Patent Lawyer Blog

Plaintiff, Two Moms and a Toy, filed an emergency motion to stay the expert phase of their case pending the court's ruling on claim construction. The plaintiff's motion was based on the argument that "expert reports and expert discovery in a patent infringement case is extremely expensive and that a ruling on claim construction could end this case and at the very least will provide the parties with needed guidance and information for assessing the patent's strength which will hopefully result in a settlement of the case."

The court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument. Indeed, it agreed with the defendant that it was "thinly veiled request for reconsideration of my two previous ruling denying motions to extend or otherwise modify the case schedule." The court noted that these argument could have, and should have been, raised in connection with the earlier requests to amend the schedule that were denied by the court. "All of the arguments about expense and efficiency could have been made in connection with the parties' previous Joint Motion to Amend Scheduling Order."

Microsoft and Google sued Geotag in the District of Delaware for a declaration that their customers did not infringe a Geotag patent, "Internet Organizer for Accessing Geographically and Topically Based Information," and that the patent was invalid. Geotag had sued in excess of 450 companies in the Eastern District of Texas and many of these companies were customers of Microsoft and Google, who provide mapping services that allow interested persons to use the Internet to search for a convenient location of a business.

Geotag moved to transfer the declaratory judgment action pending in Delaware to the Eastern District of Texas. The district court in Delaware analyzed the private and public interest factors pursuant to Section 1404(a) and concluded that transfer was not appropriate.

Defendant moved to compel the deposition of a member of Plaintiff 's trial counsel regarding Plaintiff's pre-filing investigation. Despite Defendant's attempt to withdraw the motion based on a representation (not disclosed in the opinion) made by the Plaintiff in its sur-reply, the Court granted the Defendant's motion and required the Plaintiff to produce a member of its trial counsel for his deposition over this topic.

The Defendant originally sought to depose Plaintiff's trial counsel over information relating to his pre-filing investigation of the claims in the lawsuit. The pre-filing investigation included obtaining and photographing the accused product. According to the Plaintiff, the information obtained was never intended to be used as evidence of any actual infringement. In fact, the Plaintiff represented that its trial counsel would not be a witness nor would it use anything from his examination as evidence in the case. The Court noted that while normally this would end the inquiry regarding the necessity of the deposition, the Defendant had raised counterclaims asserting that the Plaintiff "has violated the antitrust laws by bringing suit against competitors without adequate justification in order to stifle competition."

Defendants moved to dismiss a patent infringement complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the theory that the complaint failed to allege facts showing that a single party performed each and every limitation of the method claim.

The district court noted that "the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has 'instructed that '[d]irect infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or element of a claimed method or product.' . . . Nevertheless, '[w]hen a defendant participates in or encourages infringement but does not directly infringe a patent, the normal recourse under the law is for the court to apply the standard for liability under indirect infringement. Indirect infringement requests, as a predicate, a finding that some party amongst the accused actors has committed the entire act of direct infringement.'" Thus, there is no finding of indirect infringement without a finding that there is a direct infringer.

In a patent case filed in the Eastern District of Texas by Eon Corporation IP Holdings, LLC ("Eon") against Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless ("Verizon"), along with other defendants, Eon moved to dismiss Verizon's inequitable conduct counterclaims and strike its inequitable conduct affirmative defenses. Magistrate Judge Love recommended that Eon's motion to dismiss be denied because Verizon's inequitable conduct claim was sufficiently pled.

Verizon's inequitable conduct was based on two separate instances. First, Verizon alleged that the sole inventor of the asserted '491 patent deliberately withheld his earlier patent from the U.S. Patent Office ("PTO") with the intent to deceive the PTO. Second, Verizon alleged that the '491 patent should be found unenforceable under the "infectious unenforceability" doctrine because it was obtained due to Eon's inequitable conduct of its parent patent application. In denying Eon's motion, the Magistrate held that Therasense did not substantially alter the pleading requirements and that Verizon sufficiently plead inequitable conduct under the standard set forth in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Oracle's damage expert was directed to submit a substitute expert report after his original report was excluded on a motion by Google because it failed to apportion the value of the asserted claims and instead used a total value of Java and Android in calculating damages. The substitute damages report calculated damages to be approximately $2.5 billion. Of this number, $200 million was for past patent infringement and an additional $205 million for future patent damages through the end of 2012. Google moved again to strike the damages expert report.

