Pipeline Technologies Inc. (“Pipeline”) filed a patent infringement action against Telog Instruments Inc. (“Telog”). Telog filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking summary judgment on the ground that the disputed claims of U.S. Patent 7,219,553 (‘553 patent) are invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
Continue reading
Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation (“Plaintiff”) alleged that Defendants Superstar International, Inc. and Sai Liu (“Defendants”) produce, advertise, and sell products that infringe Plaintiff’s design patents for UGG boots. The district court previously ruled that default judgment was appropriate, considering both the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) and the factors laid out in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). In the previous order, the district court left open what relief Plaintiff could recover.
The district court then addressed whether the Plaintiff should be entitled to treble damages. As explained by the district court, “[u]nder 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Section 284”), when a Court finds that a patent has been infringed, ‘the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.’ One way damages may be measured under Section 284 is by the patentee’s lost profits. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The burden of proving damages is on the patentee. Id.”
Continue reading
In this patent infringement action, FedEx moved for reconsideration after the district court had denied its motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s claim for inducing patent infringement. FedEx moved for reconsideration based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
The district court first analyzed whether the motion to reconsider was procedurally proper. “Under Local Rule 7-18, a motion for reconsideration may be made on the following grounds only:
(a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time of such decision, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such decision, or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before such decision. No motion for reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion.”
Continue reading
In this patent infringement case, Plaintiff, CTP Innovations, LLC (“CTP”) sued V.G. Reed and Sons, Inc. (“Reed”) to stop Reed’s alleged infringement of two United States patents, which pertain to systems and methods of providing publishing and printing services by a communication network involving computer to plate technology.
Reed moved for a stay of the action pending a determination of an inter partes review (“IPR”) before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “PTAB”). In the motion, Reed asserted “that the stay is appropriate because the PTAB’s resolution of invalidity issues regarding the two patents will simplify the instant action and no party will be prejudiced by the stay.
Continue reading
In this patent infringement action, the defendants, Hangzhou Langhong Technology Co., Ltd. and Langhong Technology USA Inc., moved to exclude the testimony of plaintiff’s experts on infringement and damages. The district court had previously issued a scheduling order setting March 26, 2014 as the deadline for the parties to designate their experts and to make the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As explained by the district court, Rule 26(a)(2) requires that the expert’s report must contain, inter alia, a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). The district court then found that “[t]he report prepared by Rogers provides virtually none of the information required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i). Plaintiff’s response to the motion asserts as an excuse for noncompliance lack of sufficient discovery before Rogers prepared his report for him to have the information he would need to comply with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). After a thorough review of the material provided by the parties, the court is not persuaded that plaintiff’s excuse for noncompliance with the scheduling order as to Rogers has merit. Plaintiff had ample time before Rogers prepared and submitted his report for the collection of whatever information it needed for Rogers to provide the information in his report required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i).”
Continue reading
On May 16, 2014, the district court entered Judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff Global Traffic Technologies, LLC (“GTT”) in the amount of $5,052,118, enhanced damages in the amount of $2,526,059, and prejudgment interest in the amount of $923,965, plus $1,384.14 for each day after October 31, 2013. Defendants Morgan and KME requested that the district court stay execution of judgment and waive the supersedeas bond requirement. Defendant STC requested that the district court stay execution of judgment with an authorized bond of $100,000, together with pending patent applications in the field of traffic signal preemption.
As the district court explained, “[a]n appellant may obtain a stay of execution of judgment pending appeal when an appellant posts a supersedeas bond, “in the full amount of the judgment plus interests, costs, and damages for delay.” Fed.R.Civ. P. 62(d); Corporate Comm’n of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians v. Money Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 12-1015, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176796, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2013) (citing New Access Commc’ns LLC v. Qwest Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138 (D. Minn. 2005) (Tunheim, J.)). The Court maintains the discretion, however, to waive the bond requirement and stay enforcement of the judgment without a bond.”
Continue reading
The ALJ terminated the ITC investigation upon granting respondent’s motion for summary judgment for lack of domestic industry, finding that the complainant’s (a licensing entity) patent-related activities were solely revenue-driven rather than production driven. Optical Disc Drives, Components Thereof, and Products Containing the Same, 337-TA-897 (ITC July 30, 2014, Order) (Lord, ALJ). This distinction was key to the ALJ’s ruling.
To satisfy the so-called “economic prong” of the domestic industry requirement under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3), a complainant must show that an industry in the United States exists with respect to the articles protected by the asserted patent in the form of:
(A) significant investment in plant and equipment;
Plaintiff Hill-Rom Company, Inc. (“Hill-Rom”) filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against General Electric Company (“GE”). The district court began its discussion by noting that “[t]he Federal Circuit has said that preliminary injunctions are a “drastic and extraordinary remedy” that should not routinely be used. Nat’l Steel Car. Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Rv., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004). There are four factors to consider when determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction in a patent infringement case: 1) likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable harm; 3) the balance of hardships; and 4) the public interest. Celsis In Vitro. Inc. v. CellzDirect. Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2012).”
The district court then focused on the irreparable harm factor. “The most salient of the factors in the present case is the second, concerning irreparable harm. The Court FINDS that the Plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing that., without a preliminary injunction, they will suffer irreparable harm. General Electric Company (“GE”) is a very large and well established corporation; any harm that Hill-Rom may suffer from GE manufacturing and selling its AgileTrac Hand Hygiene System (“AgileTrac”) can be quantified and the Plaintiffs will be able to be made whole. There is no question that the Plaintiffs will be able to collect on a judgment, should they win one.
Continue reading
Plaintiff Fleet Engineers, Inc. (“Fleet”) develops, manufactures, and sells after-market products for the trucking industry. Defendant Tarun Surti, the president of Mudguard Technologies, LLC (“Mudguard”), owns a mud flap patent on which this lawsuit is focused. Fleet filed a complaint which asserted three claims: (1) a request for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, (2) a request for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, and (3) tortious interference with a business relationship. Defendants answered the complaint and filed three counterclaims: (1) patent infringement, (2) breach of contract, and (3) misappropriation of trade secrets.
After the Court held a claim construction hearing, counsel for the defendants requested leave to withdraw from the lawsuit. On September 24, 2013, the Court granted the motion and ordered the defendants to retain new counsel within 30 days. Defendants requested an extension until December 20. On October 25, 2013, this Court gave Defendants an additional 28 days to find new counsel, extending the deadline to November 25, 2013. On November 22, Defendants again requested additional time to hire counsel, which the district court granted but warned Defendants that if counsel did not enter an appearance by December 20, default would enter against Mudguard.
Continue reading
In this patent infringement action brought by plaintiff Trustees of Boston University (“BU”) , BU alleged that defendants infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,686,738 (the “‘738 Patent”), which pertains to light emitting diodes (“LEDs”). BU moved for sanctions against Defendants and their counsel for overdesignating documents as “Confidential-Outside Counsel Eyes Only.”
After BU served document requests for emails, Defendants ran search terms that produced over 3.5 million pages of emails. The Defendants then designated every document of that production as Outside Counsel Only, but the Defendants did not review each document to determine whether it in fact contained confidential information. As explained by the district court, “[b]ecause there was not enough time to review each document and meet [the 30-day] deadline, Defendants reviewed the documents quickly and determined that the emails generally met the requirement of the Global Protective Order, and marked them “CONFIDENTIAL-OUTSIDE COUNSEL EYES ONLY.”‘
Continue reading
