Patent Lawyer Blog

The court had previously granted Apple's motion to compel Samsung to produce the source code for Samsung's accused products. Apple moved to compel a second time and sought issue preclusion sanctions for Samsung's failure to produce source code. The court decided to focus on Samsung's failure to produce code for its "design-around" products. The court focused on design-arounds because by "their very nature design-arounds impact key questions of liability, damages, and injunctive relief."

The court noted that its previous order had required Samsung to produce all source code for all accused products by December 31, 2011. Samsung did not produce the source code for the design-around products until March, 12, 2012: "Samsung did not produce source code for its '891 and '163 design-around until March 10 and 12, 2012 - after the close of fact discovery - knowing full well that the court would not grant the parties any exceptions. Samsung offers no explanation why it could not produce code in commercial release months before the deadline, or produce other code in commercial release until months after the deadline. Samsung also offers no explanation why it failed to bring any source code production problems to the court's attention as soon as practicable and instead put the onus on Apple to seek relief."

Apple sought sanctions against Samsung pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) in two separate motions pertaining to alleged violations of discovery orders, including an order regarding discovery on damages. The court had initially ordered Samsung to produce two categories of documents: (1) documents from the custodial files of Samsung designers of the Samsung products at issue during the preliminary injunction motion referencing the Apple products alleged by Apple to embody one or more of the ornamental or utility features claimed in the patents; and (2) all survey documents from central or custodial files that reference the Apple products-in-issue. After this order, Apple contended that the Samsung production was still woefully inadequate and the court issued a further order directing Samsung to comply by December 31, 2011 and stating that failure to comply would subject Samsung to sanctions.

The court ultimately agreed that Samsung had failed to comply with the court's orders, even though there was significant burden on Samsung due to the compressed case schedule. "The scale of Samsung's production and the burden placed on it by the compressed case schedule and the numerous claims at issues . . . That burden, however, does not negate Samsung's obligation to comply with no fewer than two court orders specifying the production of documents that reference Apple's products claimed to embody the features and designs at issue. As this court has stated under similar circumstances, '[o]nce the order compelling production issues, the focus of this court's appropriate inquiry necessarily shifts to compliance.' Notwithstanding Samsung's efforts, the court agrees with Apple that Samsung's production as of October 7 and December 31, 2011 failed to comply with the Court's orders."

Plaintiff Schering Corp. ("Schering") filed a patent infringement action against Apotex Inc. ("Apotex"). Schering brought a motion contending that Apotex spoliated relevant evidence. The motion was based on the omission of allegedly relevant evidence from Apotex' expert report. The expert report was served in October 2011 and Schering notified Apotex of the alleged spoliation a few days after the report was served. Apotex responded to the letter and stated that it had no other additional information to provide because the expert did not save the slides that he analyzed.

Schering did not bring the alleged spoliation to the court's attention for several months. The court found that this delay was significant and that Schering had not adequately explained the delay. "Schering fails to adequately explain why it waited for months, and until the eve of trial, to bring this alleged spoliation to the attention of the Court."

Defendant was the sole named inventor of the patent in suit. Plaintiff brought a claim for inventorship, alleging that he was the co-inventor of the patent. The parties cross moved for summary judgment and for sanctions.

The defendant and plaintiff maintained a business relationship for approximately 15 years, with plaintiff agreeing to pay the defendant $5000 in consulting fees in connection with the plaintiff's idea for a video product to be used in automobile marketing. Defendant would act as a consultant and advise the plaintiff how to build the system. Defendant in fact designed the system, hired one or more computer programmers and had the system built.

In three patent cases brought by the same plaintiff, Raylon LLC, against numerous defendants, Judge Davis of the Eastern District of Texas denied Rule 11 sanctions and motions for attorneys' fees under Section 285 of the Patent Statute, and Section 1927 of Title 28.

Following the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, Defendants filed motions contending that Raylon's infringement theory was "so legally untenable" that fees and costs should be awarded under Sections 285 and 1927. Defendants earlier had filed a Rule 11 motion seeking sanctions. Raylon asserted U.S. Patent No. 6,655,589 ("the '589 patent") against all of the defendants. All of the claims of the '589 patent require a "display being pivotably mounted on said housing." Raylon argued that this should be construed to mean "an electronic device attached to a housing that visually presents information and allows the display to be moved or pivoted relative to the viewer's perspective" and alleged that infringement was found where the entire device, not just the display, could be pivoted to the view. Defendant EZ Tag sought a construction of the term to mean that "an integral computer screen which can move positions with regard to the computer housing and is not maintained in a fixed position." The remaining defendants argued that it should mean "the display must be mounted on the housing and the mounting of the display on the housing must be pivotable so that the display and housing may pivot with respect to each other." The Court construed the term as "the display must be mounted on the housing so that the display and housing may pivot with respect to each other." Because it was undisputed that all of the defendants' accused products had displays that were rigidly mounted as to the housing, the court granted summary judgment of noninfringement, both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents.

