Articles Posted in Discovery

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In this patent infringement action, Apple moved to exclude Masimo’s damage theory on lost profits for failure to disclose during discovery. As explained by the district court, Masimo presented its lost profits theory based on the equation: “Lost profits = Apple Watch units sold x Masimo’s per-unit profit.” Masimo claimed that the equation breaks down and is supported as follows:

  • Apple Watch units sold from Q4 2018 to Q1 2023 (i.e., from the first sale of an Apple Watch to present), including Series 4-7
  • Masimo’s sensor module price of $100
  • Masimo’s gross profit margin (overall as a company) of 65% (or, alternatively, subtracting the cost to build each sensor module from the $100 price)

The district court analyzed whether each of these “building blocks” were adequately disclosed by Masimo.

With respect to the first building block, sold units of Apple Watches, the district court determined “that Plaintiffs did not disclose during fact or expert discovery (1) the subset of Apple Watch models and sales units on which they now intend to rely at trial; or (2) an explanation of why this subset of units properly informs lost profits.” Masimo’s reliance on Apple’s disclosure of total watches sold was insufficient because Massimo was not contending that all watches were part of the lost profits theory. Continue reading

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In this patent infringement action, Plaintiff Eagle Eyes Traffic Industry USA Holding LLC (“Eagle Eyes”) filed a motion for an order compelling Defendant E-Go Bike LLC (“E-Go”) to provide responses to Eagle Eyes’ requests for production of documents (“RFPs”), interrogatories (“rogs”), and requests for admission (“RFAs”).   After noting that E-Go’s counsel conceded that the requests were properly served by e-mail, the court addressed E-Go’s explanation for failing to respond to the discovery:

E-Go’s explanation for its failure to respond is that the company ceased operations toward the end of last year, and it was difficult for U.S.-based counsel to obtain information from the pertinent former E-Go employee due to Covid lockdown in Shanghai and surrounding cities. That is a reasonable explanation for why it was difficult to produce documents or provide substantive information that counsel did not possess. But it does not constitute an explanation for why U.S. counsel based in Pleasanton, California did not serve written responses and objections. Drafting objections is an exercise of legal judgment under U.S. law, and a Chinese ex-employee would have been no help with that anyway.

The court then turned to appropriate remedies.  The court noted that there was no good cause for failing to submit objections to requests (even if substantive responses could not have been provided) and therefore found that any objections to requests were now waived. Continue reading

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In this patent infringement action, Plaintiff Personalized Media Communications, LLC (“PMC”) filed a motion seeking (1) a court order compelling Defendant Netflix Inc. (“Netflix”) to provide PMC with on-site access to Netflix’s source code after the close of fact discovery or, in the alternative, (2) an extension of the fact discovery deadline to allow review of the source code. Netflix opposed the motion asserting that PMC should have completed review of the source code prior to the close of fact discovery and that there was no good cause to extend the fact discovery deadline.

In support of its positon, PMC did not cite to any case law that supported its argument that a party producing confidential source code through on-site access procedures must allow further review of this source code after the fact discovery deadline. The district court did not find persuasive the cases cited by PMC, which concern inspection of physical sites rather than review of confidential source code. Continue reading

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Plaintiff, Fox Factory, moved to amend its final infringement contentions, asserting that the defendant, SRAM, LLC, had failed to produce relevant information regarding its custom “BRAIN” product that had delayed Fox Factory from learning that the BRAIN product infringed the patent-in-suit. SRAM opposed the motion and contended that Fox Factory was well aware of the BRAIN product before the amendment deadline and that SRAM had no obligation to craft or intuit Fox Factory’s infringement position.

In analyzing whether there was good cause to permit the amendment, the court first looked at whether Fox Factory was diligent—and found that it was not. “Strikingly, Plaintiff’s arguments https://patentlaw.jmbm.com/files/2019/04/white-vintage-wheel-retro-old-bicycle-519554-pxhere.com-cc0-04.09.2019-crop-300x300.jpgsidestep its own knowledge—and when it gained such knowledge—about the existence and functionality of Defendants’ customized BRAIN shock for Specialized. Instead, FOX Factory seeks to direct the court’s attention to Defendants’ discovery shortcomings. But in considering good cause, this court first focuses on whether the original deadline could have been met with reasonable diligence by Plaintiffs, not any bad faith by Defendants. Colorado Visionary Academy, 194 F.R.D. at 687. Using this framework, based on the record before it, this court is not persuaded that FOX Factory exercised adequate diligence to warrant amendment of its Final Infringement Contentions at this late juncture.”

In reaching the conclusion that Fox Factory was not diligent, the court specifically noted that “FOX Factory carefully never argues it only learned of Defendants’ BRAIN shock at the end of the discovery period. Indeed, the record before this court belies any suggestion that FOX Factory’s knowledge of the BRAIN shock was dependent upon Defendants’ disclosures late in discovery. And while FOX Factory vigorously argues that it was diligent in pursuing Defendants’ identification of all its rear shock products so that it could pursue discovery and understand the full scope of infringement, Plaintiff never cogently explains why its own internal document related to competitive analysis from September 28, 2017 is insufficient to constitute knowledge of the BRAIN product and trigger its own independent obligation to diligently pursue discovery on the topic.”

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8-o-clock-alarm-clock-analogue-1198264-300x200In this patent infringement action, the defendant, Playmonster LLC (“Playmonster”), requested that the district court stay discovery during the pendency of its forthcoming dispositive motion. As part of its request, Playmonster contended that a dispositive motion “would be the most efficient resolution of this case,” and that a stay of discovery would promote judicial efficiency and conserve the Parties’ resources, which would include reducing the attorney’s fees that would be spent on the case should the dispositive motion be granted.