In terms of the patent damages, Google challenged the starting point of $100 million for the hypothetical negotiation instead of $28 million, which was the number in a draft agreement proposed by Sun (Oracle's predecessor) for a broad technology partnership between Sun and Google. The district court disagreed with Google, finding that Oracle's expert had reviewed the entire licensing history between the parties and noted that the $100 million offer was on the table during real-world negotiations.

Plaintiff Intertainer, Inc. brought an action for patent infringement against Defendant Hulu, LLC. Hulu moved to dismiss Intertainer's first amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In the first amended complaint, Intertainer alleged infringement of a patent entitled, "Method for Interactive Video Contention Programing," which according to the district court, "relates to a method of creating and streaming an interactive video stream permitting a user to view ancillary content, such as advertisements."

Intertainer also alleged that the interactive video program includes an interface which when selected, displays ancillary material for the user and interrupts the running of the video and when the user returns to watching the video content, the video program resumes streaming from the point in time at which it was interrupted. Intertainer's first amended complaint alleged that Hulu operated a website at www.hulu.com, which displays video content to users over the Internet and that the Hulu media player displays video content and video advertisements as well as advertising banners on its website.

Intertainer further alleged that users watching videos on the Hulu website can choose to view additional advertising content by clicking on the advertisement or the advertisement banner, which will then direct the user to another webpage displaying the advertisement content and will interrupt the streaming of the content from the web server. The video content can be resumed when the user returns to the Hulu website and clicks play. Intertainer contended that these steps directly infringed the patent-in-suit.

On September 16, 2011, President Obama enacted the much heralded "America Invents Act" ("AIA"). Although the AIA is recognized as the most significant patent reform legislation in years, a less heralded aspect of it was a series of five initiatives identified by President Obama intended to assist in the creations of jobs. Initiative 2, entitled "Nurture the High-Growth Enterprises that Create New Jobs" dealt with various issues including fostering the commercialization of inventions at universities. Specifically, Initiative 2 allows "university faculty to shop discoveries to any technology transfer office." This initiative, in its entirety, states:

America's colleges and universities, funded with federal dollars, have produced many of the great breakthroughs in clean energy, information technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology that have led to new industries and jobs across the country. However, all too often potentially groundbreaking research that could find market success lingers in university labs. The Counsel recommends allowing research that is funded with federal dollars to be presented to any university technology transfer office (not just the ones in which the research has taken place). Additionally, we recommend adding successful entrepreneurs to university academic staffs on 25 campuses nationwide; incentivizing the creation of 15 additional entrepreneurship centers like the University of Michigan's Center for Entrepreneurial Studies; and winning commitments from 25 universities in the next 12 months to use an "open-source" approach for researchers with government funding."

Plaintiff Internet Machines LLC ("iMac") filed a patent infringement action against several defendants including, among others, PLX Technology, Inc., ASUS Computer International and CDW Corp. alleging infringement of three patents that pertain to PCI Express switches. PLX manufactures the accused products while the remaining defendants distribute the products, incorporate the accused products into other devices or sell devices that incorporate the accused devices.

The defendants, other than PLX (the "Downstream Defendants"), moved to stay the litigation between themselves and iMac pending the resolution of iMac's claims against PLX. The Downstream Defendants argued that PLX, as the product manufacturer, was the only true defendant in the case and that the resolution of iMac's claims against PLX would moot any dispute between iMac and the Downstream Defendants. Based on a related case against PLX, iMac asserted that this was incorrect because PLX, in that other currently pending case, argued that it does not ship the accused products in an infringing state and that it is ignorant of any downstream configuration by its distributors or retailers. Based on this argument made by PLX, iMac asserted that a stay would therefore be inefficient and financially burdensome because it would require a second suit against the Downstream Defendants.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on lost profits challenging plaintiff's use of the entire market value rule. Defendant contended that plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the entire market value rule. Plaintiff asserted that the defendant was misapplying the entire market value rule and ignoring the evidence.

The district court began its analysis by quoting from the Federal Circuit's decision in Lucent that "[f]or the entire market value rule to apply, the patentee must prove that 'the patent-related feature is the basis for the customer demand.'" Lucent Techs, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The district court noted that "[p]laintiff acknowledges the language from Lucent that the entire market value rule does not apply unless the patent-related feature is the basis for the customer demand, but argues the rule is not as narrow as that language suggests."

