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Plaintiff Trading Technologies International, Inc. (“TT”) moved to strike the invalidity expert report of the defendant, CQG. TT made two arguments its motion: “(1) that Dr. Mellor failed to conduct a proper written description analysis because, according to TT, he incorrectly focuses on features that are not recited in the claims and concludes that there is no written description to support the unclaimed features; and (2) that Dr. Mellor failed to consider the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art in his written description analysis.”

CQG responded that TT mischaracterized Dr. Mellor’s opinions and that Dr. Mellor correctly applied the written description test to determine whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand whether the inventors were in possession of TT’s asserted Static Limitation. CQG further asserted that TT misrepresented Dr. Mellor’s explanation of a person of ordinary skill in the art and offered no explanation why the district court should adopt TT’s definition.
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Plaintiffs Versata Software, Inc. and Versata Development Group, Inc. (collectively, “Versata”) filed a patent infringement action in July 2012 against defendant Callidus Software, Inc. (“Callidus”) The patents were all characterized as “covered business method patents.”

Callidus filed a challenged to the validity of the patents-in-suit in August 2013, pursuant to the “covered business method” (“CBM”) patent review process provided for under the America Invents Act. As explained by the district court, “[t]he CBM petitions were filed by Callidus some 13 months after suit was filed and after Callidus had instituted a motion practice which included motions to dismiss and/or transfer. On March 4, 2014, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) granted review of the patents-in-suit, finding it more likely than not that the challenged claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter and, therefore, unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”
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In this patent infringement action between Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. (“Golden Bridge or GBT”) against Apple, Golden Bridge’s counsel moved to withdraw as counsel of record because Golden Bridge had failed to pay the legal bills. As explained by the court, “[s]ince this case appeared on the undersigned’s docket, Plaintiff Golden Bridge Technology Inc. has been represented by attorneys from the McKool Smith firm. With GBT’s consent, McKool now seeks to withdraw as GBT counsel based on the client’s failure to pay its bills.”

Although the court was sympathetic to the plight of the attorneys, it did not believe that granting the request to withdraw was appropriate. “This court is quite sympathetic to the idea that attorneys ordinarily should not be made to work for free. But here two key factors weigh against granting McKool’s withdrawal request. First, no other attorneys have appeared for GBT. Even in the time since McKool filed its motion, no new attorneys have appeared. Second, trial is upon us. Jury selection is May 30, and opening statements are set for the following Monday. All pretrial motions have been briefed, and the parties are set to appear for a final pretrial conference this Friday.”
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HTC Corporation and HTC America, Inc. (“HTC”) moved for a finding that this patent infringement action is “exceptional” under the Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision which authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases.” 35 U.S.C. § 285.

The district court had previously found that the patents in suit were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct before the patent office. Intellect Wireless, Inc., v. HTC Corp., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d, 732 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The prior rulings establish prima facie support for a finding of an exceptional case. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). As a result, the district court had granted HTC’s request for additional limited document discovery was granted.
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In this patent infringement action, the district court concluded that the parties were over-litigating the case and matters were only getting worse as trial got closer. “The Court’s previously stated concern that the parties are over-litigating this case is growing. 18 motions in limine were filed, and 15 were denied. A few days before trial, an ex parte motion was filed concerning discovery. After agreeing long ago at the Scheduling Conference that the trial should last 8 days, the parties recently asked for a much longer trial or trials, even though the case has been greatly simplified through motion practice. The number of documents on the docket in this case is approaching 350. The parties’ continual expansion of the remaining issues in dispute retroactively waste the substantial resources the Court has committed to resolving the multitude of disputes the parties have presented.”

The district court also expressed concern that the parties were not simplifying the issues for the jury. “Rather than viewing billions and billions of stars, they need to be told about the constellations that unify and simplify. This is not happening in this case, and the Court believes effectiveness in front of the jury will thus be diminished. This case is being over-litigated, particularly considering the amount involved.”
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After the district court granted a motion to compel in which it overruled the defendants’ objections and ordered the defendants to provide complete responses to the interrogatories and to produce all responsive documents, the defendants provided supplemental responses but renewed the overruled objections and asserted additional objections that were not previously made. The district court found that renewing overruled objections and asserting new objections not previously made was disingenuous, but did note that the supplemental answers were comprehensive.

The district court found that there were still problems with the supplemental responses, including that “the defendants responded to requests to identify documents supporting interrogatory answers by referring” to “the documents already in disclosure, as well as those which will be provided by supplementation as discovery in this case progresses.” The district court found this inadequate. “The defendants’ response fails either to identify adequately the documents to be examined or to segregate and produce, on an interrogatory-by-interrogatory basis, the responsive document and produce them for inspection.”
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Novartis sought to use the deposition testimony of defendant’s expert at trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(4)(B). As explained by the district court, “the Rule provides that a party may use the deposition of a witness for any purpose” if “the witness is more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or trial or is outside the United States, unless it appears that the witness’s absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.” FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(B). “[A] conclusion that a party has procured the absence of a witness requires a finding that the party ‘actively took steps to keep the deponents from setting foot in the courtroom,’ and ‘procuring absence and doing nothing to facilitate presence are quite different things.'” Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 2012 WL 1161125, at *2 (D.N.H. Apr. 6, 2012) (quoting Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1988)).

The district court then noted that Dr. Kibbe was an expert witness on obviousness for the defense in a case that went to trial in August 2013. The defendant here, Par, had its case stayed on the morning of trial because Par and Novartis had purportedly reached a settlement agreement. The trial against another defendant then proceeded without Par’s presence, and Dr. Kibbe testified as scheduled.
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After the jury returned a verdict of approximately $390 million against SAP and the verdict was affirmed on appeal, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) preliminarily invalidated the patent (subject to appeal to the Federal Circuit). As a result, SAP moved to stay the execution of the judgment or, in the alternative, to vacate the judgment.
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In this patent infringement action, both parties moved to redact information from the transcripts and both motions were unopposed. The district court found that the information should be redacted because it had been disclosed in open court.

In reaching this conclusion, the district court noted that there were procedures in place on redacting personal information, such as social security numbers, from transcripts. “The Eastern District has procedures to redact personal information from transcripts. See The Ohio Willow Wood Company v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 9:07-CV-274, Docket No. 27 (Clark, J.); Transcript Procedures for Attorneys (2008)1; Local Rule CV-5.2. The policy protects four categories of personal data identifiers, namely social security and taxpayer-identification numbers, dates of birth, initials of minor children, and financial account numbers.”
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Having obtained a $1.5 billion judgment and an ongoing royalty against Marvell, Carnegie Mello University (“CMU”) sought to liquidated the ongoing royalty amount in the Final Judgment. In response, Marvell argued that the district court made clear in its decision that such ongoing royalties are to be dealt with as a separate matter. The parties are battling over these amounts as they will impact the amount of the supersedas bond, which will be a very significant amount given the damage award.

The district court agreed with Marvell, finding that the ongoing royalties should be addressed as a separate matter and not be liquidated in the Final Judgment. “To this end, as the Court recounted in its decision of March 31, 2014, through its various post-trial motions, CMU sought supplemental damages for damages which accrued from July 2012 until the date of the initial Judgment in this case, i.e., January 14, 2013, and the Court awarded supplemental damages of $79,550,288.00, a figure which represented the supplemental damages for the infringement until that date. (Docket No. 933]).”
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