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Plaintiff, D Now, Inc. (D-Now), obtained an exclusive license to U.S. Patent No. 8,795,020, which claims a bubble blowing tube. D Now filed a patent infringement action against defendants TPF Toys Limited and TPF Toys LLC (collectively “TPF”). As explained by the district court, “[b]oth parties sell the bubble blowing tube in bouncing bubble kits, wherein the consumer can blow a bubble with the tube then use either gloves (in D Now’s product) or paddles (TPF’s product) to bounce the bubble.”
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Defendant Baker Hughes Incorporated (“Baker Hughes”) filed five inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) asserting that the plaintiff Lubrizol’s patents were invalid because of obviousness. Baker Hughes and a third-party, Flowchem LLC (“Flowchem”) had previously produced documents in the underlying case that they designated “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential” under the district court’s Protective Order.

Lubrizol asserted that the confidential documents would refute Baker Hughes’s obviousness argument in the IPR proceedings and sought a modification of the district court’s Protective Order to allow Lubrizol to use the confidential documents in the IPR proceedings. In particular, Lubrizol asserted that the Baker Hughes documents would reveal evidence of copying, which would refute any contention that the patents were obvious.
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Dexcel filed a motion to compel contending that Takeda has refused to provide any fact discovery concerning Takeda’s methods for particle size analysis used in prior litigations or underlying the data in the patents-in-suit. Dexcel asserted “that this information was relevant because it targets whether Takeda’s position as to test methods to assess the literal infringement of Takeda’s particle size limitations by Dexcel’s product is consistent with positions Takeda has taken in the past.”

Takeda objected arguing that any discovery into test methods for particle size that were employed in prior litigations “implicates the confidential and highly confidential information” of the defendants in those suits. Takeda also contended that the Discovery Confidentiality Orders entered in those matters prohibit it from disclosing information designated confidential by those defendants.
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Plaintiff Synopsys, Inc. (“Synopsys”) filed a motion to compel defendant, ATopTech, to respond to interrogatories. ATopTech opposed the motion by arguing that it had already answered Synopsys’s Set One, Interrogatory Nos. 1-5, which contained at least 21 discrete subparts. ATopTech therefore contended that it was “not required to respond to any of the interrogatories in Set Two, Interrogatory Nos. 6-25, because the Set Two interrogatories also contain discrete subparts, and even responding to Interrogatory No. 6 would require ATopTech to exceed the 25 interrogatory limit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a)(1).”

The district court began its analysis by noting that “[p]atent cases present unique challenges with respect to the application of Rule 33’s numerical limit on interrogatories. A circuit judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting as the district court in a patent case, recently devoted an entire opinion to the issue of what constitutes a ‘discrete subpart’ for purposes of Rule 33(a)(1). See Erfindergemeinschaft Uropep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co., 315 F.R.D. 191 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
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Posted in: Discovery
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The plaintiff, Chrimar Systems Inc. and Chrimar (“Chrimar”) filed a motion to compel an additional deposition of Defendant D-Link Systems, Inc.’s (“D-Link”) corporate representative, William C. Brown. Chrimar previously took the deposition of D-Link’s corporate representative, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6).

After the deposition concluded, Mr. Brown supplied an errata sheet, correcting numerous portions of his deposition testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e). In its motion, Chrimar contends that over 60 answers were materially altered and several answers were changed from “yes” to “no.” As a result, Chrimar moved the district court to compel “Mr. Brown for a second deposition in Dallas, Texas regarding the changes represented in his errata sheet.”
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During the pretrial conference, the Plaintiff Arthrex(“Arthrex”) told the district court that it may be able to narrow its case once the district court resolved certain pending motions for summary judgment. Shortly after the pretrial conference, the district court informed the parties it would deny the parties’ motions for summary judgment and that Arthrex had “raised triable issues of infringement that are sufficient overcome summary judgment.”

The district court also stated that it would deny both motions and that a detailed reason for the denials would follow in a separate order.
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After the district court conducted a claim construction hearing (but before it issued an order), the district court stayed the litigation between Finjan and Symantec pending a decision by the PTAB regarding whether to institute an inter partes review (“IPR”) over the asserted patents. When the district court lifted the stay and issued a new scheduling order, Symantec filed a motion seeking additional claim construction briefing another hearing.
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A jury returned a verdict finding that LG infringed the claims of the patent-in-suit and that the claims were not invalid. The jury also found that the infringement was willful. As a result, the district court determined whether enhanced damages were appropriate under 35 U.S.C. § 284.

As explained by the district court, “Section 284 allows district courts to punish the full range of culpable behavior. Accordingly, the degree of enhancement should be proportional to the degree of the willful infringer’s culpability. An enhancement of treble damages may be appropriate to penalize the most egregious conduct. A less significant enhancement may be appropriate for less egregious (though still culpable) conduct. The Court also has the latitude not to enhance even if willfulness is found, where the degree of culpability is de minimis. The particular circumstances of each case must dictate the degree of enhancement.”
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In this patent infringement action, MMEI, owns U.S. patent 6,234,099 (“the ‘099 patent”). Fineline Industries, Inc. (“Fineline Inc.”) entered into a license agreement with MMEI that permitted Fineline Inc. to use the ‘099 patent for its products for the payment of royalties The agreement also provided that any change of majority control in Fineline Inc. had to be agreed to by MMEI in writing. Fineline Inc. converted into a Florida LLC–Defendant Fineline LLC. Fineline LLC continued to use the 2010 license agreement as a successor to Fineline Inc when . MMEI terminated the 2010 license agreement, arguing that Fineline Inc. had breached the license agreement.

On the same day that MMEI filed the patent infringement action, MMEI filed a lawsuit in state court against Fineline Inc. and Fineline LLC for, among other things, breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, including that Fineline LLC was an “unauthorized successor” to the license agreement.
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As this patent infringement proceeded closer to trial, the parties filed various motions in limine. The plaintiff, PerDiemco, filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence or argument referring to PerDiem’s prior settlements as “nuisance value settlements.” The defendant, Geotab, contended that it should be permitted to refer to low-value settlements as “nuisance” settlements to rebut PerDiem’s accusations of willful infringement.
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