Plaintiff Tyco Healthcare Group and United States Surgical Corporation moved to disqualify defendant Ethicon Endo-Surgery's attorneys of record (the law firm of Akin Gump). Tyco based the motion to disqualify on the ground that Akin Gump had improper access to privileged and confidential information of Tyco because Akin Gump hired and used a trial presentation technology consultant who had worked on a related trial involving the same patents four years earlier.

In the previous related case, Tyco's counsel hired TrialGraphix to assist Tyco's counsel with presenting witnesses and exhibits in a December 2007 bench trial. As a result, a trial technician provided by TrialGraphix worked directly with Tyco and Tyco's attorneys. During and in preparation for the bench trial, the trial technician worked closely with the Tyco trial team and received confidential and privileged information.

In an effort to encourage more participation from less experienced attorneys, the District of Massachusetts has several judges adopting standing orders that strongly encourage the participation of relatively inexperienced attorneys. Judge Casper is the most recent judge in the District of Massachusetts to adopt such a standing order.

Judge Casper explained the reason for the standing order: "The decline in courtroom opportunities for newer lawyers is widely recognized and is one of concern to both the bench and bar. A Task Force of the Boston Bar Association acknowledged this much in its report, "Jury Trial Trends in Massachusetts: The Need to Ensure Jury Trial Competency Among Practicing Attorneys as a Result of the Vanishing Jury Trial Phenomenon, issued in 2006. As a result of its year-long work exploring the statistical and anecdotal evidence regarding the rate of jury trials over time, the Task Force concluded that 'the vanishing jury trial is actually affecting the jury trial experience of current and future generations of practitioners and made recommendations to courts, lawyers and clients to remedy this issue. Among its recommendations to the judiciary, the Task Force called upon 'judges presiding over pre-trial conferences and related matters to identify and encourage opportunities for a junior attorney to participate in the examination of witnesses and other significant trial work.'

Plaintiff TiVo brought an emergency motion to compel production of an e-mail that defendant AT&T produced and then clawed back pursuant to a protective order agreed to by the parties. During a deposition, TiVo marked an e-mail as an exhibit and questioned the deponent for several minutes about the e-mail before AT&T's counsel demanded that TiVo return the e-mail. AT&T's counsel explained that the e-mail may be subject to a common interest agreement with a third party. TiVo returned the e-mail pursuant to the parties' protective order.

TiVo subsequently moved to compel the e-mail arguing that it did not contain attorney-client privileged or work product information. TiVo pointed out that neither the sender nor the recipient are attorneys and the subject matter of the email did not contain legal advice. In addition, the e-mail was created for a business purpose and not for purposes of litigation and therefore could not be work product. TiVo also argued that the e-mail was discoverable under the crime-fraud exception because the contents of the e-mail constitute prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.

In Degelman Industries Ltd. v. Pro-Tech Welding and Fabrication, Inc., et al., plaintiff Degelman sued the defendants for patent infringement of various utility and design patents related to moving blades used in heavy equipment such as bulldozers and snowplows. 06-CV-6346T (W.D.N.Y.). The parties filed a litany of motions for summary judgment, motions to strike and motions to preclude expert testimony and reports. Most interestingly, and the subject covered herein, was the latter motion by Degelman to preclude the testimony and expert reports of defendants' experts, Nicholas P. Godici and Alan P. Douglas, both experienced patent examiners at the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

Defendants had proffered Godici and Douglas as experts not only on patent office practice but also as experts on patent validity and inequitable conduct. Degelman moved to preclude their testimony on all topics, but as to the issue of inequitable conduct, moved to preclude because neither was an attorney and thus neither could speak to the legal issues of inequitable conduct. And as to invalidity, Degelman moved to preclude their testimony because neither was an expert in the particular technical subject matter of the patents.

The district court issued a stay pending reexamination of an inter partes reexamination of the patent at issue in the litigation. Plaintiff filed a motion to lift the district court's stay pending re-examination based on the argument that the reexamination was nearly complete because an office action had issued invalidating many of the claims, but not all of them.

Defendants responded by asserting that the reexamination process was not yet complete and that either party to the reexamination could appeal a recent office action that had issued. In addition, one of the defendants to the action informed the court that it would appeal the office action that had issued from the PTO.