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The district court had previously granted a stay pending an inter partes reexamination by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) of U.S. Patent No. 6,797,454 (the “‘454 patent”). After the PTO affirmed the validity of claims 2-6, 15, and 16 of the ‘454 patent, the Federal Circuit unanimously affirmed the PTO’s decision.

Although a reexamination certificate had not yet been issued, the plaintiff argued that the stay should be lifted and further argued that the certificate had not yet been issued only because the defendant had filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The plaintiff argued that given the extreme unlikelihood that the United States Supreme Court would grant certiorari in this matter, particularly in light of the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance of the PTO’s decision, the stay be lifted now.
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The defendants produced documents in response to plaintiffs’ first set of requests for production and included in the production were five documents that the defendants were later claim were subject to attorney-client privilege. Before the defendants made that claim, however, the plaintiffs deposed a corporate designee of Defendants Musion Events Ltd. and Musion 3D Ltd. During that deposition the five documents in questions were marked as exhibits. For some of the documents, the deponent testified regarding the contents of the documents and even read portions of the documents into the record–all without objection as to privilege or work product.

Shortly after that deposition, the defendants’ counsel to plaintiffs’ counsel and requested a claw-back of the five documents pursuant to the parties’ protective order.
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In this patent infringement action, the defendant, Ericsson moved to compel the plaintiff, TCL, to produce bills and invoices for worked performed by TCL’s expert witnesses. TCL sought to redact the bills and invoices to eliminate statements and narratives from the bills that do not reflect compensation.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(C) provides that “Rule 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect communications between the party’s attorney and any witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications . . . relate to compensation for the expert’s study or testimony.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C).
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The plaintiff, Odyssey Wireless (“Odyssey”) filed four separate actions for patent infringement against Defendants Apple, Samsung, LG, and Motorola, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,881,393; 8,199,837; 8,576,940; 8,660,169; 8,855,230; and 8,879,606. Each of the patents-in-suit lists on its face Peter D. Karabinis as the inventor and EICES Research, Inc. as the assignee of the patent. Dr. Karabinis is the Founder and Chief Technology Officer of EICES, and EICES is the predecessor of Odyssey Wireless.

In April 2001, Mobile Satellite Ventures (“MSV”) hired Dr. Karabinis to be its Vice President and Chief Technical Officer and he entered into an intellectual property and confidential information agreement with MSV, which granted MSV ownership rights in Dr. Karabinis’ work for MSV. Based on the agreement with MSV, the Defendants moved to dismiss the patent infringement action based on lack of standing.
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In a multi-district litigation, the district court had previously granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the issue of willful infringement. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., the plaintiff moved to reconsider the ruling on the ground that the substantive legal standard required for a finding of enhanced damages due to willful infringement had changed.

In response, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s motion was futile because the plaintiff had failed to identify any facts that would suggest egregious conduct subject to enhanced damages. The defendants also argued that if the motion was granted, then they should be permitted time to take discovery on the issue of willfulness and file appropriate motions after the discovery was completed.
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The defendants’, Roland DGA Corporation and Roland DG Corporation (collectively “Roland”), filed a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff, Gerber Scientific International, Inc. (“Gerber”) regarding Gerber’s claims for lost profits and enhanced damages. Gerber’s claim for lost profits was based, in part, on survey evidence.

The district court explained that “[t]o recover lost profits a patentee must show that „but for’ infringement it reasonably would have made the additional profits enjoyed by the infringer.” Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 316 F.3d 1119, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “A patentee may resort to any method showing, with reasonable probability, entitlement to lost profits „but for’ the infringement.” Id.
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Google, Inc. and YouTube, LLC (collectively “Google”) filed a motion for leave to amend their answer to include an implied license affirmative defense. Because Google filed the motion to amend its answer more than two months after the district court’s scheduling order’s deadline to amend the pleadings, Google had to show good cause for the district court to grant its motion.

The district court noted that Google did not file its present motion to amend until December 22, 2015, near the end of the fact discovery deadline of February 26, 2016. The district court also noted that “[t]he basis of Google’s implied license defense is VideoShare’s June 21, 2013 covenant not to sue for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,987,492. Nonetheless, Google failed to include the implied license defense in its pleadings for a year and a half after VideoShare entered the covenant not to sue. Google has made no attempt to explain its delay in presenting this defense. Google does not contend that it lacked sufficient information to meet the amendment deadline, or that it discovered new information that could not be timely pled. Therefore, Google has not demonstrated why its amended defense could not have been sought in a timely manner.”
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After a jury trial finding American Technical Ceramics Corp. (“ATC) willfully infringed Presidio Component’s (“Presidio”) patent, ATC filed a motion for a finding of no willful infringement based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Halo. At the time the jury reached its verdict, the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Seagate Tech required that “an award of enhanced damages [under section 284] requires a showing of willful infringement.” In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).

ATC argued that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Halo, the jury’s verdict as to willfulness is void and should be disregard. The district court explained that on June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No. 14-1513, 579 U.S. __ (June 13, 2016). In Halo, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s two-part test from Seagate for determining when a district court may award enhanced damages as inconsistent with § 284. Id., slip op. at 1-2. The Supreme Court explained that § 284 commits the award of enhanced damages to the discretion of the district court. See id. at 8, 12-13, 15. The Supreme Court further explained that the Seagate test is “‘unduly rigid'” and “‘impermissibly encumbers'” a district court’s discretion, particularly its requirement that there must be a finding of objective recklessness in every case before a district court may award enhanced damages.
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Chris Tavantzis and ChrisTrikes Custom Motorcycles, Inc. (“ChrisTrikes”) filed a complaint against a number of individuals and entities that allegedly infringed on a patent for a wheelchair-accessible motorcycle (the “Wheelchair Motorcycle Patent”). After the complaint was filed, the district court received notice of Mr. Tavantzis’ death. When no party moved to substitute the proper party to continue Mr. Tavantzis’ claims within the time required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a), the district court dismissed Mr. Tavantzis from the lawsuit, leaving ChrisTrikes as the only remaining plaintiff.

As a result, the district court examined whether ChrisTrikes’ had standing to maintain the patent infringement claims, which included claims based on theories of direct infringement, contributory infringement, and induced infringement. The district court noted that “[b]ecause standing is a fundamental component of a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is entitled to examine ChrisTrikes’ standing on its own initiative. See Bischoff v. Osceola Cty., 222 F.3d 874, 877-78 (11th Cir. 2000).”
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After the parties settled the lawsuit, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice, subject to the right of any party to re-open the action within sixty days, upon good cause shown, or to submit a stipulated form of final order or judgment (the “60-Day Order”). Sixty-five days after the district court entered the 60-Day Order, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the 60 day deadline and enter a proposed consent judgment and permanent injunction pursuant the parties’ settlement agreement.

In the joint motion, the parties told the district court that a “disagreement arose concerning the terms of the settlement that required the settlement hearing to be transcribed.” The district court noted that “whatever disagreement arose between the parties, it arose and was resolved prior to the expiration of the 60-day period. Yet, the parties did not move to extend the deadline within that period.”
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