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In inter partes proceeding Apple Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute et al., IPR2014-00320, Petitioner Apple sought a second request for rehearing, before an expanded panel of the PTAB, on the Board’s decision not to institute an inter partes review of RPI’s U.S. Patent No. 7,177,798 (“the ‘778 Patent”). The Board held that Apple’s request was unauthorized and therefore ordered it expunged from the record of the proceeding.

On January 3, 2014, Apple initially filed its IPR petition seeking invalidity of the ‘798 Patent based three pieces of prior art that Apple alleged anticipated and/or rendered obvious certain claims of the ‘798 Patent. On April 17, 2014, RPI filed its preliminary response asserting that the Board should deny the petition just as it denied Apple’s first petition for inter partes review of the ‘798 Patent. In its preliminary response, RPI asserted that the Board already considered (and rejected) the same grounds and prior art that Apple now relies on in the second petition. Accordingly, RPI argued that the second petition should be denied because “[t]he Board denied the first petition [which included the same prior art asserted in the second petition] as to all challenged claims because Apple failed to establish that it would prevail in showing that even a single claim of the ‘798 Patent is unpatentable.”
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Amazon.com (“Amazon”) filed a motion to dismiss Tuxis Technologies, LLC’s (“Tuxis”) complaint for failure to state a claim. Tuxis alleged infringement of the 6,055,513 (“the ‘513 patent”) against Amazon. As explained by the district court, the ‘513 patent relates to a method of upselling. The term “upsell” is defined in the patent to be “an offer or provision of a good or service which is selected for offer to the customer and differs from the good or service for which the primary contact was made.” The patentee defined “real time” as “during the course of the communication initiated with the primary transaction or primary interaction.”

Amazon moved to dismiss, asserting that the ‘513 patent’s claims are invalid because they do not claim patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. After analyzing the recent case law on section 101 of the Patent Act, including Alice Corp., the district court found that “[i]n applying the framework set out above, it is clear that the claim 1 of the ‘513 patent is drawn to unpatentable subject matter. It claims the fundamental concept of upselling–a marketing technique as old as the field itself. While the additional limitations of the claim do narrow its scope, they are insufficient to save it from invalidity.”
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In the Macronix International Co., Ltd. et al. v. Spansion LLC, the PTAB denied Petitioner’s motion for joinder under Section 315(c). On November 8, 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. 7,151,027 (“the ‘027 patent”), which was later granted on May 8, 2014. Subsequently, on June 4, 2014, the Petitioner filed a second petition for inter partes review of the ‘027 patent. At that time, the Petitioner also moved to join the two IPR proceedings and proposed a revised schedule in the event its motion for joinder was granted.

The Board explained the factors establishing entitlement to joinder:

As the moving party, Petitioner has the burden of proof in establishing entitlement to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.122(b). A motion for joinder should: (1) set forth the reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (Apr. 24, 2013).

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In this patent infringement action between Personal Audio (“Personal Audio”) and Togi Entertainment, Inc. (“Togi”), the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on a license defense. They requested summary judgment “to the extent Plaintiff’s claims involve Apple software, products, systems, or services, all of which were previously licensed by Plaintiff under Section 2.2 of the Apple License.”
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In the Ariosa Diagnostics v. ISIS Innovation Limited inter partes review, the PTAB set for the guidelines for taking depositions in a foreign language as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(c). In addition to the requirement of 42.53(c) that the party calling the witness must initiate a conference with the Board at least five days before the deposition, the Board directed the parties to the following guidelines:

In the guidelines below, “party” refers to the party proffering the witness, and “opponent” refers to the party cross-examining the witness.
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As this patent infringement action headed to trial, the district court scolded both parties for their exhibit lists and, in particular, the objections to the exhibit lists. The district court explained that “Affinity has submitted a 39 page list of 979 exhibits. Out of the first 360 exhibits Ford objected to no less than 250, at which point the court stopped counting, although it appears that the percentage of objections is about the same for the remaining 607 exhibits. Even better, the objections are not actually stated and do not refer to specific portions of any exhibit. Instead Ford uses a code consisting of 16 symbols.”

The district court then criticized Ford’s “secret decoder ring” of objections. “Ford did provide a version of a ‘secret decoder ring’ so the court could discern, for example, that exhibits marked ‘BT’ were objected to on the ground that they were ‘Admissible for Bench Trial Only,’ an objection not listed in the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, most of the exhibits were marked with multiple symbols, requiring repeated references to the ‘code.’ For example, Plaintiffs Exhibits 174 through 228 were all marked ‘ R, P, H.'”
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In Masimo Corporation v. Philips Electronic North America Corporation, et al., the Philips Defendants moved for leave to amend their answer to add a defense of inequitable conduct based on Masimo’s alleged inequitable conduct during the ex parte reexamination of the patent-in-suit. Masimo opposed the amendment on the grounds that it was futile and unduly prejudicial. As summarized below, the Court sided with Philips and allowed the amendment and related discovery.

After setting forth the good cause standard for leave to amend after a deadline in the scheduling order, the Court recited the substantive elements of inequitable conduct required to plead this defense:

“(l) an individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application made an affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material information; and (2) the individual did so with a specific intent to deceive the PTO.” Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “[I]n pleading inequitable conduct in patent cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO.” Id. at 1327. Generally, the materiality required to establish inequitable conduct is “but-for materiality.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As for the intent prong, Rule 9(b) states that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind of a person may be averred generally.” The relevant “conditions of mind” for inequitable conduct include: “(l) knowledge of the withheld material information or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) specific intent to deceive the PTO.” Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327.

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In this patent infringement action between MAG Aerospace Industries, Inc. (“MAG”) and B/E Aerospace, Inc. (“B/E”), MAG filed an ex parte motion as a result of conduct during a deposition. The court began its analysis of the motion by reminding the parties that “[a] deposition is a judicial proceeding that should be conducted with the solemnity and decorum befitting its importance. Lawyers participating in depositions should comport themselves in a professional and dignified manner.”

The court went on to state that “[w]hen lawyers behave otherwise, it reflects poorly on the entire judicial process. The purpose of a deposition is for a witness to provide testimony under oath. The testimony may or may not be admissible at trial; nonetheless, the opposing party is entitled to ascertain the witness’s knowledge, as imperfect and imprecise as that knowledge may be.”
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In CTP Innovations, LLC v. Solo Printing, Case No. 1:14-cv-21499-UU, the Court denied, without prejudice, Defendant’s motion to stay the litigation pending the inter partes review of the two patents-in-suit.

In its motion to stay, the Defendant argued the traditional factors considered by court favored a stay, including that the USPTO’s analysis will simplify the issues in litigation because third party petitions have challenged all claims of the asserted patents, that the case was in its earliest stages having just been filed a little over two months ago, and that there would be no prejudice to the plaintiff because, as a non-practicing entity, it does not compete in the marketplace with the Defendant and thus any infringement, if proven, could be adequately remedied by monetary damages.
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After the jury trial between Apple and Samsung, and shortly before the July 10, 2014 hearing on post-trial motions, Samsung requested leave to file supplemental briefing to argue that the asserted claims of two of Apple’s patents were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (June 19, 2014) (“Alice“).

The district court permitted the filing of the supplemental briefing on the invalidity issued, but ultimately concluded that Samsung had not timely raised the invalidity issue. “The Court concludes in this case that Samsung could have–but failed to–preserve § 101 invalidity defenses, and that Samsung’s request for the Court to adjudicate a legal theory that was disclosed after trial is untimely, regardless of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Alice. Accordingly, the Court will not consider the merits of Samsung’s § 101 arguments.”
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