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Rosebud filed a patent infringement action Adobe and Adobe moved for summary judgment arguing that Rosebud had no remedy for its patent against Adobe. Adobe based its summary judgment motion on the argument that the patent-in-suit did not issue until after Adobe’s accused product was discontinued.

As set out by the district court, the parties did not dispute that the accused feature of Adobe’s product (Collaborate Live) was discontinued and could not have been used after January 2013. As the ‘280 patent issued on November 5, 2013, Rosebud could not recover post-issuance damages. Instead, Rosebud sought to recover provisional remedies under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d), based on the publication of the ‘280 patent application on December 29, 2011, which requires the defendant to have actual knowledge of the published patent application.
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The defendant, Samsung, had previously filed IPRs on several of plaintiff’s patents, which were granted and denied in part. After the plaintiff reduced its asserted claims to those that the PTO had declined to institute review, Samsung filed an additional IPR to challenging the asserted claims and moved to stay pending the new IPR.

In requesting the stay, Samsung argued that “the IPRs will address the validity of all asserted claims of the patents-in-suit” and “[c]onsidering the current status and likely disposition of each USPTO proceeding for the patents in suit, there is strong possibility that nearly all of Rembrandt’s infringement allegations will be moot.” The district court observed that the “simplification offered by Defendants is not likely based on the recent denials of IPR institutions.”
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The district court had previously stayed the patent infringement action between Nidec Motor Corporation and Broad Ocean Motor pending the PTO’s decision on whether to institute an inter partes review on three of the patents-in-suit. After the PTO declined to institute review on one of the patents, the plaintiff moved to lift the stay on that patent.

As explained by the district court, “the parties notified the Court that, on January 21, 2015, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) instituted Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) against the ‘895 and ‘349 Patents but it denied institution against the ‘970 Patent. The parties state that they met and conferred on January 26, 2015, but the parties did not agree as to whether the Court should lift the stay at this time with respect to the ‘970 Patent.”
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Intellectual Ventures (“IV”) filed a motion to bifurcate and stay discovery of Symantec’s patent misuse defense. The district court agreed with Intellectual Ventures. “While the Court views IV’s motion as essentially two motions one to bifurcate for a separate trial, see F.R.C.P. 42(b), and one to stay discovery, to which the general stay factors may be pertinent, see, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 921 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313-14 (D. Del. 2013) it finds that the circumstances do not warrant departure from the Federal Circuit’s general guidance that antitrust and related issues be bifurcated in patent cases, and further finds that judicial economy warrants staying discovery related to these issues. See In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1986).”
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As the Open Text v. Box patent case gets closer to trial, Open Text sought to preclude Box from asking the jury to award damages in the form of a fully paid-up lump sum that would cover the life of the patents-in-suit. Open Text argued that such a result would preclude Open Text from seeking an injunction or post-verdict ongoing royalties, which would improperly allow the jury to decide equitable issues.

Although the district court agreed that a lump-sum award might indeed preclude the injunction and/or post-verdict ongoing royalties, the district court stated that “there is no doubt that a fully paid-up lump sum is an allowable form of damages. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing the licensor and licensee’s option of entering into an “upfront, paid-in-full royalty” in the hypothetical negotiation).
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In this patent infringement action between defendant Adobe Systems, Inc. (“Adobe”) and plaintiff Blue Spike, LLC (“Blue Spike”), Adobe filed a motion to strike the infringement contentions (“ICs”) filed by Blue Spike. In the motion, Adobe contended that Blue Spike’s ICs fail to comply with the Patent Local Rules for the following reasons: (1) the ICs fail to provide a claim chart for each of the accused instrumentalities and instead group together all four products in violation of Patent Local Rule 3-1(c); (2) the claim chart cites to exhibits that discuss Auditude’s (a company acquired by Adobe) products generally–both fingerprinting and ad insertion products–without identifying the particular product to which each exhibit refers, rendering the documentary support insufficient under Patent Local Rule 3-2; (3) the ICs chiefly rely on online articles published by third parties that do not specifically identify the accused products and are therefore insufficient under Patent Local Rule 3-2; and (4) the ICs do not properly set forth allegations of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in violation of Patent Local Rule 3-1(e); and (5) fail to allege indirect infringement, willful infringement, or assert a priority date in accordance with the Patent Local Rules.
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In this patent infringement action, the plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the defendants’ claim construction experts. The plaintiff’s motion was based on the argument that the defendants’ disclosures did not comply with local rules in that they did not identify the actual opinions of the experts.

The district court agreed with plaintiff’s position. “After consideration of the briefing and of Defendants’ expert disclosures, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants’ disclosures do not comply with Local Rule 4.2.d.2. insofar as Defendants simply identify the general subjects on which their experts may testify, but do not identify the actual opinions Defendants expect the experts to offer.”
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After trial, HTC Corporation and HTC America, Inc. (“HTC”) filed a motion seeking to recover attorney fees and costs from plaintiff’s attorneys as well as from plaintiff Intellect Wireless, Inc. (“IW”). IW withdrew its initial opposition and conceded that the case was exceptional within the meaning of the Patent Act. HTC also contended that a finding should also be made that the attorneys for IW are jointly and personally required to satisfy HTC’s attorney fees and costs because, among other things, IW’s attorneys unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
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In an earlier filed decision, the district court had previously found that Escort and its defense counsel had knowingly misled the plaintiff, Fleming, which warranted a sanction of attorney fees. As explained by the district court, “they falsely claimed that the source code identified as ESC17363 was the current operating source code for Escort’s commercially sold products and that it provided a complete defense to Fleming’s patent infringement charges.”

After awarding attorney’s fees, the district court turned to Fleming’s motion to compel the production of certain documents. “Fleming seeks discovery of a wide variety of documents and communications in an effort to determine if Escort fabricated ESC17363 and falsely represented that it was created in the normal course of product development.”
In response, Escort argued that all of the material sought by Fleming was protected by the work product doctrine and the attorney client privilege.
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In this patent infringement action, the Defendants requested that the court order a further Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of one of the deponents, Mr. Pang. In the motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s counsel objected more than 300 times during the course of Mr. Pang’s deposition, and the objections impeded the fair examination of Mr. Pang.

In response, the Plaintiff argued that Defendants failed to show good cause to compel a second deposition of Mr. Pang and pointed out that during the deposition, Defendants never raised any issue with Mr. Pang’s responses or with Plaintiff’s counsel’s objections. Plaintiff also argued that its objections were necessary and were stated in a concise, nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner and noted that Mr. Pang answered every question after Plaintiff’s counsel stated his objection on the record.
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