The plaintiffs, Quality Innovative Products, LLC (“Quality”), opposed the stay of discovery in the case.  As its main argument, the plaintiffs asserted that the case was filed over a year ago, “and the Defendant has enjoyed substantial delay already while it pursued a first dispositive motion” that it used “as an excuse not to comply with its discovery obligations.”  Quality further argued that they “should not have to piece meal litigation for the convenience of the Defendant.” Quality also asserted that they oppose filing of dispositive motions until discovery closes.

The district court concluded that a stay of discovery was inappropriate.  “The court is disinclined to stay discovery pending the filing of a dispositive motion. While Defendant may file a dispositive motion at any time it deems appropriate on or before the set deadline, the court’s practice standards do limit parties to one dispositive motion without leave of the court. See NYW Civ Practice Standards 56.1. In addition, leave to file additional dispositive motions is only granted in exceptional circumstances. See id. Further, stays of discovery in this District are generally disfavored, see Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coutu, No. 17-CV-00209-RM-NYW, 2017 WL 3283090, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 2, 2017), and nothing in the record before the court at this juncture justifies a stay.”

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TC Technology filed a patent infringement action against Sprint alleging that Sprint infringed a patent pertaining to wireless services used on an LTE network. The complaint did not allege willful infringement.

171030-JMBM-14-Jill-Skinner-001-300x269During discovery, Sprint responded that it had received an email several years before the lawsuit was filed with an offer to purchase the patent-in-suit. An attachment to the email identified and described the patent-in-suit. Although the general counsel for Sprint forwarded the email and attachment to several Sprint employees, Sprint explained that it believed the attachment was never opened. TC Technology took the deposition of one of these employees and then filed a motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for willful infringement. Because the motion was filed after the cut-off established to amend the pleadings, TC Technology could not amend the complaint without a showing of good cause.

During deposition, the Sprint witness (Mr. Ball) testified that “there was no way to verify one way or the other” whether the attachment had been opened, other than the recollections of himself, Mr. Wunsch, and Mr. Cowan that it was not opened. As explained by the district court, Mr. Ball also testified that he did not think he, Mr. Wunsch, or Mr. Cowan would have opened the attachment in the normal course of business.

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https://patentlaw.jmbm.com/files/2019/01/background-close-up-court-1415558-pexels-CC0-01.14.2019-1-300x201.jpgIn this patent infringement action, the plaintiff, Whirlpool Properties (“Whirlpool”) noticed several depositions of third-party witnesses near the discovery cut-off.  The defendant, Filters Fast, moved for an order to stop the depositions.

As explained by the district court, “[t]he crux of the pending motion is that the Whirlpool Plaintiffs emailed Defendant on November 28, 2018, the dispositive motions deadline, attaching two third-party deposition subpoenas that noticed depositions for December 6 in Windsor, Va. and December 7 in Simpsonville, S.C.  Defendant contends that Plaintiffs had never identified these potential witnesses, nor even disclosed the possibility of deposing them.  Moreover, Defendant notes that these newly noticed depositions overlapped with already scheduled depositions of Whirlpool witnesses to be held in Chicago, Il. on December 5, 7, and 11. According to Defendant, Whirlpool Plaintiffs then emailed a notice on December 2, regarding a third third-party witness it intended to depose in Texas on December 11 or 12.”

In opposition, Whirlpool asserted that witnesses in question “were disclosed within three days of confirming them for depositions.”  Whirlpool argued that the notice of depositions in dispute here was “reasonable under the circumstances.” ((citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(1)).  Whirlpool further argued that the third-party depositions could have been conducted by the parties’ stipulated extension of the discovery deadline – December 12, 2018. Whirlpool also contended that the depositions address non-complicated issues that would require minimal preparation.

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In this patent infringement action, Teva inadvertently produced documents to Sunovion. Teva subsequently attempted to claw back the documents under the parties’ protective order. Sunovion moved to compel the inadvertently produced documents.

In analyzing the motion to compel, the district court noted that it had “reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Discovery Confidentiality Order (DCO), and, in particular, paragraphs 28 and 30 of the DCO.” The district court further noted that “[t]hese paragraphs are applicable to the instant matter insofar as they refer to notice ‘promptly after its discovery’ and ‘prompt remedial action’ in the event of an inadvertent disclosure.”
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Plaintiff Krausz Industries Ltd. (“Krausz”) filed a motion for an order compelling Defendants Smith-Blair, Inc. and Sensus USA, Inc. (collectively “Smith-Blair”) to allow discovery into various attorney-client communications and work product related to an advice of counsel defense.

Although the parties agreed that raising an advice of counsel defense can result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, the parties disagreed about the scope of the waiver. Smith-Blair asserted that any waiver should be limited to communications and related work product between Smith-Blair and its opinion counsel on the issue of noninfringement that occurred before litigation began.
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The plaintiff filed an ex parte application to be relieved of admissions that were deemed admitted for failure to respond.

In analyzing the ex parte application, the district court first concluded that the plaintiff had not justified the filing of an ex parte application rather than a noticed motion. “Plaintiff has not shown Plaintiff’s ‘case will be irreparably prejudiced if the underlying motion is heard according to regular noticed motion procedures.’ Mission Power, 883 F. Supp. at 492. To the contrary, there is no mention anywhere in the Application or supporting declaration that there is any crisis or emergency warranting ex parte relief, nor does it appear to the Court that Plaintiff’s case would be ‘irreparably prejudiced’ if the underlying motion were heard according to regular noticed motion procedures. Moreover, to the extent there is any crisis, Plaintiff has not shown it is ‘without fault in creating the crisis that requires ex parte relief, or that the crisis occurred as a result of excusable neglect.’ Id.
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