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit for patent infringement, unfair competition and breach of fiduciary duty against several defendants, including AIM Sports. Plaintiffs design, develop and distribute firearm related tools, accessories and sporting optics. Defendants and plaintiffs had a business relationship that permitted Defendants to access trade secret information that belonged to the plaintiffs, including trade secrets regarding manufacturing, product development and plaintiffs' patented products. After the plaintiffs sued defendants for patent infringement and settled the lawsuit, plaintiffs discovered that defendants had formed a new company that continued to infringe the patent and violated the settlement agreement.

After both parties filed motions to compel the production of documents, the Magistrate Judge granted both motions in part and denied both motions in part. Plaintiffs' motion with respect to two of the requests was denied because the defendants represented in declarations signed under penalty of perjury that they had no responsive documents. Plaintiffs then conducted fact witness depositions and alleged, after conducting these depositions, that defendants had withheld responsive documents and that declarations filed with the district court were false. At this point, the Magistrate Judge granted plaintiffs' motion, ordered the production of the responsive documents and ordered defendants to file new declarations. When the defendants failed to produce the financial and design documents sought and filed no new declarations, the plaintiffs moved for monetary sanctions and evidentiary sanctions.

Plaintiffs and defendant manufacture machines that automatically inspect integrated circuits made on semiconductor wafers. Plaintiffs sued defendant for patent infringement and a jury found that the patent was valid and infringed, but did not find that the infringement was willful.

After the jury verdict, the defendant notified its sales force of the verdict and emphasized that the process was not over and that no judgment had been entered. Plaintiffs notified the defendant that it would consider any sales that occurred after the jury verdict evidence of willful infringement. Several months later, the district court denied defendant's post-trial motions and entered judgment for plaintiffs based on the jury verdict. The district court also entered a permanent injunction. Despite the permanent injunction, the defendant continued to sell the infringing product by meeting with potential customers in the United States who planned to use the machine in other parts of the world. The plaintiffs moved for contempt.

Plaintiff brought a patent infringement action alleging direct infringement of a single patent. The defendant, a corporation, sought an extension of time to respond to the complaint through a request from its CEO. Because corporations cannot represented themselves and must instead be represented by a licensed attorney, the district court denied the requested extension and ordered the defendant to answer within 30 days. A few months later, the CEO of the defendant filed an extension request in order to complete a re-examination of the plaintiff's patent even though there was no re-examination request pending before the Patent and Trademark Office. The defendant still had not filed an answer to the complaint.

In response, the plaintiff requested that the district court enter a default judgment against the defendant and to set a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff and whether a permanent injunction should issue. More than a week later, the defendant, through an attorney, filed an answer to the complaint. Plaintiff moved to strike the answer because the defendant had failed to seek leave of court to files its late answer. The district court denied plaintiff's motion and permitted the defendant to answer the complaint.

In a patent infringement action, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the on sale bar and dismissed plaintiff's claims with prejudice. Defendants then requested that the district court find the case exceptional due plaintiff's litigation misconduct. Based on that misconduct, the district court found that the case was exceptional. Defendants then moved for an award of $800,000 in attorneys' fees.

The district court noted under 35 U.S.C. § 285, it may in exceptional cases award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. To do so, the court must first determine that there is clear and convincing evidence that the case is exceptional and then the court must exercise its discretion in determining whether an award of fees is justified. The district court also noted that "[l]itigation misconduct and unprofessional behavior may suffice, by themselves, to make a case exceptional under § 285" but "[i]n cases deemed exceptional only on the basis of litigation misconduct, however, the amount of the award must bear some relation to the extension of the misconduct."

After a serious delay by the defendant in providing discovery, the district court granted plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's answer and enter a default judgment. The district court found that the defendant continually mislead the plaintiff and the court regarding its discovery obligations and caused the case to be delayed for several years by doing so. "This Court gave [defendant] numerous opportunities to provide the requested documents, yet it chose to produce incomplete responses. . . . [Defendant] and [its counsel] affirmatively misled Plaintiffs -- and more importantly, this Court -- as to the production of documents and compliance with Court orders. . . . By failing to provide the discovery as ordered, [defendant] has prevented Plaintiffs from pursuing their claims and delayed this litigation for nearly seven years."