alternative means to obtain the relief” that it sought. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
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In this patent infringement action, the district court issued a sua sponte order requiring plaintiff to show why its inducing infringement claims should not be dismissed as a matter of law. After addressing the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Limelight, the district court noted that no single party performed all of the steps of the method in the patent-in-suit.

As noted by the district court, “[e]ach of the method claims presented by the ‘835 and ‘740 patents specifies that some method steps are to be performed by the ‘assisted user,’ while other steps are to be performed ‘at the relay.’ Conceding that no single party actually performs every step of the claimed methods, plaintiffs seek to establish that defendants’ customers (the ‘assisted users’) direct and control defendants in performing those steps to be performed ‘at the relay’ such that the performance of all of the steps of the method can be attributed to the assisted users.”
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In this patent infringement action, the defendant moved to exclude portions of the plaintiff’s (Dr. Bambos’) expert testimony. Defendant argued that Dr. Bambos lacks familiarity with the infringing products, relied too heavily on someone else to provide him with relevant segments of source code to review, and used the district court’s claim construction to determine how the products work.

In analyzing the motion, the district court noted that “Dr. Bambos never used the allegedly infringing products, but his expert opinion was based on ‘thousands of pages of technical manuals, source code, and depositions transcripts.’ (D.I. 221 at p.1) (See D.I. 221-4 at 3-6; D.I. 221-3 at 2-5). Rule 702 requires that expert testimony be based on “sufficient facts or data.” Dr. Bambos need not use the product if, as here, he has familiarized himself with it in other ways. Reviewing source code and other materials can be sufficient.”
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In this patent infringement action brought by Trustees of Boston University (“BU”), BU alleged that defendants infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,686,738 (the “‘738 Patent”), which centers on light emitting diodes (“LEDs”) and the technology behind them. BU moved for an order compelling defendant Epistar Corporation (“Epistar”) to designate new Rule 30(b)(6) deponents on certain deposition topics.

As explained by the court, Rule 30(b)(6) requires the noticing party to describe the topics of examination with “reasonable particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). If the noticing party does not describe the topics with sufficient particularity or if the topics are overly broad, the responding party is subject to an impossible task. McBride v. Medicalodges, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 581, 584 (D. Kansas 2008). To avoid liability, the noticed party must designate persons knowledgeable in the areas of inquiry listed in the notice. Id. Accordingly, if the noticed party cannot identify the outer limits of the topics noticed, compliant designation is not feasible. Id.; see also Newman v. Borders, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2009).
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At the end of trial, the Defendant, Texas Instruments Incorporated’s (“TI”), pursued its equitable defense of laches, the only remaining issue left in this patent infringement case. The district court conduced an evidentiary hearing on laches at which the district court heard the live testimony of five witnesses and also accepted deposition designations, prior trial testimony, and exhibits to consider separate from the live testimony.

As explained by the district court, “[t]he equitable defense of laches may be available where the plaintiff unreasonably delayed filing its infringement suit. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. ChaidesConstr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). The defense is applicable where the accused infringer proves two things: (1) ‘the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its claim against the defendant,’ and (2) the defendant suffered material prejudice as a result of the delay Id. at 1032. The defendant must prove delay and prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1045.”
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Juno Lighting, LLC (“Juno”) filed a complaint against Nora Lighting, Inc. (“Nora”) on February 11, 2013. The complaint alleged that Nora infringed Juno’s patent, No. 5,505,419 (“‘419 Patent”), entitled Bar Hanger for a Recessed Light Fixture Assembly. Nora filed a counterclaim on May 28, 2013.

After the case was stayed pending a reexamination of the patent by the Patent Office and a summary judgment motion for literal infringement was granted in favor of Juno, Nora filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
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